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ABSTRACT
The traditional approach in economic Sovietology has emphasised the ideological 
content, corresponding to the major "isms", such as, capitalism, socialism and 
communism, and regarded property relations as the essential element in distinguishing 
systems. However, from an organisational viewpoint, the economic experience in both 
East and West have more in common. The difference is lying in degree of government 
involvement in individual economic decision-making, not in fundamental kind. In this 
context, my first attempt is to develop a general politico-economic model, indicating 
and emphasising dynamic interrelations between collective political processes and 
individual economic activities in a political economy. The methodological and 
theoretical approach and theories of the ‘modern political economy’ is applied to 
understand the real nature and problem of the Soviet system as an extreme model of 
‘non-market’ government-command system. With this unified conceptual and 
analytical framework, the tme nature and actual operation of the Soviet government- 
directed model are examined, indicating its intrinsic information and incentive 
problems.
The evolution of the Soviet government directed socialist system was the outcome of 
the Soviet regime’s ultimate goal: rapid economic growth to catch up the advanced 
Western countries while maintaining and strengthening the political and economic 
dictatorship of the Communist Party. This government-directed politico-economic 
model was designed and intended for the party leadership to direct the whole political 
economy in order to achieve these goal as fast as possible. Its basic nature can be 
characterised by the totalitarian political nature under the dictatorship of the Communist 
Party and the government-directed economic nature, such as the centralised economic 
hierarchy, the government planning mechanism, and the socialist motivation 
mechanism. However, the Soviet government planning mechanism, without an active 
role of market mechanism, was unable to provide sufficient information to economic 
actors concerning co-ordination errors and any incentive weapons to eliminate these 
errors. In practice, the Soviet economic participants possessed neither sufficient 
information nor incentives to appraise the alternative use of scarce resources in 
production.
These information and incentive problems were likely to generate clironic co-ordination 
problems in individual economic activities, which induced unique intrinsic economic 
phenomena: ‘economic bureaucratism’, ‘centralised pluralism’, ‘non-scarcity 
information’, ‘supply uncertainty’, ‘success indicator problems’, ‘soft budget 
constraints’, and ‘economic security’. Conff'onted with these conditions, each 
participant, in practice, engaged in operational ‘opportunistic behaviours’ in activities 
of ‘tactical planning’, ‘securing plan-fulfilment’, and ‘low incentive work’, which were 
often not compatible with the intended goals. The outcomes were just ‘extensive’ and 
‘intensive’ aspects were neglected. For that reason, the party leadership turned its 
attention towards raising efficiency through better utilisation of inputs, increasing the 
quality of products and opening up for technological innovation in the production units. 
Notwithstanding the reform policies o f ‘further perfection’ and later ‘perestroika’, the 
regime’s attempted reform within the framework of the government-directed model 
failed and the regime collapsed dramatically. This grand Soviet experience would 
provide us with important general lessons for long-term stability and dynamism in any 
political economy
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INTRODUCTION
The history of the twentieth century has been hugely affected by the rise and fall of the
Soviet-type system of political economy and is now being poweiiully affected by the
consequences of its transformation to the new form of political economy. The advent
of the communist regime in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and its
spread to Eastern Europe and China after World War II spawned the new fields of
Sovietology, including the economics of socialist central planning and comparative
economic systems. The work in these fields was canied out for several decades amidst
the shifting, highly politicised, and ideologically charged atmospherics of the Cold War.
Over the years, specialists on the Soviet economy have tried to formulate paradigms for
understanding how the Soviet-type economic system worked without market exchange
and for predicting their likely future performance. Their efforts produced a huge
literature, often controversial, detailing our understandings of this Soviet-type non-
market economy, measuring its performance and relative achievements overtime, and
analysing and interpreting economic developments and policy actions as they unfolded1throughout the Cold War.
The felt need for some sort of paradigm, that would enable us better to understand and
predict the behaviour of the Soviet-type (largely non-market) economy, produced a
parade of “models.” Gregory Grossman applied the paradigm of the “command
2economy” and developed “a Theory of the Command Economy.” With the resurgence
■of mathematical economics in the Soviet Union in 1960s, there as well as in the West 
the Soviet economy came to be characterised as the “imperative” or “directive” type of 
government planning economy, in contrast to the “indicative” planning practised in 
some market economies. Although the term “centrally planned economy” was 
commonly applied to the Soviet economy up to the end, the usefulness of that term as a 
general paradigm always was diminished by observations of large and frequent
3deviations between plans and their implementation in practice. Accordingly, focusing 
on the practical problems of central planning in the Soviet economy, two theoretical 
paradigms were proposed: that of the permanent “shortage economy” developed by 
Janos Kornai and that of the “general disequilibrium” economy elaborated prominently
I
4by Richard Portes.
The Soviet-type economic system has also often been described by the inseparability of 
economy from the politics, as Alec Nove argued that “Politics and economics, political 
organs and managerial functions, do indeed intertwine.” In accordance, some 
scholars adapted the paradigms of other disciplines and sought firameworks that are
more general. Robert Campbell attempted to develop a general theory of the
6“administered economy.” In the same context. Rush Greenslade argued that the 
Soviet economy should be viewed as a huge collection of bureaucracies in a hierarchy 
and might best be understood in terms of the theory of bureaucracy being developed in
7the West. Following from this, the development by political scientists of pluralistic, 
interest-group models to analyse communist societies stimulated efforts by economists
to employ theories of bargaining and game theory to elucidate the workings of the
8economy, focusing on the behaviour of Soviet bureaucracy. Paul Gregory, for 
instance, used a principal-agent approach derived from the economics of regulation to
9characterise relations among Soviet economic institutions. Considerable attention 
among economists and political scientists in Sovietology has thus been devoted to 
recognition both to ‘bureaucratic pluralism’ in the policy process and to the centrality of 
the interaction between politics and economics in the Soviet system.
The paradigms and models in economic Sovietology have provided analytical 
foundation to understand how the Soviet-type economy was operating without active 
market exchange and co-ordination. In spite of their contributions. Sovietology, 
particularly in economy, has come under attack from many quarters in the wake of the 
collapse of the Soviet-type economy in 1980s. The criticisms cover the range from 
failure to predict the demise of the Soviet-type economic system and overestimation of
its performance in a variety of areas to a failure to understand the ‘true’ nature of the
10Soviet-type system itself. Reflecting heavily the ideologically charged and highly 
politicised atmospherics of the Cold War, scholars had focused on the antagonistic 
concepts and characteristics distinguishing their systems from other systems, such as 
‘capitalism versus socialism’, ‘market versus planning’, and ‘democracy versus 
totalitarianism’. They, therefore, failed to grasp the common structural problems in
government managed economies that even appeared severely in the Soviet-type 
government command economy. From an organisational viewpoint, the economic 
experience in both East and West have more in common than is generally recognised. 
The difference is lying in degree of government involvement in individual economic 
decision-making, and is not fondamental in kind.
In this context, my first attempt is to develop a general politico-economic model, 
indicating and emphasising dynamic interrelations between collective political 
processes and individual economic activities in a political economy. The traditional 
approach to the political economy has emphasised the ideological content, 
corresponding to the major "isms", such as, capitalism, socialism and communism, and 
regarded property relations as the essential element in distinguishing systems. I will 
apply the theoretical and methodological approach of the ‘modern political economy’. 
The approach of the modern political economy and much of theories in this field, of 
course, are directed at the fonctioning of political decision-making and non-market 
mechanism under conditions of capitalist democracy and, therefore, it is not 
immediately applicable to the Soviet-type system. But, this methodological and 
theoretical works can be applied in order to understand the real nature and problem of 
the Soviet-type system, which can be defined an extreme model o f ‘non-market’ system.
While politics and economics coexisted as the single discipline of political economy for 
much of the period of modern scholarship, these fields were formally split in the late 
nineteenth century toward a high degree of specialisation. Economists concentrated on 
market activities and, for the most part, took the political and institutional structures as
given. Political scientists, on the other hand, devoted their energies to understand how 
institutions interacted with individuals and were shaped by individuals in essentially 
non-market situations. Although such specialisation promoted the rapid development 
of knowledge in each area of “politics” and “economics”, the problem comes, too, when 
the divisions of inquiry mask important issues. A rejoining of political science and 
economics into political economy has been in progress in areas where the disciplinary 
divisions are most distorting. Thus, the reconstitution of political economy is designed 
to reunite the separate perspectives in those areas where the interaction of individuals.
institutions, and markets is paramount. The unified approach of new political 
economy is promising for its natural relevance to the problems of government economic 
policy making, regulation of industry, legislative structure and performance, and the 
development or conversion of economic and political systems.
The theoretical and methodological accounts on the ‘non-markef decision-making i
mechanisms has been developed by scholars working within the Public Choice schools
12of economic analysis. The public choice approach applies the ‘methodological
individualism’, which is based on the same human behavioural hypothesis as general 
economics. Individuals and organisational units, including enterprises, interest groups 
and government bureaucratic organisations, will react to utility and costs in a 
predictable and systematic way, and they are rational and seeking self-interests within 
the rule of the law in the society. They view political actors in the same manner as they 
view economic actors—as self-interested individuals—, not as benevolent despots.
This does not mean that economists must model political actors as homo economicus or 
wealth maximising agents. Political agents have goals and they arrange their means to 
attain those goals, which could include ideological pursuits, high ideals or monetary 
reward. What matters for economic analysis is the implications for the analysis of 
market economic activities and political processes that follow from viewing individuals 
as purposive actors. Such a position of value freedom may prove helpful in catching a 
clear picture of what is the real problem and what it is supposed to be reformed.
Sharpening of conceptual and analytical tools, I will develop a unified politico- 
economic model showing that how the essential political and economic elements in a 
modern society are interrelated. This model will present the internal logic and 
historical dynamics of the politico-economic system and will provide an analytical 
framework to the task of understanding the internal logic and problems of the Soviet- 
type government-directed model. With this unified conceptual and analytical 
fi amework, I will examine the nature of the Soviet government-directed system of 
political economy, indicating its intrinsic information and incentive problems. Next, I 
will examine its operation discussing major political and economic participants’ 
opportunistic behaviours and its performance. Finally, I will discuss the implication of
the past Soviet experience to the preconditions for the long-term stability and dynamism 
in the political economy. The grand experience under the Soviet regime would provide 
us with important general lessons for long-term stability and dynamism in any political 
economy.
I
ANALITICAL FRAMEWORK
Politico-Economic Model
In a modern society, all human activities involve decision, that is, choice between 
alternative courses of action and their combinations, which demand usage of some 
scarce material and human resources. The decision involves the consideration of 
available alternative choices to reach the intended goals. Human activities appear as 
‘economic’ if the accompanying allocation of these resources is considered from the 
angle of the associated costs and the benefit value of the outcome. Thus, the adjective 
‘economic’ refers to one particular aspect of human activities which have economic 
angle, that is, resource-allocation and cost-benefit side. In this context, economic 
activities can be defined as human activities of making decisions and their 
implementation concerning the allocation of scarce material and human resources to 
achieve intended benefits from these activities bearing their opportunity costs.
In each economic activity, scarce economic resources are allocated and human 
participants are involved. These economic resources include raw natural resources, 
processed material resources, human resources, and technology, otherwise the classical 
assortment of resources are land, capital, and labour. The raw natural resources, land 
in the old parlance, include water, air, gravity, as well as physical, chemical, and 
biological properties of inorganic and organic things. The processed material 
resources, so-called capital, are materials and fixed producer durables, such as not just 
machine tools but also means of transportation and communication and records of 
information, etc. The human resources, called labour, are a reservoir of physical and 
mental services, a stock of capacity to work, skills, and accumulated knowledge 
attached to human beings. The technology is the stock of technical knowledge 
incorporated in the human and manufactured productive assets.
The economic participants who take part in economic activities and by whom economic 
decisions are made and implemented are naturally people considered as individuals, but 
it is more useful to think of them as aggregated groups or organised units for definite 
purposes. These organisational units include economic units, for example, enterprises
I
and households, and administrative units like economic ministries in government. The 
economic units bring forth material labour, goods and services. For instance, 
households supply labour and consume produced goods and services for final 
satisfaction and enterprises purchase resources which are needed for production and sell 
produced goods and services. The administrative units that constitute the 
administrative structure in a government are organised to implement government
14economic policies and regulate the economic activities of individual economic units.
From their economic activities, participants wish to attain satisfaction of wants, needs, 
and desires, which are the ultimate goals of their participation, so-called preferences.
In order to pursue these goals, they engage in their individual economic activities.
While their participation in economic activity, they establish exchange linkages of 
information, goods and services with other participants. These linkages and exchange 
among them become stabilised through consistent and systematic repetition reflecting 
their advantageous character to them. These established and stabilised linkages make 
up organisational structures among all economic participants and process mechanisms 
which have a logical sequence; information gathering—decision making—decision 
implementation—outcomes—feedback. These organisational linkages and structures 
among participants and process mechanisms of their economic activities are 
institutionalised by social sanctions of approval and disapproval and become economic 
institutions.
However, members of a society are willing to take part in economic activities so as to 
achieve not only their own individual goals but also to increase social benefits flom the 
society thi'ough their individual economic activities. As long as their economic 
activities are related with socially collective decisions to achieve the collective goals of 
the society, so-called social goals, their economic activities can not be separated from 
the politics. The politics is the process by which members of a society reach collective 
decisions for the society as well as for themselves. When we consider these individual
...preferences for the social benefits from the society, each member has different 
individual preferences and there, furthermore, exist mutual inconsistencies and trade­
offs among those collective goals and their various preferences for them. For those
reasons, these various individual preferences must be settled into social goals by 
political institutions through the collective political activity..
The inseparability of the economy from the politics and the mutual interdependence 
between them constitute a politico-economic system within a boundary of broad socio­
economic environment. The politico-economic system can be defined as a socially 
established set of mechanisms and institutions for the economic decision making and 
implementation concerning allocation, production, distribution, and consumption in 
order to achieve aggregated goals of a society including individual goals as well as 
social collective goals. Any society and its members have to resolve the fimdamental 
economic questions derived from the “law of scarcity” in the allocation of resources 
from the angle of cost-benefit side in its politico-economic system: what and how much 
goods and services are to be produced; what production methods are used to produce 
them; how income, wealth and other factors that contribute to people’s welfare are 
distributed; and who makes which economic decisions.
Figure 1, Politico-Economic Model (Ovei-view)
Broad Socio-Economic Environment
Government Policy
Collective Political Activity
Economic Nature
IndividualEconomic Activity O utcom es of Economic Activity
V
A ssessm entPolitical Nature
Figure I is illustrating the components and the operation of a politico-economic system 
in a brief framework indicating the mutual interdependence between political and 
economic factors. In the system, economy and polity are closely linked systematically
i
by feedback. The upper link shows political intervention through government policy 
to the economy by changing the economic nature of its system and by inducing 
economic regulations in order to achieve social collective goals. The lower link shows 
influence of economic conditions and its economic performance on the political sector,
■ .  Iwhich would change the political nature of its system and government policy.
Nature of Politico-Economic Model
In the politico-economic system, each participant willing to take part in individual 
political and economic activities to satisfy their individual own preferences and goals, 
but their individual activities are restricted and influenced by the prevailing political and 
economic features of the system. Thus, the nature of the system can be characterised 
by its four major elements—the political power structure, the information mechanism, 
the decision-making structure, and the motivation mechanism—in the politico- 
economic system. The characters of these elements are the outcomes of the collective 
political activity closely related with the political nature of the system, since the 
ultimate reinforcement of economic institutions and mechanisms takes place through 
legal codes and legal sanctions. Under the conditions of quantitative as well as 
qualitative changes in the broad socio-economic environment, these elements should be 
continually modified to overcome intrinsic problems and to improve the performance of 
politico-economic system in response to new judgements and new predictions in the 
society.
Political Power Structure
The various individual preferences in the society must be settled into social goals by 
political process through the collective political activity. The rules and procedures of 
setting social goals and the collective political activities are dependent upon the 
political power structure in the system, which determines whose preference is more 
influential in the political process. Accordingly, the political power structure indicates 
who has real power to set social goals and elaborate government policies to achieve 
these goals. It can be useful to understand the political power structure as the extent of 
power concentration ranging from totalitarian, authoritarian, to liberal democratic
structures. The more totalitarian the political power structure is, the more influential
the ruling political party or the political leadership who compose the government is in
the process of setting social goals and making government policies. The number and
characteristics of their political parties and the political autonomy of pluralistic interest
«groups and mass communication system in fact can determine the extent of 
concentration.
The authoritarian sti'ucture means only one party is actually allowed to operate in the 
politics and therefore no organised political opposition exists. Citizens are unable to 
organise into competing political parties or clearly identifiable interest groups. There 
is no alternative set of political leaders that can take the place of existing elite for 
implementing new policy programs. The alteration of government personnel and 
policies must, therefore, take place within the single party, often only after the death or 
purging of the dominant leader in the party. The majority of citizens do not have any 
institutionalised role in government policy-making. The political public 
communication is strictly controlled according to what the government and its ruling
15party allow. The totalitarian sti'ucture can be described as the extreme type of
authoritarian structure. In addition to the characteristics of authoritarian structure 
already cited, there exists an official ideology, for instance, communism in the former 
Soviet Union, which members of the society must adhere to and which covers all
16aspects of life in the society including the direction of the entire political economy.
The most obvious measure of liberal democracy is universal suffrage: the right of all 
citizens to vote. Universal suffrage is expressed by voting for representatives who 
then are responsible for making public policies and supervising the administration of 
public policy. Furthermore, citizens must be able to participate in competitive 
elections, in which personnel and policy choices are structured by the competition of 
two or more political parties, so as to give meaningful expression to the rights of 
universal suffrage in the context of representative government. A variety of special 
interest groups must exist and function independently from the government, even as 
they attempt to influence government policies. The high political autonomy of interest 
groups is based, in part, on equally autonomous systems of public communication and
10
17mass media system. In addition, the society should be governed in accordance with 
the law and any changes in the society, including the political and economic changes, 
occur within the framework of the constitutional law thi ough reaching social consensus.
Information Mechanism
The information mechanism is a mechanism for the provision of information and the 
economic co-ordination in the politico-economic system. The key role of the 
information mechanism is to reduce the uncertainty connected with participants’ 
decisions-making, which was induced by the changes in the broad socio-economic 
environment. The crucial function of the information mechanism is the co-ordination 
process by which each decision-maker attains right and sufficient information about the 
given state of socio-economic environment as well as the decisions of other decision­
makers that are interdependent with his own decisions. The co-ordination process 
enables them to determine whether their proposed action will maximise their utility of
■goals, given the present state of the environment and the proposed actions of other 
decision-makers. There are three main types of information mechanisms: the free
market price mechanism, the regulated market price mechanism, and the government 
command mechanism.
In ih&fl'ee market price mechanism, the actual provision of information and co­
ordination process are solely based on fluctuations of free market prices to equilibrate 
the demand and supply for each good and service, and for each factor of production.
The free market prices carry information for economic decision-making and flexibly 
reflect the changes in the invested amount of work and relative scarcity of resources.
The market prices include not only prices of goods and services in consumer and 
producer markets, but also wages in labour markets, and interest rates in financial 
markets. For the effective fonction of the free market price mechanism, the economic 
decision-making authorities should be in the hands of each individual economic 
participant. The participants are free to spend their income as they wish, including the 
purchase of property, and to signal his preferences by independent selling and buying 
actions in the markets. For the voluntary exchanges of resources, goods, services, and 
information in the market, they have organic linkages with others. Through the market
transaction, information flows horizontally.
12
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In the regulated market price mechanism, the actual provision of information and co- 
ordination process for individual economic activities are primarily based on fluctuations 
in the market prices. However, these market prices are regulated by price regulations 
politically and administratively elaborated by the government, including prices of 
products and services, wages of labour forces, interest rates of credit, taxes and 
subsidies, and duties and tariffs of export and import. These price regulations provide 
additional information in individual market activities. Each participant is fi*ee to 
engage in market activities and make individual decisions and actions in the market, but 
their choices of actions are restricted by government price regulations. Consequently, 
each economic unit has not only horizontal linkages with other participants in the form 
of market exchange, but also functional linkages with administrative units who are 
responsible for the elaboration and implementation of price regulations according to the 
government fiscal or monetary policies so as to achieve social collective goals. For the 
enforcement of equilibrium in its functional domain, the administrative units are 
organised on the basis of specialised fonctions such as finance, trade, or price control.
In the government command mechanism, the politically and administratively elaborated 
targets for each basic economic unit specify major aspects of individual economic 
activities in the form of directly addressed and precisely specified directives as 
command, such as how, how much, and what is to be produced and how, how much, 
and what kinds of resources to be allocated, and so on. Each individual economic unit 
produces only according to precisely specified production targets, and all goods and 
services are centrally rationed through the administrative supply system. Market 
prices do not have any co-ordinating role in the economic decision-making, therefore 
money becomes unnecessary as a regulator, and no direct horizontal market 
relationships are necessary between economic units. The administrative units of the 
government are organised to direct the individual economic activities based on the 
specific branches like products, product groups, or services. Accordingly, economic 
participants including administrative units are organised hierarchically and information 
flows from the highest administrative units, thi'ough the lowest administrative units, to
the basic economic units in the form of directives.
Decision-Making Structure
The decision-making sti'ucture is an organisational structure of decision-making
19arrangements in the politico-economic system. The economic participants have 
linkages to other participants—among basic economic units, between economic units 
and administrative units, or among administrative units—in the exchange of information, 
goods, and services. These linkages create the organisational stmctures of the system.
We can distinguish between three types of organisational structures; the hierarchical
20structure, the functional structure, and the organic structure. Each politico-economic 
system has a set of combinations of those three structures. In the hierarchical 
sti'ucture, economic participants are vertically organised according to specific branches 
like products, product groups, or services. In the functional structure, they are 
organised on the basis of specialised functions like finance, trade, or price control. In 
the organic structure, they, mainly basic economic units, are organised on the basis of 
horizontal linkages, where there are no superior and subordinate units.
The most important issue here is the arrangement of the economic decision-making
authorities. To address this question, it is necessary to specify what decision-making
authority is, and then to determine who exercises that authority over what decisions.
The decision-making authority over a given decision will be defined as the legitimate
power either to choose directly among the set of alternative actions into which the
decisions can be resolved, or influence directly or indirectly other decision-makers’
choices of actions by giving them incentives to choose what action to take. The
sources of decision-making authority are tradition, coercion, ownership, information,
and delegation of authority, for example, position in an administrative bureaucracy or 
21election to office. These sources of authority need not be exclusive, thus a decision­
maker may derive his power from several sources. The government and its 
administrative units obtain delegated decision-making authority backed by coercive 
power in order to increase social welfare of the society.
In practice, it is virtually impossible to delineate precisely the allocation of decision-
13
making authorities in the system. Nevertheless, it would be sufficient to deteimine 
certain broad features of decision-making arrangements, particularly the extent to which 
decision-making authorities are concentrated. Systems analysts have generally viewed I
this question in terms of centralisation or decentralisation of the decision-making 
authorities. The degree of centralisation can be analysed in terms of the extent of 
control exercised by the higher echelons over the decision-making authority of the 
lower echelons. The extent of control primarily over the number and relative 
importance of the decisions controlled by higher echelons, and secondly on the form in 
which the higher echelons exercise authority. In the hierarchical structure, the 
decision-making authorities are more centralised than in the functional structure. In 
the organic structure, on the other hand, the authorities are decentralised and there is no 
hierarchical level. The degree of centralisation in the politico-economic system, 
therefore, can be recognised by the composition of these structures.
Motivation Mechanism
The motivation mechanism is a mechanism for motivating economic participants to
achieve the social collective goals rather than only to seek individual private self-
22interested goals. The economic participants are generally motivated to pursue their 
own self-interests and private goals determined by themselves, but they as a member of 
the society are also supposed to fulfil the social collective goals as well for the increase 
in social welfare of all. However, the pursuing of their individual own goals is often in 
conflict with the fulfilment of the socially determined collective goals. A distinction 
exists between the social goals determined by the political activity and the structure of 
the aggregated individual private goals. To what extent should individuals be allowed 
to pursue their own self-interest? To what extent should the political authorities of the 
government direct areas of their economic behaviour? A central issue of the political 
economy always has been the looking for the solutions of these fundamental questions 
of appropriate rewards to induce the achievement of social collective goal.
When a conflict between individual gaols and collective goals occurs, the essential 
component is incentives, that is, a set of events that can be and are manipulated socially 
in order to make individual participants fiilfil the social goals. The incentives may be
14
The economic motivations are closely linked to property-holding arrangements, namely
23ownership rights o f the means o f production. These property ovmership rights are the 
essential part of the motivation mechanism. Ownership right is an amalgam of right 
that individuals may have claims to these objects or services and these rights may affect
24its disposition and its utilisation. There are two broad forms of property ownership: 
private and public ownership. Private ownership has the effect of mobilising 
individuals to husband resources effectively, but the justification for material rewards 
with private ownership leads to often substantial income differentials. When 
ownership rights of the means of production become public, proprietorial material 
incentives of the private ownership are replaced by moral incentives to increase social 
collective benefits. However, public ownership produces a situation where since 
everyone owns everything nobody owns anything. Consequently, property is not cared 
for and resources are easily wasted.
Operation of Politico-Economic Model
Figure 2 presents the analytical framework for the politico-economic system, indicating 
its major components and interrelationships among key variables determining its
25performance. Such key components are the broad socio-economic environment, 
including individual preferences and social collective goals; the political nature of the 
system, such as the political power structure; collective political activities; government 
policy; the economic nature of the system, such as the information mechanism, the
15
I
material or moral incentives and is usually a combination of the two. Material 
incentives are defined as rewards that would promote desirable activities for achieving 
social collective goals by giving the recipient a greater claim over material goods than 
one who has performed less well. Moral incentives are rewards for socially desirable 
activities by appealing to the recipient’s responsibility to society and accordingly raising 
the recipient’s social status within the society. Whatever incentives or combination of 
incentives is used, to be effective it must correspond to the participants’ individual self 
preferences. In addition, incentives are more effective if each participant knows 
precisely what action he must choose in order to get rewards, if the participant is certain 
that the rewards will actually be forthcoming, and if there are no conflicting incentives.
I
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decision-making structure, and the motivation mechanism; individual economic 
activities; the outcomes of the economic activities; and individual and social assessment 
of the outcomes. These components and the interaction between them will be 
examined and discussed in detail. The major important sets of variables determining 
the performance of the politico-economic system are the political and economic nature 
of the system and government policy.
Figure 2, Politico-Economic Model (Analytical Framework)
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Government Policy
The government is one significant participant in a politico-economic system and the 
government policy is one of the most important variables determining the performance 
of the system. In contemporary party politics, the raling political party forms the 
government and the governing principles of the ruling party have an important effect 
upon setting social goals and making government policies. The decision-making 
authority delegated to the government is based upon the social contract—a balance (or 
sometimes an imbalance) between economic, political, and civil guarantees and 
restrictions—between citizens and their government in a modern society, which
16
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legitimises the authority of the leadership to rule, and guarantees controlled social
behaviour on the part of majority of its citizens in order to increase collective benefits of
26the society. The citizens enter into a social contract in order to pursue their self- 
interest as well as increase collective benefits. They agree to obey the laws and the 
government agrees to respect the citizens’ rights. The citizens relinquish the liberty to 
do whatever they want and accept the constraints and obligations induced by their 
government in return for its collective benefits.
The rules and procedures of collective political activity and the government policy­
making are dependent on the prevailing political nature of the system, mainly the 
political power structure. The more totalitarian the political power structure, the more 
influential the ruling political party or the political leadership that compose the 
government is in the process of setting social goals and making government policies.
In a democratic society, political activity and government policy-making are essentially 
bargaining between the various preferences and therefore political decision-making can 
be best understood as political bargaining. The social goals and the government 
policies to achieve these socially decided goals are the consequence of pressures exerted 
by various preferences and the political bargaining. It can be very useful to divide 
government policies into two categories, the policies to modify the economic nature of 
the system and the policies to regulate individual economic activities for improving the 
performance of the system.
Principle fo r Economic Management
In order to improve the performance of the system, the government can modify the 
economic nature of the system, i.e., information mechanism, decision-making structure, 
and motivation mechanism. The economic nature of the system is closely related with 
the principle for economic management of the government, which exerts great influence 
on choosing a different set of infoimation mechanisms, decision-making structures, and
27motivation mechanisms in the system. Chosen the combination, the government 
manages the economy and co-ordinates other individual participants’ economic 
activities through its social and economic policies to induce some direct regulations or 
indirect price regulations for the achievement of social goals determined thi ough the
17
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collective political activities. In modern societies, the alternatives of economic 
management principle can be categorised into three broad types on the basis of the 
major dominant co-ordination mechanisms chosen by the present government: laissez- 
faire management, functional management, and directive management.
The principle of laissez-faire management means that the economy should be managed
autonomously by individual participants themselves to achieve self-interests without
any government obstruction. The basic assumption is that pursuing own interests
through one’s individual economic activities leads to achieve the best benefits for all as 
.if by an “invisible hand”, so that any government interference with free competition in 
the market is almost certain to be injurious. This principle implies that the economic 
decisions of allocation, production, and distribution should be co-ordinated and self­
regulated by a free competitive market exchange mechanism. For the effective 
function of the free market exchange mechanism, economic units should be free to 
spend their income as they wish, including the purchase of property. The private 
ownership right is usually considered essential attributes of the laissez-faire 
management and the free market exchange mechanism. Theoretical analysis 
emphasises the efficiency of the free market co-ordination, whereas interpretations of 
human motivation stress its incentives to work, save, invest, and innovate. The 
classical laissez-faire policy was conducted by the British government in the nineteenth 
century, according to the principle of laissez-faire management.
The principle of the functional management implies that the economic decisions of 
allocation, production and distribution are basically made by individuals in the market, 
but the market regulations, such as price controls, subsidies, taxation, and non-price 
regulations from the government restrict available alternatives of their choices. The 
logic of this principle is that some market regulations are necessary to overcome some 
shortcomings, such as cyclical instability and economic inequity of the free market 
exchange mechanism, while maintaining some of its efficiency and incentive attributes. 
The government provides special financial incentives for particular types of economic 
activities with inducing market regulations for the particular purpose of increasing 
collective benefits and social welfare, for instance, reducing the price fluctuations
18
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sometimes found in free markets; encouraging people on a low income to purchase the 
necessities of life; and stimulating the growth of important economic sectors. After 
the outbreak of the Great Depression in 1930s, most governments in Western 
industrialised countries followed this principle of functional management and 
intervened in individual market activities through government social and economic 
policies.
Finally, the principle of the directive management suggests that the economy should be 
guided and directed centrally in the form of precisely specified directive regulations or 
commands. The basic assumption is that the shortcomings of laissez-faire 
management and the free market exchange mechanism are so severe that only 
deliberately and rationally elaborated collective political decisions from the government 
would co-ordinate individual economic activities and guide the whole economy into the 
socially optimal state of social welfare. In many societies, some economic activities, 
which exhibit the characteristics of monopolies, scale economies and externalities, are 
commonly directed by the government with public ownership and considered essential 
for the growth of the economy. The Soviet government in the former USSR and 
subsequent socialist governments in Europe, Asia, Latin America, Africa and elsewhere 
adapted the principle of directive management.
Types o f Politico-Economic Model
In the politico-economic system, the principle for economic management of the 
government exerts important influence on the formation, transformation, or reformation 
of its economic nature. Based on historical and empirical surveys, the political power 
structure in the politico-economic system seems to be related to the choice of key 
economic variables, namely, the principle for economic management and accordingly 
the information mechanism, the decision-making structure and the motivation 
mechanism in the political economy. The three-dimensional figure 3 shows the 
possible types of the politico-economic model on the basis of key political and 
economic alternatives in the politico-economic system, i.e., its political power structure, 
its principle for economic management, and dominant co-ordination mechanism. The 
possible types of politico-economic systems can be broadly divided into three
19
categories: the market-oriented system, the regulated market system, and the 
government-directed system.
Figure 3, Types of Politico-Economic Model
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In the market-oriented model, the economic decisions of allocation, production, and 
distribution are primarily made by individuals through their activities in ftee markets 
without considerable government intervention, according to the principle of laissez-faire 
management. Usually, the government makes and implements the price policy, the 
differentiated tax policy, or the governmental investment policy so as to implement 
social goals in those areas, but the share of functional economic regulations or 
economic directives from the government is very limited. This market-oriented model 
is characterised by the dominance of the fi'ee market prices mechanism with horizontal 
linkages and information flows, the decentralised organic decision-making structure, 
and proprietorial material incentives with private ownership and active role of economic 
competition in the motivation mechanism. These characters in the system require the
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liberal democratic social and political environment as an effective condition for the free 
market exchange co-ordination.
In the regulated market model, the economic activities are co-ordinated by market 
forces, but with considerable government fiinctional intervention according to the 
principle of functional management. The government controls market forces with 
indirect market regulations through fiscal or monetary policies, such as price controls, 
subsidies, taxation, and non-price regulations, which aim at achieving social collective 
goals by introducing incentives and disincentives into economic activities in the market. 
The dominance of the regulated market price mechanism with diagonal linkages and 
information flows, the quasi-centralised functional decision-making structure, and 
material and moral incentives with private ownership and the passive role of economic 
competition distinguish this model. The division from the market-oriented model 
depends on the degree of government intervention and market regulation into the price 
establishments in the market. The degree of government intervention in market 
economic activities is greatly influenced by the authoritarian nature of political power 
structure.
In the government-directed model, the totalitarian government directs almost the whole 
national economic activities through the government economic administration. The 
national economy operates as one single large enterprise, which is managed by the 
highly centralised administrative bureaucracy. All economic activity is concentrated 
on the achievement of key social goals like victory in war, rapid industrialisation, 
pursuing the ideological aim, and so on, which necessitates direct political intervention 
in economic activities. Through government planning and political co-ordination, the 
whole economy is guided into the direction of achieving these ultimate social goals. 
This government-directed model is characterised by the dominance of the government 
command mechanism with vertical linkages and information flows, the centralised 
hierarchic structure, and moral incentives in the motivation mechanism to achieve the 
social goals usually combined with public ownership rights and no active role of 
economic competition.
Figure 4 provides logical linkages and influences among these key political and
^1Ï
economic variables, suggesting an available set of alternatives in the politico-economic 
system. Each type of the politico-economic model can be characterised by the 
political alternatives of the political power structure, the alternative principle for 
economic management of the government, and the economic alternatives of a certain 
combination of information mechanisms, decision-making structures, motivation 
mechanisms among others. The ruling political party forms the government and 
chooses an alternative principle for economic management through the political 
activities in the system. This political process is largely determined by the current 
nature of the political power structure. Given the principle for economic management, 
the main co-ordination mechanism is decided. For the effective function of this co­
ordination mechanism, a certain combination of informational linkages, decision­
making structures, incentives, ownership rights, and the role of economic competition. 
All these elements characterise the current politico-economic system.
Figure 4, Logical Linkages among Key Variables
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Individual Economic Activities
With the guidance of a particular government policy, the administrative units in the
22
government elaborate specific regulations or directives and implement them for the
purpose of co-ordinating and inducing other individual economic participants’ decisions i
to choose socially favourable alternatives. These regulations are closely linked to the
economic nature of the system, in particular, the co-ordination mechanism. Some
functional market regulations, such as price controls, subsidies, taxation, and non-price
regulations, provide additional information for individual economic units and
manipulate available alternatives of their decisions and their actions in the market.
Furthermore, government directives are issued in the form of directly addressed and 
precisely specified instructions for the individual economic units’ decisions of 
allocation, production and distribution. In a situation of a rapidly changing socio­
economic environment, the administrative directives and regulations should provide 
individual economic participants with sufficient and correct information in the right 
time to accommodate not only quantitative but also qualitative changes in the 
environment for the effective co-ordination.
Given the economic nature of the system, each individual economic participant gathers 
information about the present state of the environment, such as scarcity of resources, 
technology, and future possibilities, tluough the information mechanism 
institutionalised in the system. Once all available information is fed into the decision­
making stage, each individual participant makes their decisions and take actions mainly 
to seek their own self-interested goals. Nevertheless, the individual decisions and 
actions of economic units are restricted directly by the government directives or 
regulations, elaborated collectively and induced by the government through 
administrative units. In consequence, individual participants gather information, make 
decisions and take actions to pursue their private goals within the limitations of their 
capability of collecting information, their decision-making authority, and their allowed
motivation and given incentives in the current politico-economic system. In a modern 
political economy, free and regulated market price mechanisms and the government 
command mechanism coexist and their active roles are determined by the principle for 
economic management of the government.
■ 3
In any political economy, the roles of the individual market activity and the government
3
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administrative activity are both important and therefore the private market sector and 
the public administrative sector both coexist. The only difference is the extent and 
intensity of government administrative influence on individual private economic 
activities or of political intervention to the economy. The extreme model of the 
market-oriented laissez-faire system can be found in Victorian Britain, where most 
economic activities, including the provision of welfare services, was undertaken by the 
private sector and the government had a minimal role in maintaining the framework of 
law, order and external security required for the operation of the free market co­
ordination. At the other extreme, the model of government- directed command system 
can be seen in the former Soviet Union, where most economic decisions were taken by 
the government and most goods and services were produced and distributed 
administratively by the public sector and the administrative bureaucracy. However, 
neither of these politico-economic systems corresponds entirely to their theoretical 
extreme.
Outcomes and Assessment
The collective political activity, the government policy and the individual economic 
activity end in some results. These outcomes change the state of the socio-economic 
environment, such as available resources, technology, and attainable production 
possibilities with these resources and technology. These economic outcomes may 
correspond individually to private goals and socially to social collective goals, but more 
often, these outcomes would more or less diverge from them. At this stage, each 
participant judges these outcomes as well as the performance of the present nature of 
the politico-economic system by their own performance criteria. Their assessment of 
these outcomes alters their individual preferences, which make up their new preference 
orders for their own goals and social collective goals. According to these new 
preference and performance criteria, each participant will judge the next stage of 
economic outcomes and the performance of the system again. The individual 
participants are able to signal immediately their changed preferences through buying 
and selling actions in the market. Besides, they can transfer their preferences by 
political activities like campaigning as interest groups for specific government policies
I'
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and voting as voters to change the government. This circulation of interrelationship 
recurs consistently and systematically with the lapse of time.
Social Goals (Performance Criteria)
Each society chooses a different type of the politico-economic system, simply because 
each society has different orders of social preferences for social collective goals to 
achieve thi'ough consistent and systemic economic activities in the system. There are 
many social collective goals that are of vital concern to the members of a society and by 
which the performance of the current natures of politico economic system can be judged. 
However, there exist mutual inconsistency and trade-offs among them and the social 
preference orders for these social collective goals are changing with time in a situation 
of a rapidly and continuously changing socio-economic environment. The major 
important social collective goals and performance criteria that are generally accepted in 
the modern political economy include economic growth, economic efficiency, economic 
stability, economic balance, economic equity, and national security and power.
Economic growth means increases in the volume of output that an economy generates 
over time or increases in output per capita. Growth in the volume of output per capita 
over time will normally bring about growth in the economic and social welfare in the 
same direction. Economic efficiency is the effectiveness of utilising available 
resources including knowledge at a particular point in time (static efficiency) or through 
time (dynamic efficiency). Economic stability involves the absence of significant 
fluctuations in growth rates, the maintenance of acceptable rates of unemployment and 
the avoidance of excessive inflation whether or not the inflation and the unemployment 
are cyclical. Economic balance refers to physical or financial equilibrium over time in 
all markets and balance of the state budget. Economic equity means some notion of 
equity in the distribution of income and wealth or in the opportunity to obtain income or 
wealth among society members. National security and power signifies the ability to
devote sufficient human and capital resources to the political and military power from
28an economic point of view.
When we consider these economic and non-economic social collective goals, there exist
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mutual inconsistencies and trade-offs among these goals. The economic growth will 
produce negative effects on social welfare, for instance, environmental disruption and 
pollution. Economic growth and economic efficiency are not the same. The 
economy may grow through increases in efficiency, that is, by finding better ways of 
doing things with the same resources, or by expanding at the amount of resources but 
using that resources at a constant rate of effectiveness. The former is often termed 
intensive growth, the latter extensive growth. The equity of income distribution 
involves fairness, but what is considered fair will differ from case to case and will likely 
evolve over time as a social judgement. The economic equity in a society would vary 
over the time and differ under socialism and capitalism. The comparative analysis of 
different economic systems may provide us with important evidence on the economic 
equity-efficiency trade-off. There can also be trade-offs between the goal of national 
existence and power and the other economic goals. Consequently, not all goals can be 
achieved simultaneously and therefore some preference ordering of goals are essential 
to understand a political economy.
Political Adaptation
The politico-economic system operates within a broad socio-economic environment, 
which contains the known stock of resources, preferences of the population, including 
their ideologies, the prevailing legal system, and the foreign relations with other 
countries and international organisations. This broad environment is changing all the 
time not just by political and economic activities within the society, but also by external 
influences exerted by other countries and international organisations and additionally 
random factors, such as the weather and natural disasters. If economic activities in the 
political economy were conducted in an unchanging socio-economic environment, it 
would be possible and advisable to formalise the solutions to resolve main economic 
questions. However, the broad socio-economic environment is changing rapidly in 
many ways. Accordingly, the uncertainty introduced by these changes is extremely 
important to understand the operation of the politico-economic system. The decisions, 
including the government policy, taken by participants in the system should be flexible 
enough to accommodate these quantitative as well as qualitative changes in the socio-
26
economic environment.
In addition, the nature of the politico-economic system must be modified continuously 
in response to new judgements and new predictions in the society in order to improve 
the performance of its system under these changing conditions. An optimal nature of 
the system for satisfying every individual preferences and every important social 
collective goals to achieve does not exit in reality, mainly because the individual 
preferences and the preference ordering of social goals are changing at all times and 
there exist mutual inconsistency and trade-offs among social collective goals. The 
continuity of the system’s integrity as an evolving social unit and the government 
legitimacy, therefore, lean heavily on the flexibility of political institutions and on the 
capacity of the government to adapt the various demands created by economic and 
social changes in the environments. The extent of popular influence on the political 
adaptation and political changes is closed related with the political power structure in 
the system. The pressures for political adaptation changes are especially strong in 
periods of rapid social and economic development. The development introduces 
modernising elements in the political economy, which entails the emergence of new 
groups of citizens, whose evolving interests or preferences mobilise them to impose
29new demands on the political economy.
In the democratic society, government policy-making is essentially one of bargaining
30between the various preferences. The government policy is, therefore, the
consequence of pressures exerted by various preferential interest groups in the context
of particular rules and procedures which form political and legal systems and so flexible
to respond to the new demands and pressures in a society. Not only political
adaptation, sometimes radical, for policy changes but also political changes in the
composition of political leadership and the succession of one government after another
have all been accomplished within the established constitutional framework.
However, the political changes can take place outside of the context of an established
and enduring constitutional framework. When the political leadership and the
government do not respond to the new judgements and the new pressures expressed by
the population and fail to reach the new form of social consensus, they may have
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recourse to violence, civil war, or the rewriting of fundamental codes of operation and 
organisation in the authoritarian, more totalitarian, society. Any political changes 
taken place within and outside of the constitutional framework are likely to induce 
radical alteration of government policies and modification of the nature of the politico-
economic system.
Two Opposite Tendencies for Reformation
28
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There exist two opposite tendencies, which intend to alter the nature of the politico- 
economic system. The first tendency comes from the assumption that the laissez-faire 
management can achieve a high degree of co-ordination efficiency in the complex and 
advanced industrial economy. Free market prices signal the relative scarcities of 
resources and provide the information that economic actors must process in making 
optimal decisions. In addition, the free market mechanism, through the incentives of 
profit and loss, mobilises individuals to discover new ways of arranging or rearranging 
means to obtain socially desirable goals. In other words, the interaction between ex 
ante expectations and ex post realisation in the mar ket process motivates individuals to 
learn how better to pursue their goals as well as collective goals. The ability of the 
entrepreneurial process of competitive markets to reveal error and motivate learning is 
perhaps its most significant weapon in combating the problem of economic co­
ordination. The institutions of competitive free markets provide signals to economic 
actors concerning errors and motivate the learning that leads to the mutual adjustments 
among market participants to eliminate the previous errors of profit opportunities 
hitherto unrecognised and losses suffered as a result of failed projects.
The judgements about its advantages and shortcomings of laissez-faire management 
have varied among individuals and societies, often based on ideological objectives. 
Faced with problems of imperfect competition from increasing returns to scale or 
barriers to entry; externalities causing discrepancies between private and social rates of 
return; economic instability caused by fluctuations in prices, unemployment rate and 
output; and unequal distribution of income, wealth, power, and oppoitunity in the 
market mechanism, some form of political regulations and administrative economic 
planning for the economic co-ordination came to be viewed as the most viable
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alternative. Consequently, the opposite tendency pushes the political economy in the 
direction of more government intervention. The major arguments for government 
involvement for the economic management, supported by the theories of welfare 
economics, representative democracy and neo-Marxist of political economy, claim 
either that real markets are not perfectly competitive or that individual resources are 
distributed so inequitably that market outcomes are not fair. Nevertheless, due to the 
logic of political and bureaucratic decision-making, there are the fundamental 
information and incentive problems in the government economic co-ordination, too.
In the field of new political economy, specifically in the area of public choice, their 
theoretical analysis of political decision-making reveals the logic of political decision 
making in a representative democracy. The underlying assumption is that major 
political actors—individual voters, interest groups, politicians, and policy-makers in the 
government—behave with self-interested motivations so as to maximise their own 
personal interests in respect to public policies. Consequently, the rule of factions is a 
logical outcome of representative democracy. This logic of politics produces 
concentrated benefits and short-sightedness bias with regard to public policy. The 
political decision-making under representative democracy are biased to concentrate 
benefits on the well-organised and well-informed and disperse costs on the ill-organised 
and uninformed mass of citizens. As a result, public policy in the Western 
democracies, therefore, contains both a concentrated benefit and a short-sightedness 
bias and popular economic policies are those that will tend to yield short-term and 
easily identifiable benefits at the expense of long-term and largely hidden costs.
Furthermore, the principal-agent problem exists between voter and politician in the 
political decision-making and another principal-agent problem between politician and 
administrative bureaucracy and another between the head of bureau and their
33subordinates within the government administrative bureaucracy. Political actors must 
devise a monitoring mechanism and an incentive mechanism to ensure that the 
bureaucracy acts in line with their social collective benefits. However, there are 
definite limits to the supervisory capacity of political actors. These limits vary 
inversely with the degree of co-ordination required to accomplish the task assigned. In
29 Î
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a large organisation, the higher the degree of co-ordination required the lower the limit 
of supervisory capacity. However, the bureaucratic agent may find it in his interest to 
act in a manner inconsistent with the goals that the principal has set because of 
informational asymmetries. The principal-agent problem, therefore, exists whenever a 
principal relies on agents to carry out its goals. Consequently, the political co­
ordination mechanism does not possess the disciplinary devices that a market 
mechanism does to overcome strategic incentive problems.
30
NATURE
Totalitarian Political Nature
The political power structure is precisely the source from which the chief regularities of 
the political economy can be deduced. Janos Kornai suggested “the key to an
The government-directed politico-economic model in the former USSR was designed 
and intended for the party leadership to direct the whole political economy in order to 
achieve the regime’s goal of building a socialism as fast as possible. The party 
leadership determined social goals and guidelines. In accordance with which, the 
government set its policies. Given the government policy, central-planning organs 
elaborated national economic plans and allocated plan-targets to each individual 
economic unit in the centralised economic hierarchy. Almost all economic units were 
owned by the state and directed by government regulations—plan targets and norms— 
to ftilfil their obligatory assignments. The implementation of the plan-targets was 
ensured by all-round involvement of not only government bureaucrats but also by the 
party-controlled economic apparatus. The basic nature of the Soviet-type government- 
directed politico-economic model is characterised by the totalitarian political power 
structure; the centralised economic hierarchy, the government planning mechanism, and 
the socialist motivation mechanism.
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understanding of the socialist system is to examine the structure of [political] power” in
34the system. The Soviet polity was made up of a unique blend of institutions and
procedures. There were three interlocking hierarchies of political power: the hierarchy 
of soviets, crowned by the Supreme Soviet; the hierarchy of ministries, headed by the 
Council of Ministers; and the hierarchy of the Communist Party. In several ways, the 
political power structure in the Soviet model was said to be totalitarian in nature, as 
described by the ‘dictatorship of the Communist Party’. The classic definition of 
totalitarianism provided by Carl Friedrich and Zbigniew Brezezinski has six key 
elements:
1. an official ideology to which adherence is demanded: the ideology is 
intended to achieve a ‘perfect final stage of mankind’;
2. a single mass party, hierarchically organised, closely interwove with the
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State bureaucracy, and typically led by one man;
3. monopolistic control of the military by the party;
4. a similar monopoly of means of effective communication;
5. a system of terroristic police control; and
356. central direction and control of the entire economy.
In the Soviet system, there was an official ideology, namely socialism and no open 
competition between alternative ideologies among the population was allowed. The 
Communist Party was not only a political party but also the dominant ‘leading and
35guiding force of the Soviet society’. No other political party was allowed to operate
and even any organised opposition within the party was banned. The principle of 
‘democratic centralism’ was extended from the party to the rest of the society and thus 
the Soviet political and administrative procedures reflected an unitary organisational 
practice. The vast party apparatus set out to convince people to support the party and 
its polities, using the whole arsenal of education and modern political propaganda 
served by the press and other mass media and educational, scientific and cultural 
activity. In addition, the mass organisations, such as the trade unions, the All-Union 
Leninist League of Communist Youth {Komsomols), and the women’s unions, were 
manipulated mainly to convey the ideas and intentions of the party to the sectors of 
society corresponding to each organisation. Consequently, the Soviet political power
37Structure was “indivisible and totalitarian” and controlled by the Communist Party. 
Structures of Political Institutions
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was a federal state, consisting of 
fifteen Soviet Socialist Union Republics. The union republics were divided into 
territories {krai), found only in the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic (RSFSR), 
and regions {ohlasti). The eight largest union republics were divided into regions.
The remaining union republics and the regions of the eight largest union republics were 
divided into districts (raiony). A number of nationalities which were not sufficiently 
numerous to have their own union republics were organised into autonomous soviet 
socialist republics (ASSR), autonomous regions {ohlasti) or autonomous areas {okrugi), 
which were subordinated to the union republics. Town-districts, urban settlements and 
villages constituted the lowest level of state authority. Although formally federal in
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structure, the local administration represented the single, indivisible authority of the 
state in a particular locality. All Soviet state institutions functioned as parts of a single 
giant state bureaucracy under the principle of ‘democratic centralism’.
Soviets
The Soviets o f People's Deputies were elected at all levels of the above state divisions,; 
the Supreme Soviet of the USSR; the Supreme Soviets of the union republics; the 
Supreme Soviet of the autonomous republics; territorial and regional Soviets; Soviets of 
autonomous regions and areas; district, city, town-district, urban settlement, and village
38Soviets. From 1937 until 1988 all these soviets of people’s deputies were headed by 
the USSR Supreme Soviet, which consisted of two chambers: the Soviet of the Union 
and the Soviet of Nationalities. The former was elected on the basis of electoral 
districts with an equal number of inhabitants and the latter was elected according to the 
following formula: 32 deputies from each union republic, 11 deputies from each 
autonomous republic, 5 deputies from each autonomous region, and 1 deputy from each 
autonomous area. Each chamber had 750 elected deputies who served five-year terms. 
Sessions of the Supreme Soviet formally convened in Moscow twice a year only for a 
couple of days.
Aiticle 2 of the 1977 Soviet Constitution stated that ‘all power in the USSR belongs to 
the people. The people exercise state power through soviets of people’s deputies, 
which constitute the political foundation of the USSR’. According to Article 108, the
Supreme Soviet o f the USSR was ‘the highest body of state authority’ of the USSR, 
which was authorised to adopt and amend the constitution, to supervise the work of all 
other state bodies, and to approve the state budget and economic plans for economic and
40social development. The Supreme Soviet, therefore, had the legislative authority and, 
as a representative institution, endowed the Soviet regime and the system with formal 
legitimacy. However, up to the mid-1980s the activity of the Supreme Soviet declined 
in practice, for instance, in the frequency and length of sessions or the numbers of
41speeches, while the volume of legislation passed remained fairly constant. The 
Supreme Soviet never rejected a legislative proposal of the party leadership or failed to 
approve a party nominee for government office and no deputy has ever voted against a
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42proposal of the party leadership.
Due to the infrequency and brevity of the sessions, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, 
elected from among its deputies in the Supreme Soviet, carried on its work between 
sessions. The membership of the Presidium included a chairman (or president) and a 
first deputy-chairman, fifteen deputy-chairmen who were also chairman of their 
respective Union Republic Supreme Soviets, a secretary, and twenty-one additional 
members designated by the party leadership from among the deputies to the Supreme 
Soviet. The Soviet Constitution authorised the Presidium to promulgate edicts and 
decrees without the requirement for subsequent legislative approval. Although 
formal meetings of the entire Presidium occurred about every two months, the staff 
functioned continuously throughout the year. The Supreme Soviet conducted some of 
its business in standing commissions (seventeen members in each chamber in 1985) 
concerning social and economic affairs, which had legal authorities to initiate legislation, 
to oversee the activities of specific government ministries, to institute investigations 
into the fulfilment of laws, and to have access to all information and government 
officials necessary to the performance of their duties. Standing commissions normally 
convened in the last few weeks before a semi-annual convocation of the Supreme Soviet
44itself.
The hierarchy of soviets in 1985 was made up of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR at the 
top, 15 supreme soviets of the union republics, 20 supreme soviets of autonomous 
republics, 129 territorial and regional soviets, 8 soviets of autonomous regions, 10 
soviets of autonomous areas, 3,113 district soviets, 2,137 city soviets, 645 town-district 
soviets, 3,828 urban settlement soviets and 42,176 village soviets, a total of 52,074
45soviets of people’s deputies. At the regional and local levels, the soviets had a single 
chamber, ranging in membership from 33 deputies at the village level, 78 in the districts,
134 in the cities, to 218 in the regions and had an executive committee and a presidium
46(with the exception of village soviets). They also had standing commissions to assist
the executive bodies in their work. Locally they met more frequently than their 
national counterparts. According to the constitution, the soviets at every level did 
‘direct all sectors of the state, economic, and social and cultural development, either
I34
directly or thi’ough bodies instituted by them, take decisions and ensure their execution.
47and verify their implication’.
Government
The Soviet government was “the integrated bureaucratic system of economic and 
political power”—an enormous bureaucratic complex, responsible for the national 
planning and management of economy and society, from the farms, shops, and factories
48to the armed forces and educational institutions. The development of the 
governmental stmcture reflected two kinds of need; the specialised administration and 
management on specific aspects of an overall task, and the functional co-ordination over 
the activities of the separated administrative government units and basic economic units 
to ensure they were contributing to common objectives. In response to these two 
needs, two types of government organisations emerged: ministries that managed specific 
sectors of the economy and society and state committees whose main purpose was to 
co-ordinate the activities of ministries in related functional matters common to all 
ministries. The governmental structure of the federal union government was 
duplicated in the union republics and the autonomous republics on smaller scales.
The highest body of the governmental hierarchy was the Council o f Ministers o f the 
USSR, which was made up of a total of 118 members in 1984—a chairman, 3 first 
deputy-chairmen, 11 deputy-chairmen, 63 ministers, 22 chairmen of various state 
committees, 15 chairmen of the councils of ministers of the union republics, and 3 
national administrators with ministerial status, —over half of whom were involved with
49managing the economy. According to Article 128 of the constitution, the Council of 
Ministers was ‘the highest executive and administrative organ of state power’ dealing 
with a large volume of legislative activity as a source of the majority of decrees in the
50country and was responsible to the Supreme Soviet. The Council was such a large 
body for the day-to-day running of the country that it conducted its work through an 
executive committee (presidium), composed of the chairman, first vice-chairmen, and 
vice-chairmen, and its branch departments {otdels). The Council of Ministers was 
more involved with implementing the policy decided by the central body in the party 
rather than policy-making.
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The ministry was usually responsible for one vertically organised branch such as 
agriculture or defence, which directly supervised individual basic economic units like 
enterprises, state farms, and collective farms. The routine business of a ministry was 
handled by its collegium staffed by the minister, the deputy ministers, the heads of the 
chief administrations, and the directors of major units. Each ministry consisted of 
fiinctional departments, such as, a finance department, a planning department, a supply 
department, a cadres department, and a summary department, in addition to a number of 
main administrations in charge of most of the ministry’s operational and administrative 
work. Besides, state committees often cut across several branches for the planning and 
co-ordination of economic activities on an economy-wide basis. Other committees 
were responsible for sport, religious affairs, state prizes, and so on. The state 
committees and ministries themselves fell into three categories: all-union under the 
direct control from Moscow, union-republic under the dual authority of Moscow and the 
republican Councils of Ministers, and republican under the republican Councils of
51Ministers.
Communist Party
The ultimate source of all authority within the party was nominally the all-union Party 
Congress, made up of about 5,000 delegates from all levels of the party hierarchy. The 
Party Congress was held only at infrequent intervals convening once every five years, 
or so, for a week, hence the Central Committee o f the handled all party affairs
52between Party Congresses. One of the significant functions of the Congress was the 
formal election of the members of the Central Committee. Since the membership of 
the Central Committee expanded and its sessions became less firequent, its original role 
was entrusted to the smaller body, the Politburo, which was elected from the Central 
Committee. The Politburo was responsible for the day-to-day running of the party’s
53affairs. Some two dozen full and candidate members of the Politburo met every 
Thursday and chaired by the General Secretary elected in the Central Committee. The 
Politburo was the most important policy-setting body and “the real cabinet of the Soviet 
system” and acted as “a board of directors” which had the supreme governing power not 
only over the Communist Party but also over all matters of public interest in the Soviet
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society.
The sessions of the Central Committee, firstly, gave authoritative endorsement to the 
policies agreed on in the Politburo and secondly gauged the broad consensus of the 
party throughout the country as a basis for friture policy-making. In addition, the 
Central Committee had a Secretariat, composed of 10 to 12 secretaries, which usually 
met on Wednesdays to draft proposals for the next day’s Politburo meeting. The 
General Secretaiy as a head of the Secretariat was merely the one who executed the 
decisions of the party leadership between sessions of the Politburo. The Secretariat 
headed the vast apparatus of appointed officials, who were divided into some 25 
departments. The important departments were administration, party organisation, 
ideology, defence industries, and international (foreign) affairs, with a special 
department for the KGB. The secretariat departments had close links with the
55ministries. The Secretariat was a “shadow ministerial system” assisted by a staff of 
apparatchiki, the full-time party functionaries who oversaw the implementation of56Politburo decisions. Accordingly, the party apparatus played a very important role 
not only in the party but also in the whole Soviet system.
At the republican, provincial, city, and district levels there was the internal structure of 
the local party organisations. At each level, the highest authority was the congress in 
an union republic (except the RSFSR), or the conference at lower levels. The congress 
or conference elected a executive committee—the central committee and the politburo at 
the union republic level, the province party committees iphkom), the city party 
committees (gorkom), and the regional party committees (raikom). Each level in the 
giant pyramid, from the republican committee, obkom, down to the raikom, had a 
bureau, a secretariat and apparatchiki as full-time party officials. They were estimated 
to number about a quarter of a million and 83 per cent of them were employed by
57gorkomy and raikomy. The base of the party hierarchy was primary party 
organisations (PPOs, formerly called party cells), which were oveiwhelmingly 
organised in workplaces and only rarely on a territorial basis. All PPOs had a 
secretary, a bureau if the organisation is large enough, and a committee in the 45,000 
very large organisations.
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Dictatorship of the Communist Party
The 1977 Soviet constitution said little about the relationship between soviet.
The structure of the Communist Party had a hierarchical dimension, reflecting its 
function of leading the whole society as the ‘guiding and leading force’. It was 
composed of party organisations at every level of state administration, fi om the national
organs in Moscow, to republic and regional levels, to large and small cities, and down to 
the most remote villages. The ‘democratic centralism,’ formulated by Lenin, was the 
key principle for governing the organisation of the Communist Party, and indeed of the 
whole society. Rule 19 of the CP SU signified five important elements of the 
democratic centralism: I
1. the election of all leading bodies, from the lowest to the highest;
2. periodical reports of party bodies to their organisations and to higher 
bodies;
3. strict party discipline and subordination of the minority to the majority;
4. the obligatory nature of decisions by higher bodies for lower bodies; and
5. collective spirit in the word of all organisations and the personal 
responsibility^of every communist for the fulfilment of his party 
assignments.
All organisations were elected from the lower to the higher level and they were 
accountable to the people. The decisions of higher organs were binding for lower 
organs. All important decisions were made at the highest levels of a hierarchy and 
only the less important, detailed decisions were delegated to lower levels.
Traditionally, ‘centralism’ predominated over ‘democracy’ and the election process was 
governed from the top down. The centralisation and the subordination of the party 
hierarchy were mainly enforced by the Secretariat that was responsible for day-to-day 
decisions. Each committee had a number of party departments to supervise the 
administrative affairs, ideological work, and personnel appointment in each level. The 
PPOs had broad responsibilities, including admission of new members, mobilising 
fellow workers in Party-sponsored activities, and carrying out various tasks delegated to 
them by higher organs of the party. All lines in the party apparatus ran directly to 
Moscow, suggesting a significant centralisation of power.
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governmental and party hierarchies, and there had was no formal separation of political 
powers until 1989. Although the Supreme Soviet was the highest state body, it had 
been undermined politically by the central party organs and administratively by the 
central government body. After the Bolshevik Revolution, the soviets were 
transformed from revolutionary organisations into the nucleus of the state 
administration in the new country of USSR. In principle, the basis of legitimising the 
Soviet system was the soviets. However, the actual operation of the Soviet system was 
governed more by an “unwritten constitution” of informal rules and convention than by60
:
formal statute. The gulf between principle and practice was complicated by the
undefined dictatorial role of the Communist Party in the Soviet society. Following the 
. . . .Marxist-Leninist principles of ‘socialism’, the ‘leading role of the Communist Party’ 
and ‘democratic centralism’ justified the Communist Party’s right to direct all aspects of 
Soviet society.
Socialism
The official Soviet ideology o f ‘socialism’ opposed individualism, self-interest, 
competition, private ownership of the means of production, and the individual market 
co-ordination mechanism. Instead, it advocated community and fraternity, equality or 
egalitarianism, collective activity, public, mainly state, ownership, and collective 
political co-ordination mechanism. The Communist Paity had a belief of ‘socialism’s 
sense of superiority’. Marx and later Lenin emphasised that socialism’s superiority 
was manifested in not only moral ascendancy but also economic achievement. In this 
context, the Soviet regime was convinced that socialist ownership and production 
relations would offer more favourable conditions for developing the forces of 
production than the capitalist. Hence, socialist ownership in the form of mainly state 
properties and central government planning was regarded as the foundation of the 
politico-economic system, where government should exercise control over the measures 
of labour and their consumption to give individuals more and more real opportunities to 
apply their creative energies, abilities, and talents in their work.
'3
In the economic sense, Soviet socialism firmly rejected the concept of ‘market 
socialism’—the market is politically neutral and therefore may be utilised under
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distributive sense, so that greater wealth could accrue to some than to others, which in 
turn would lead to the growth of a property-owning class. Furthermore, market co­
ordination was thought to be an irrational logic, the sum of individual preferences
62failing to constitute the social collective benefits.
a
socialism as long as scarcity of resources exists. The property-class-market approach 
to socialism dominated in the Soviet regime, which regarded ‘the market’ as an intrinsic 
component of the capitalist mode of production. Only through market operation might 
surplus value be extracted from the working class and production of services and 
commodities was for exchange, which could only take place through the market. This 
approach defined capitalism as an organic system based on a property/class/market 
nexus. The Soviet regime insisted that socialism not only abolished the ownership 
relations of capitalism by replacing private property but also replaced market relations 
by political co-ordination through central government planing. Accordingly, under 
socialism a different set of property, class and central political co-ordination replaced 
the property/class/market nexus of capitalism. The logic of this position was that if 
market co-ordination were adopted, they would undermine socialist society in a
Leading Role o f the Communist Party
Under socialism, the working class had power, but it did not exercise its power directly. 
Hence, the Communist Party guided ‘the general perspective of the development of 
society’ as the dominant ‘leading and guiding force of Soviet society’ on behalf of the 
working class, simply because the party understood the interests of the society better 
than the millions of people outside the party. The Communist Party was the very 
vanguard of the working class and so ultimately also of the whole Soviet society. The 
authority and power of the party was, therefore, legitimated by the manifest expression 
of the people’s interests and the repository of permanent public goods. The party 
organisations persuaded the public of the legitimacy of party directorship and the 
correctness of the goals articulated by the party leadership using the whole arsenal of 
education and modem political propaganda. Consequently, the dictatorship of the 
Communist Party was legitimated and substituted the dictatorship of the proletariat by 
“self-definition” and the Communist Party leadership determined the goals for the
40
Soviet society as a whole and directed social and economic creative activities o f the
63
41
Soviet people.
Accordingly, the central party leadership was the ultimate collective policy-making 
body on every affairs for ‘the general perspective of the development of society’. The 
responsibility for making decisions was closely associated with the accountability for 
securing its implementation. Hence, the result was a curious kind of duplication in 
which the party apparatus was in direct touch with the apparatus of the government.
Each ministry, each local soviet executive committee, and each department of the large 
city and provincial administrations had its own primary party organisation. These 
PPOs had rights to ‘exercise control over the government work of administration in
64fulfilling party and government directives’. The local and primary party 
organisations and their secretaries in republics, cities, regions, factories, farms and other 
basic units were the cornerstone of the party directorship in the Soviet political 
economy. Each party organisations and party secretaries were judged by not only their 
performance in ensuring social order but also fulfilment of economic plans in their 
territories, hence their careers depended on detailed involvement in government 
administration and economic operation of economic units.
Democratic Centralism
The distinctive and well-known tool of the party directorship was the nomenklatura 
system. The nomenklatura system ensured a stable group of political, economic, and 
social elite composed mostly of party members or favourable persons for the party to 
occupy leading positions in all formal political, economic and social institutions. Prior 
to a person’s appointment or election to an important post in the party, government, 
state, or any social and economic organisation, his name had to be on a “list,” namely 
the nomenklatura, of candidates for the listed posts, which was approved by a 
responsible party secretariat at each level. Accordingly, all important posts in the party, 
soviets, ministries, enterprises, farms, armed forces, and leading scientific, academic 
and cultural institutions were appointed by the party. The centre of the vast 
nomenklatura system was the Secretariat of the Central Committee. In this way the 
party controlled the appointment, promotion, and firing of officials inside as well as
3:'I
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outside the party and ensured the loyalty both of the people appointed and of their
65organisation to cany out party policy willingly.
The nomenklatura system reinforced the extensive interlocking party-state bureaucracy 
between party committees and soviets, government, and social and economic 
organisations, which used its membership to maximise the effect through placing them 
in strategic positions in the state bureaucracy. Some members of the elected party 
bodies held leading positions of ministers, deputy ministers, chief executives of state- 
owned firms, ambassadors, generals, police chiefs, deputies of each soviet, and so on. 
For that reason, the term of bureaucracy in the Soviet system could apply to the entire 
party, state and government apparatuses, and social and economic organisations. The 
chief organising principle in the Soviet bureaucracy was the ‘democratic centralism’. 
Not only the authority of the highest leadership in the bureaucracy but also the prestige, 
privileges and benefits that were granted to them served as a major monitoring and
incentive mechanism by which the party directed the whole society including the
66economy. Consequently, the principle of ‘democratic centralism’ was extended 
from the party to the state bureaucracy, and finally to the rest of society. Thus, the 
Soviet political and administrative procedures reflected unitary organisational practice.
Government-Directed Economic Nature
Marx and Engels wrote little about the nature of the future socialist economy. Without 
any precise description, they only emphasised the principles of public ownership and 
central planning to overcome critical problems inherent to capitalism. According to 
them, the resource allocation and economic co-ordination by the market mechanism 
based on private ownership would create a crucial anarchy in the capitalist political 
economy. This anarchy might be overcome by centrally co-ordinated collective 
actions, that is, some form of central planning. Moreover, the Soviet socialists, 
including Lenin, were impressed by the ‘German war economy,’ where the central 
government directed individual economic activities with directive political control in
67order to pursue the war purpose. Following the Marxist theory of ‘ socialism’ and 
‘collectivism’ and observing the ‘German war economy, the Soviet regime adopted the 
principle of directive management to co-ordinate the economy. The logical economic
I
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consequence was the government-directed nature of the Soviet politico-economic 
system characterised by three main features of economic institutions and mechanisms: 
the centralised economic hierarchy, the government planning mechanism, and the 
socialist motivation mechanism.
Centralised Economic Hierarchy
The economic decision-making structure of the Soviet system was a highly centralised 
hierarchy. This hierarchy included not only administrative units in the government but 
also basic economic units, since almost all legal enterprises and farms were owned by 
the state. The principle of ‘democratic centralism’ was also applied for the effective 
fimction of the economic bureaucracy. All important decisions were made at the 
higher units of the hierarchy and only the less important, detailed decisions were 
delegated to lower units. Each decision received from a higher level was a 
command—plan was state law, not a recommendation, and therefore the subordinate 
was obliged to implement it. As a result, the Soviet economy was commonly referred 
to as a ‘command economy’. The decision-making authorities in the hierarchy of 
economic bureaucracy were not based on their ownership claims for the means of 
production but on the delegation of authority to them, as protectors of the socially 
owned means of production.
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Party-State Economic Bureaucracy
In the Soviet hierarchy of economic bureaucracy, the leadership of the Communist Party 
played roles of the board of directors to direct the Soviet economy. For that reason, the 
central bodies of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union—the Central Committee of 
the CPSU, the Politburo, and the Secretariat—were considered rather more significant 
in the Soviet policy-making than the governmental cabinet of the USSR Council of 
Ministers. In principle, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Party Congress had 
supreme powers, but these organs were too large to serve as effective policy-making
bodies. In practice, they served mainly as a means of ratifying the decisions and
68policies decided in advance by smaller executive bodies. Consequently, the Politburo, 
the Central Committee, and the Secretariat of the CPSU held the real executive power to
I
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69reach final policy decisions. The Council of Ministers of the USSR was responsible
for executing the policies determined by these party central bodies.
The Central Committee (CC) o f the CPSU issued formal decrees, which represented 
party policies. The periodic meetings of the Central Committee served as sounding 
boards for the consideration of policy alternatives and as a body that gave authoritative 
endorsement to the policies agreed on the Politburo o f the CC. In the crucially 
important sense of political decision-making and policy determination, the Politburo 
was the most important policy-setting body, where all major policies were decided.
The Politburo had the authority to determine economic policies, which indicated 
guidelines and general priorities of government national planning. The party policies 
determined by the Politburo were approved and enacted by the Central Committee and 
by the Supreme Soviet. The Central Committee had the Secretariat as an agenda- 
setter for the Politburo meeting that played a major role in deciding which items should 
appear on the agenda of the Politburo. The Secretariat also headed the large number of 
departments of the CC, which supeiwised the implementation of Politburo decisions.
The Council o f Ministers (CM) o f the USSR exercised general supervision of activities 
for the government economic management in the Soviet system and served as the chief
70“executive arm” of the political masters. It was empowered to issue government 
regulations in the form of decrees and resolutions so as to co-ordinate the economic 
activities and social construction. It, therefore, had responsibility for formulating 
national economic plans for economic and social development and the state budget, and 
supervised and monitored government planning organs and administrative units through 
its branch departments. However, as it was a too large body—118 members in 1984— 
to supervise effectively the complex affairs of government, these affairs were actually 
lain by a smaller body, the Presidium o f the CM. The Presidium aggregated and 
articulated social demands of an economic kind and then translated them into economic
71policies with bringing them to the attention of the Politburo. The Presidium played 
the role as “Economic Bureau,” which was responsible for making economic policy 
below the level of significance demanded for the Politburo consideration.
The broad economic policies of the Politburo and the Presidium of the Council of
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Ministers were translated into economic plans by government planning organs, 
reconciling the requests from the basic economic units through the administrative
73bureaucratic hierarchy. The Gosplan (the State Planning Commission), as the most 
important planning organ, had responsibility for preparing the draft of annual, mid­
term—typically on a five-year basis—, and long-term “perspective” plans for the 
economic and social development and the state budget. Gosplan had no productive 
economic units under its order and therefore no responsibility for under-fulfilment of
74their planning targets as well as bad planning except in extraordinaiy circumstances. 
Hence, Gosplan served as a “specialist adviser” to the Council of Ministers, and in
75practice also to the Politburo. Gosplan itself contained two kinds of departments: co­
ordinating departments for national planning, territorial planning and location, material 
balance and allocation, capital investments, labour productivity, and wages and sectoral
76departments for planning particular branches of industry. Gosplan was assisted by a 
number of functional state committees, functional ministries, and research institutions.
The functional state committees, specialising in engineering, technical, price, and 
finance matters, had responsibility for providing technical information and giving 
advice to Gosplan and the Council of Ministers in making decisions of national 
planning. They gave Gosplan independent information on which to evaluate the
requests from below and set rules and norms, i.e., parametric functional regulations, for
the co-ordination of nation-wide economic activities in their spheres. Gossnab (the
State Committee for Material and Technical Supply) distributed detailed assortments of
materials to ministries according to priorities set out in the plan. Goskomtsen (the
State Committee on Prices) set prices for important goods and established rules for price
setting. Goskomtrud (the State Committee on Labour and Wages) established staffing
norms and the rules of compensation and payment. GKNT (the State Committee on
Science and Technology) set norms for scientific work. Gosstroi (the State Committee
on Construction) set standards for documenting construction projects and assisted
Gosplan in site and project selection. Goskomstandart (the State Committee on 
.Standards) established rules forjudging quality standards and there were many more of
77them.
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The functional ministries also played co-ordinating and supervising role similar to that 
of the functional state committees. The Ministry of Finance QAinfiri) co-ordinated the 
state budget and the banking system, the most important components of the latter being 
Gosbank (the State Bank), Stroibank (the State Construction Banlc), and Vneshtorgbank 
(the Foreign Trade Bank). These banks had a monopoly on issuing credits. Gosbank 
was the most important of them, and worked directly with the enterprises to cany
78through their credit plans and monitored the supply of money. The Ministry of Trade 
(Mintorg) was primarily engaged in managing retail trade through the state retail outlets 
and restaurants, canteens, and other eating establishments. It was not directly involved 
in setting outputs for products or deciding on their distribution, but managed the sale of 
the products that eventually emerged from factories operating under the planning.
These functional state committees and ministries did not have subordinated productive 
economic units and enterprises, thus they were not held responsible for their plan
79fulfilment and any economic outcomes.
For the management of economic branches, branch ministiies maintained the 
operational links between central planning organs and basic economic units. Each 
branch ministry supervised the activities of their subordinate economic units. Their 
activities were monitored by a sectoral department of the Council of Ministers. They 
received their ministerial plan-targets from Gosplan and bore responsibility for the 
fulfilment of these plans. Each branch ministry, therefore, had the authority to make 
operational plans for subordinate economic units based on these ministerial plans. To 
ensure plan-fulfilment, they elaborated operational plan-targets and devised appropriate 
incentives for their subordinates to fulfil their plan-targets. They were also responsible 
for the allocation of materials and equipment to their economic units subject to the input 
limits set by Gosplan as an ‘allocation-holder’. The branch ministry consisted of 
functional departments, such as a finance department, a planning department, a supply 
department, a cadres department, and a summary department, and a number of main
administrations (glavki). Most of the operational work of the branch ministry was
80done by its glavki.
The individual economic units in industry, agriculture, and other branches of the
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economy, such as production enterprises, state farms and collective farms, and state 
shops, were the basic units of production, distribution, and exchange. Each economic 
unit received its individual plan disaggregated from a ministerial plan by its superior 
branch ministry. This plan specified in considerable detail physical and financial plan- 
targets in production, material inputs, technical progress, capital constmction, labour 
and social development, and finance. The economic unit was responsible for the 
fulfilment of its individual plans. It was also charged with providing information 
about its future production possibilities with the available resources and technology and 
sending draft proposals for the future planning to its branch ministry and to Gosplan.
The economic unit was headed by a professional manager or director, who was aided by 
a staff of accountants, engineers, designers, technologists, and economists. The 
manager was responsible for the plan-fiilfilment of his economic unit. Within the
constraints imposed by the plan, the manager had an authority to make operational
81decisions managing labour and capital resources.
Besides the management of economic branches and by the branch ministries and the 
operational management of individual economic units by it managers, local party 
organisations also got involved in the management and the operational side of economy.
It could be justified by the party’s responsibility to supervise all aspects of Soviet social
82and economic life and to implement party policies. Although the local party 
organisations at republican, provincial, city, and district levels had no formal authority 
to make operational plans for economic units in their jurisdictional territory, they were 
easily involved in their operational decisions, since they held responsibility for the 
economic performance of their territory, normally measured by the achievement of 
territorial plan targets and the percentage of territorial production units that met these
83targets. They therefore monitored plan-fiilfilment, enforcing centralised priorities, 
formulating regional policy, resolving conflicts, and handling appointments to key
84positions that were not filled by the Moscow cadres department.
The households provided labour as workers and consumed produced goods and services 
as consumers. Their activities were controlled primarily by the quasi-market 
mechanism, rather than by the government planning mechanism, unlike the individual
economic activities of other participants. They had some degree of free choice in the 
market for consumer goods and services and for labour, but they had only very limited 
opportunities. Almost all consumer goods and services were produced by state 
enterprises and supplied by state agencies according to the government plans. Most 
prices and wages were also determined by central planners, rather than by the 
interaction between demands and supplies in markets. Furthermore, their private 
economic activities, such as private employment, production and trade, were restricted 
by Soviet law. It was illegal to employ anyone to produce a commodity for sale and to
85sell anything one had not oneself produced. Consequently, in the Soviet consumer
market ‘planner’s preferences’ substituted ‘consumer sovereignty’ by taking individual 
free decision-making out of their hands and placing it under the collective political 
control.
Government Planning Mechanism
The function of the information mechanism in the politico-economic system is to collect, 
absorb, and generate information on the given state of socio-economic environment, 
such as available resources and scarcity of these resources, available technology, 
production possibilities with available resources and technology, and social preferences. 
The information mechanism co-ordinates the decisions of each economic participant to 
efficiently and optimally utilise economic resources for the maximum social welfare as 
a whole. In the market-oriented model, most of the steps that must be taken to co­
ordinate economic decisions occur autonomously and automatically under the guidance 
of market prices steered by the ‘invisible hand’. However, in the government-directed 
model, such steps are politically co-ordinated by government planning, thus guided by 
the controlled hand of the state. In the Soviet system of the government-directed 
model, therefore, the economic co-ordination was guided by the government planning 
organs.
National Economic Planning
The Soviet national economic planning process was virtually a constant ‘vertical 
bureaucratic bargaining’ procedures, which continuously occurred within the hierarchy
48
86of the Soviet economic bureaucracy. The bargaining was supervised, conducted and 
organised by Gosplan around negotiations over long-, medium-, and short-term nation
87economic planning. The long- or medium-term, usually five years, plan provided a 
general view of the desired future state of the economy. However, this five-year plan 
was not operational because the limited and highly aggregated data did not form the 
basis for specific directives to various economic units in the economy. The five-year 
plan had evident implications for the investment program and was used primarily as a 
guide to the construction of short-term plans. The short-term, usually annual, plan was 
the operational plan, which must give specific and directive orders regarding what to
produce, how to produce, and where to get inputs and to deliver outputs to thousands of
88basic economic units throughout the whole economy.
The annual plan was very similar to that of the five-year plan, but more compressed in 
time and more expanded in coverage to be operational. The annual plan was guided
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The procedure of the famous five-year plan began approximately three years before the
89plan was to take effect. Gosplan started to gather information on the production 
possibilities and requested ff om economic units through the economic hierarchy, and 
was assisted in doing so by various functional state committees. With the collected 
information, Gosplan set specified targets, so-called 'controlfigures for the growth 
rates of national income, investment, defence, consumption, and foreign sector in 
accordance with guidelines and priorities that had been determined by their political
90masters in the party. These control figures were approved by the Council of 
Ministers and the Politburo, and passed down to branch ministries and finally to
91individual economic units in more disaggregated form. Each individual economic 
unit negotiated with its branch ministry over alterations of its control figures with their 
own counter-proposals. In turn after bargaining with the branch ministries, Gosplan 
prepared a draft plan in greater detail, which was later approved by the Council of 
Ministers and the Politburo and subsequently enacted by the Supreme Soviet as a five- 
year plan. The final version of the five-year plan passed down again through the 
bureaucratic hierarchy to individual economic units as a legal document which they 
were obliged to implement.
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by its five-year plan and technically a one-year division of five-year plan. In 
accordance with the guidelines and priorities of the party, the control figures for the 
coming year were developed during the first quarter based on information about recent 
economic performance and norms for improved efficiency in the use of major inputs 
assisted by functional state committees. These control figures were mainly concerned 
with growth in national income and its distribution among final uses, which in turn 
implied output for various branches and input requirements. These figures were 
transmitted to appropriate branch ministries and finally to individual economic units in 
more detailed form. Along the entire chain of the bureaucratic hierarchy, the comment 
on their figures and negotiations for the adjustment of the delivered control figures were 
sought during the second and third quarters. After these bargaining, individual 
economic units and ministries were charged with sending draft counter-proposals back 
to Gosplan.
Gosplan then formulated the finally internal balance between the planned supplies of 
each commodity and its targeted requirements of material inputs and final uses.
Gosplan prepared for about 2,000 most important products and Gossnab prepared for
9218,000 important products. The key method used by Gosplan and Gossnab was the
93method of ‘material balances’. Once they were brought into balance, this process 
concluded with a draft annual plan. It was approved by the Council of Ministers and
94the Politburo and then passed as a law by the Supreme Soviet. The enacted annual 
plan was sent down to branch ministries as an obligatory set of plan-targets. Each 
branch ministry in turn broke these targets into plan-targets for subordinate economic 
units, whose totals must add up at all times to the ministry’s targets. According to the 
annual plan, the most important industrial raw materials and equipment, so-called 
“centrally planned commodities,” were allocated to branch ministries by Gosplan and 
Gossnab in the form of allocation certificates {nariady). Again, each branch ministry, 
as “allocation-holders” (fondoderzhateli), reallocated these centrally planned
95commodities to their subordinate economic units.
The final plan which was handed down to the individual economic units was the 
technical-industrial-financial plan {techpromfinplan), which specified both their
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physical and financial targets in six categories; production, material inputs, technical
96progress, capital construction, labour and social development, and finance. The most 
important one was the production plan, and particularly the gross-output targets which it 
contained, mainly because the most important economic objectives of the Soviet regime 
was rapid growth in production. The production plan included targets for the output of 
key products in physical units, targets for delivery, and targets for the share of output in 
a three-tier quality standards system—highest, high, and all others. The material input 
plan included deliveries for essential inputs and targets for reductions in the use of these 
inputs. The technical progress plan included targets for innovations in products and 
processes. The capital constmction plan included targets for additions to capacity
■from new machinery and modernisation of existing plant. The labour and social 
development plan specified the size of the labour force and the wage fund. The 
financial plan specified major financial flows, most notably of profits, loans incurred 
and repaid, and reseiwe hinds.
Central Planning Co-ordination
In the Soviet politico-economic system, the government planning mechanism covered
97eveiy aspect of economic activities. In production decision, there were production
targets for the most important priority products: quantities in physical units or aggregate 
value terms. For the allocation of semi-finished and finished producer goods and 
materials, quotas (upper limits) for various inputs in uses and their balances were 
prepared. One side of the balance consisted of the sources, such as production, 
imports, reduction of stocks, and other uses, like production use, exports, consumption 
by the population and increase of stocks. For the allocation of labour forces, 
manpower quotas and wage funds were distributed among the various spheres, and 
wages rates and differentials were set in order to manipulate labour forces. In the 
investment decision, aggregate investment quotas for investment projects were broken 
down. The separate quotas were set for the utilisation of constmction capacity and for 
imports of capital goods. For the technical development, the new technologies for 
introduction, the fields in which to employ them, and the new products whose 
manufacture should be launched were planned. On foreign trade and international
economic relations, import quotas needed to equilibrate the balances and the export 
targets were set.
Producer Goods and Materials. The supply and demand for producer goods and 
materials were balanced through the material balance planning. These producer goods 
and materials, so called “centrally planned commodities,” were allocated to each 
enterprises by planning agencies, such as Gosplan, Gossnab, and branch ministries as 
“allocation-holders.” This allocation was distributed in the form of allocation 
certificates (nariady), which allowed its recipients to obtain the items needed in the 
quantities specified. Accordingly, unlike the market prices in the market-oriented 
system, the Soviet prices of producer goods and materials in their wholesale trade were 
primarily accounting prices, and thus played no real allocative role. The wholesale 
prices were set on the basis of the average cost of production in each branch plus a 
small profit mark-up about 5 to 10 per cent in general. Included in costs were wage 
payments, costs of intermediate materials, depreciation, insurance, and payments to 
overhead. Interest and rental charges were not normally included in costs, and the 
depreciation charge did not include charges for obsolescence. Using branch average 
costs as a standard resulted in both planned profits and losses in the operation of
98economic units within the same branch ministry.
Consumer Goods and Services. In retail trades for consumer goods and services, the 
Soviet planners relied heavily on the turnover tax or subsidies in addition to government 
rationing or just tolerating an excess demand for specific products. The supply of 
consumer goods and services was planned largely by planners, but their demand was a 
function of relative prices, incomes, and consumer preferences which were largely out 
of the direct purview of planners’ controls. For the balance of consumer goods and 
services, the government planning agencies typically set their retail prices at or near the 
market-clearing level simply by adding turnover taxes or subsidies—if the wholesale 
price was above the clearing level. The Soviet price policy always emphasised the 
desirability of pricing necessary goods and services relatively “low” and others luxuries 
relatively “high”. The turnover tax—the difference between wholesale and retail 
prices—became an important component of the Soviet budgetary revenue.
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Consequently, the Soviet equilibrium in the retail trade was determined by government- 
set retail prices which just reflected planners’ preferences, not expressions of consumer
99demand.
Labour. Although there was a substantial degree of market influence on the Soviet 
wages stmcture, labour forces were administratively manipulated by government plans. 
Once the output targets were decided, the requirements of labour to produce the given 
output targets were also planned on the basis of technical coefficients (norms), 
representing the amount of labour required per unit of output with existing technology. 
However, on the supply side, workers were, to a substantial degree, fi’ee to make
I
occupational choices and to decide between labour and leisure. For that reason, wage 
differentials or other devices were also used to manipulate labour supply in an attempt 
to induce appropriate supplies to meet the planned demands for labour among its 
various occupations, uses, and regions. The wage rates and wage differentials were 
determined by wage-setting government agencies. The trade unions and individual 
workers played virtually no effective role in setting wages. In the 1980s, industrial 
workers were divided into six tariff schedules for wages rates. High average wages
were set in priority sectors, in regions with harsh climates and lacking cultural amenities,
100and for dangerous work and work performed under arduous conditions.
Investment. In the market-oriented model, the investment decisions for research and 
development (R&D) work are determined independently and the investment projects are 
selected based upon projected rates of return by enterprises themselves. In contrast, 
the investment decisions and projects in the Soviet system were planned 
administratively and largely controlled at the ministry level by project-making 
government organisations. With the output plan-targets, the amounts of capital 
investment that would be necessary to produce these output targets were planned at the 
same time. The investment programmes were planned for five-year periods and 
sometimes longer. Once the investment plan had been approved, the investment ffmds 
would be disseminated through the state banking system within the confines of 
availability. The Ministry of Finance provided a portion of the funds required to 
finance the various investment projects and the Investment Bank with Gosbank, was in
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directly charge of disbursing such funds for investment projects and providing the funds
for general repairs. High levels of investment were absolutely central to the Soviet
model of economic development, based on the rapid growth of heavy industry and on
the holding down of consumption levels, at least in the short run, to make room for 
101investment.
Innovation. The technological development was predicted and embodied in economic 
plans, too. Certainly, the basic research was still the prerogative of the Academy of 
Sciences, that was directly responsible to the Council of Ministers, but of course had 
facilities at republican level as well as at the centre. After 1961, however, a new State 
Committee for the Co-ordination of Scientific Research (now Science and Technology) 
was set up to break the stranglehold of the Academy on all R&D and co-ordinate much 
of the Soviet R&D effort. Besides, most of the applied R&D works were handled by 
external R&D organisations attached to each branch ministry, while large enterprises 
had their own R&D facilities. As innovations moved closer to the production stage 
within a ministry, they passed through an engineering-design organisation to a 
construction-engineering organisation that produced the blueprints for a new plant.
About 45 per cent of the Soviet R&D budget were spent centrally, either by the 
Academy itself or tlii'ough the co-operation of ministries in joint ventures. In the 
defence sector the R&D facilities attached to factories and pilot plants. Moreover,
quality control had been carried out by military inspectors protected from the influence
102of factory directors.
Foreign Trade. Foreign trade was monopolised by the state and the decisions about 
the foreign trade in terms of what would be traded, with whom, and on what terms were 
also administratively planned. Due to the state monopoly of foreign trade, the 
domestic consumers or producers to enter foreign markets were substantially isolated 
from them. As the individual enterprises generally did not deal with the external world, 
the various foreign trade organisations (FTOs) conducted foreign trade and provided 
necessary technical and financial seiMces. The Ministry of Foreign Trade (MFT), like 
other ministries, was responsible for foreign trade planning, that is, the development of 
import-export plans, material and services supply plans, and the balance of payments
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plans, all of which formed an integral part of the material balance planning. The
?
financial arrangement was handled by a special bank, Vneshtorgbank (the Foreign Trade
Bank), in close co-operation with the Ministry of Foreign Trade. For both imports and
exports, the internal dealings between FTOs and enterprises were conducted at domestic
rouble prices and the external trading at negotiated or world market prices. A surplus 
.in the foreign trade was paid directly into the state budget. Most of the Soviet foreign 
trade, even with other socialist countries, was bilateral, that is, directly negotiated for 
each trade deal with each trading partner. The bilateral trade means that Soviet exports
103and imports were handled largely on a barter basis.
Finance: State Budget. The balance between the demand and supply of credit, like 
most other macroeconomic balances, was co-ordinated by government without 
adjustments in the opportunity costs of credit. The demand for credit was determined 
as a by-product of physical planning. The banking system automatically supplied the 
credit required to implement the physical plan. The state monopoly bank, Gosbank, 
provided banking services and played three important functions: providing short-term 
loans for working capital; overseeing enterprise plan-fulfilment and monitoring 
payments to the population by acting as the centre of all accounts; and creating money. 
Gosbank was the sole legal grantor of short-term credit to finance inventories and 
working capital as well as the single clearing agent. Gosbank was, therefore, in a 
unique position to monitor enterprise operation. Each enterprise was required to hold 
an account with a local Gosbank branch where all transactions were recorded.
Gosbank’s audit operations served primarily to reveal deviations from the planned tasks, 
which were then corrected by planners. Gosbank, in conjunction with the Ministry of 
Finance, formally controlled the supply of money by authorising enterprises to pay 
additional wage fimds and by creating new money, if government expenditures
i04exceeded government revenues, to cover the budget deficits.
The major financial decisions in the Soviet economy were reflected in the annual state 
budget, which directed available resources and finances into consumption, investment, 
defence, and government administration. The state collected revenues from sale taxes, 
so-called turnover tax, deductions from enterprise profits, direct taxes on the population.
:
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and social insurance contributions. These revenues were then directed through the 
national budget, the republican budgets, and provincial and local budgets to finance 
investment in the form of grants; to finance communal consumption; and to finance 
defence and administration. Since all capital was owned by state and capital markets 
did not exist, the ‘income’ from capital would accme directly to the state budget and 
ffom which the various investment projects were directly financed. The state budget, 
therefore, had a much larger portion of the Soviet GNP, about 45 per cent in the 
cumulative average for the post-war period than 10 to 30 per cent in USA between 1929 
and the present. This ability to control savings and investments was a powerfiil 
mechanism to promote a more rapid rate of economic growth than would likely be 
tolerated in the market-oriented system. Though the Soviet officials claimed that the 
Soviet State budget had been balanced, there had been budget deficits between 2 and 8
105per cent of the GNP in the 1980s.
Socialist Motivation Mechanism
In the market-oriented model, the major motivating force is the pursuit of individual 
self-interests or private gains. For instance, the worker’s choice of the higher paying 
job, the businessman’s acceptance of the more profitable contract, and the investor’s
.ipurchase of the higher interest security, all which motivate the individual participants to
work actively with creative initiative and to reach economic efficiency in their
106activities. Compared with the market-oriented system, the main distinctive feature 
of the motivation mechanism in the Soviet system was the ‘socialist motivation’ under 
the ‘socialist ownership of the means of production’ in accordance with the Soviet
107official ideology of socialism. The Soviet economist, Abalkin describes the socialist
motivation in The Economic System o f Socialism. “Under socialism, all the finit of
collective labour go to the working people, and solely to them. This gives rise to a
new powerful impulse of working energy in the form of creative activity and socialist
emulation.” Consequently, under the condition of socialism, the individual self-
interests and the interests of society as a whole together become united and therefore
“the organic unity of personal and public interests” become the direct motive forces of
108all individual activities.
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Socialist Moral and Material Incentives
The core of the Soviet motivation mechanism in the economy was how the party 
leadership and the government gave individual economic participants the sufficient 
incentives to apply their creative energies, abilities, and talents for their work. In other 
words how higher authorities activated their lower units to obey plan-directives and 
how higher authorities manipulated sufficient incentives to assure that their lower units 
would make the decisions desired for the Soviet society and conformed with the party 
policy. Under the directorship of the Communist Party in the Soviet politico-economic 
system, the local party organisations and their committees, all the way up to the 
Politburo, gave formidable pressures for each participants at all levels of the 
bureaucratic hierarchy to take the government plan seriously and to fill the plan which 
they had received from superior units. Historically, there were three significant groups 
of socialist incentives that the Soviet system director, namely the party leadership, relied 
on so as to create a productive work-force and to make the system operate properly: 
socialist obligation, moral incentive, and material incentive.
In accordance with the socialist principle of “from each according to his ability, to each 
according to his work,” the Communist party and the Soviet government exercised 
control over the measures of labour and their consumption to offer individuals more and 
more real opportunities for applying their creative energies, abilities, and talents in their 
work. Consequently, everyone had the state guaranteed rights to work and to chose 
their profession and they were free to choose their sphere of activity and way of 
applying their ability, but to work was their duty. The duty to work was a major 
obligation of every able individual and therefore measures were taken against those who 
refused to take part in socially beneficial labour. Article 60 of the 1977 Soviet 
Constitution formulated this socialist obligation as follows:
It is tlie duty of, and a matter of honour for, every able-bodied citizen 
of the USSR to work conscientiously in Ms chosen, socially useful 
occupation, and strictly to observe labour discipline. Evasion of 
socially useful work is incompatible witlitlie principles of socialist
109society.
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In addition, the Communist Party had long engaged in the task of socialising the Soviet
people into ‘Soviet men’ who had ‘communist morality’, that is, concern about the
public interest; a conscientious and creative attitude toward work; political activeness;
socialist patriotism; high civic consciousness; a spirit of collectivism; readiness to offer
comradely mutual assistance; impatience with relics of the past; and lofty moral 
_ _ 110qualities. Historically, all kind of moral incentives, such as personal honour and 
gratification, solidarity, and patriotism or feelings of nationalism, were manipulated to 
induce their compliance with party policies and government plans and stimulate their 
motivation for the fulfilment of their plan-targets. The mass media was replete with 
stories praising the work of exemplary workers and criticising those who had failed to I
show sufficient zeal or initiative in their plan-fulfilment. Also, the regime constantly 
campaigned to stimulate workers’ incentives for plan-fulfilment like the Stakhanovite 
movement of the 1930s, awarded for factories that had fulfilled or over-fulfilled the 
plan, or decorated honorary awards and titles to individual workers who had been 
exemplary in their work.
.Besides the formidable efforts of the Soviet regime to emphasise the socialist obligation 
and to induce moral incentives, material incentives or material self-interests were also 
one of the keystones of the Soviet motivation mechanism. Lenin himself used to say 
that communism must be built “not directly on enthusiasm but with the aid of 
enthusiasm born out of the great revolution; [communism must be built] on private 
interest, on personal incentive, on businesslike accounting.” Following Lenin’s 
suggestion, material incentives, such as the material bonuses and penalties for plan- 
fulfilment, were designed to stimulate individual economic participants conducting the 
desired participation and efforts for the party policies and the government plans. 
However, the material self-interest was acceptable only if it would promote public 
wealth for the Soviet society. Consequently, the central government authorities strictly 
controlled the size of earnings retained by each economic unit and their distribution 
among the accounts, which were used significantly for their investments and workers’ 
welfare and bonuses to give incentives for their plan-fulfilment.
Annual plans specified in considerable detail the flow of earnings into those economic
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simulation accounts as a function of fulfilling key plan-targets. The economic 
stimulation accounts were the basic accounts that the enterprise management could 
draw on to pay bonuses, to finance other expenditures affecting worker welfare, and to 
undertake small capital projects in the enterprise. The important accounts for the 
economic stimulation fund were the Material Stimulation Account, the Social-Cultural 
Measures and Housing Account, and the Production Development Account. The 
Material Stimulation Account was the sole source for enterprise managers’ bonuses as 
well as the very source of all bonuses to workers. These bonuses were the primary 
device available to the enterprise management for rewarding those workers who had 
contributed most to their plan-fulfilment, since their wage scales were fixed centrally by
the government. The Social-Cultural Measures and Housing Account was a source 
used by the enterprise management to contribute to the housing and housing repair and 
the construction of children’s institutions, clubs, or sports facilities. The Production 
Development Account was a source to make small investments involving, for example,
113technical refurbishing of a plant.
Intrinsic Co-ordination Problems
The Soviet regime’s principle of directive economic management through the 
government planning mechanism was deeply connected with the governing principles 
of the ruling Communist Party, i.e., Soviet socialism, the leading role of the Communist 
Party, and democratic centralism. For the purpose of shortening the transition period 
from the socialist society to the communist society, the Communist Party organised the 
centralised hierarchical state bureaucracy to co-ordinate social and economic creative 
activities of the Soviet people and manage the whole Soviet socialist economy through 
the government planning mechanism. Each economic participant was placed in the 
centralised economic hierarchy, co-ordinated by their directive plan-targets and norms, 
obliged to engage in the fulfilment of their plan-targets, and expected to be motivated 
by the socialist moral and material incentives. Although the Soviet system was 
intended and designed to co-ordinate individual economic activities in detail by the 
government planning mechanism, there existed certain communication distance 
between party leadership, planners and plan-implementers. Moreover, each level in
I
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the economic bureaucracy including the management of state enterprises felt co­
responsibility for the fulfilment of plan-targets, which created incentive problems in 
individual economic activities.
Information and Incentive Problems
I
In a large industrially developed economy, a large number of microeconomic 
interrelationships must be considered to co-ordinate effectively all individual economic 
activities. An increase in the size and complexity of the economy and an increase in 
the rate of changes in the socio-economic environment will, therefore, result in a greater 
burden on the information mechanism, particularly on the government directive 
mechanism, in the politico-economic system. For the effective and optimal economic 
co-ordination of the government directive mechanism, the central government 
authorities should obtain detailed information for every basic economic unit in all field 
and should deal with interrelations among all these units and all goods and services. In 
consequence, it is simply unmanageable for them to deal with a large number of 
detailed microeconomic decisions for the co-ordination of individual economic 
activities. The essential weakness for optimal co-ordination in the Soviet government- 
directed model was caused by this information problem. However, through directive
agovernment economic management and national planning the party leadership was able to control over resources to flow in a direction that would achieve the priorities 
determined by them.
Another weakness for optimal co-ordination in the Soviet system came from incentive 
problems. In the market-oriented raodel, the entrepreneurial incentives of profit and 
loss derived from private property and free competition reveal the previous errors with 
losses and motivate individuals not only to learn better ways but also to discover new 
ways of arranging or rearranging means to pursue their profits, through which socially 
desirable goals are obtained with the efficient allocation and utilisation of scarce 
resources. For that reason, the private property ownership and free economic 
competition are perhaps its most significant weapon in combating the incentive ■
problems of economic co-ordination in the market system. However, in the Soviet 
government-directed model, the state property ownership produced a situation where
since everyone owned everything nobody owned anything. Consequently, the public 
property was not cared for and resources were wasted all the time. Furthermore, the 
state was the source and protector of monopolistic practices and economic safety for 
economic participants, which generated the lack of competition and incentives for hard 
and creative work in individual economic activities.
'I
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Intrinsic Economic Phenomena
Figure 5, Nature of the Soviet-type Government-Directed Model iÎ
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Throughout the history of the Soviet government-directed system, in practice, the Soviet 
economic participants possessed neither sufficient information nor incentives to 
appraise the alternative use of scarce resources in production. The Soviet government 
planning mechanism was unable to provide information to economic actors concerning 
errors and incentive weapons to eliminate these errors. Therefore, the existing social, 
political and economic life was one of perpetual error.  ^ These information and 
incentive problems were likely to generate chronic co-ordination problems in the 
individual economic activities, which induced unique intrinsic economic phenomena in
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the Soviet political economy. These phenomena can be characterised by ‘economic 
bureaucratism’, ‘centralised pluralism’, ‘non-scarcity information’, ‘supply uncertainty’, 
‘success indicator problems’, ‘soft budget constraints’, and ‘economic security’.
These economic phenomena exerted a great influence on individual economic decision- 
making and their actions. Figure 5 illustrates the nature of the Soviet-type 
government-directed system, indicating interrelations between totalitarian political 
nature, politically co-ordinated economic nature, directive government economic 
management, and unique economic phenomena derived from intrinsic co-ordination 
problems.
Economic Bureaucratism
The economic decision-making structure of the Soviet system was a highly centralised 
economic hierarchy at the economy-wide level. The hierarchy included not only 
administrative units in the government but also basic economic units, since almost all 
legal enterprises and farms were owned by the state. The principle of ‘democratic 
centralism’ was also applied for the effective function of the economic bureaucracy.
All important decisions were made at the higher units of the hierarchy and only the less 
important, detailed decisions were delegated to lower units. The comprehensive 
economic and social policies were planned and carried out by a centralised government 
planning and administrative apparatus, which spawned a vast and powerful network of 
bureaucratic offices concerned with economic and social institutions. The structure of 
the Soviet government included the major elements of the economy and made it one of 
the world’s largest bureaucracies. The total number of ministries and committees 
constituting the government of the USSR rose ffom 18 in 1924 to 132 in 1984. This 
was a gigantic bureaucratic enterprise operating at the level of the USSR (all-union 
ministries) and in the republics (union republican ministries).
However, the regime’s intention to control over every smaller segments of individual 
economic activities in the economy and the state ownership of economic units and 
enterprises gave rise to the ‘economic bureaucratism’ in their individual economic 
activities. The basic economic units and industrial enterprises received directive plan- 
targets to fulfil from their superior body, thus the ultimate goal of their management
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.was primarily the fulfilment of their plan-targets. Their economic bureaucratism 
lacked entrepreneurial drive; there was a tendency to stagnation, to reproduce the 
system rather than to innovate. The main objective of bureaucratic action was not to 
increase economic productivity per se, but rather to increase the rents and perquisites 
available from the principal organs. Bureaucratic competition substituted for 
economic competition, and resources were allocated according to political rationales 
rather than economic ones with the corresponding waste that would be expected. But 
waste was not penalised in the Soviet system of bureaucratic management. As long as 
output targets were met, and everyone in the process received the perquistities due to 
them, then the Soviet manager was judged a success. Certainly such considerations as 
consumer demand were not to enter the state enterprise manager’s calculations.
Centralised Pluralism
In the government planning mechanism, the central planners, particularly Gosplan and 
Gossnab, were in fact unable to make the bulk of detailed microeconomic decisions for 
production of all economic units and distribution of all commodities. In the Soviet 
economy, about 514,000 enterprises and about 24 million commodities existed in 1986
117and a full input-output analysis involved up to 250 billion inter-sectoral flows.
Hence, the physical impossibility of working out centrally such large number of 
planning figures was self-evident. Due to the information problem, the delegation or 
decentralisation of decision-making authorities was inescapable. Consequently, a 
significant number of the planning authorities, less important and detailed commodity- 
by-commodity plans, were delegated to lower level administrative units. Branch 
ministries, formally in charge of production in their branches, in fact acted as co­
ordinators responsible for the distribution of operational planning tasks and the
118allotment of state-controlled resources to their subordinate economic units.
Consequently, Gosplan provided the economic plans for 2,000 aggregate product groups,
Gossnab divided those aggregate groups into 15,000, and ministries further divided
119them into 50,000 groups. Thus, the operational economic planning was indeed a co-
120Operative effort between Gosplan and branch ministries.
Although the sheer volume of works and planning authorities were delegated in the
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hands of branch ministries, they also faced the same information problems that the
central planners had faced. They could not possibly have sufficient information to
specify in detail all outputs and inputs for their share of the products, although they had 
.certainly better information than central planners. Thus, they also had to compromise 
.in this case giving some of their authorities to their subordinate economic units within
general parameters that constrained their choices. In practice, since the basic
economic units had more local information than their branch ministries and in turn
branch ministries had more local information than the central planners about the
existing situation and future production possibilities, the counter-proposals in the 
.planning process made by lower units affected significantly on the elaboration of their 
plan targets which they finally received from the central planners. For this reason, it 
would be erroneous to think that the Soviet economic participants were hilly regimented, 
mechanically followed instructions, and had little freedom of action. In fact, there was 
quite a bit of managerial freedom—so-called ‘centralised pluralism’, which was 
different from the original design and the Soviet regime’s intention.
The techpromfmplan for a basic economic unit was a formidable document, which 
specified all major aspects of individual units’ activity. For a large enterprise, the 
number of obligatory targets could easily fall in the range of 200-300. However, the 
Soviet national planning was never completed in its implication. Eugene Zaleski has 
concluded from his analysis of the Soviet plan-fulfilment that plan adjustments made 
after the plan had been finalised had a stronger significance on actual resource 
allocation than do the plans themselves in the Soviet economy. Because of the 
complexity of the planning, disequilibria, misallocation, mismatching of production and 
supply, delays in communicating plans and instructions, and repeated changes during 
the year in these plans and instructions inevitably occurred. In spite of the inevitable 
weak-point of co-ordination in the information mechanism, the basic rationale for using 
the deliberate government planning mechanism, without the free market price 
mechanism, to co-ordinate economic decisions was that it enabled the Communist Party 
to induce the past economic growth in the direction of the party preference with 
tolerating the chronic economic inefficiency and imbalance.
I
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Non-Scarcity Information
In the Soviet government planning mechanism, the national economic plan coexisted in 22
both physical and financial terms. Since the financial plan—main entries in the state
budget and main targets for the banking system—automatically corresponded to the 
.physical plan, the financial flows were subordinated to the physical flows. The various
;
kinds of prices were set to measure and monitor the implementation of the physical plan 
and to assess their fulfilment. The Soviet price, therefore, was “a servant rather than a 
master,” an appendage to the physical planning, that is, prices were affected by physical
125plans, but did little to affect them. The price was purposely designed to facilitate 
planners’ efforts to collect the information on production possibilities and to control 
individual economic activities rather than to play the active co-ordination role. Almost 
all Soviet prices, except collective farm market prices, were set by central planning
authorities on the basis of average cost rather than by the interaction of supply and
126demand in the market. However, without any active free market price mechanism, 
it was difficult for planners to obtain information on the demand side.
In the Soviet economy, several price categories were existed; industrial or “wholesale” 
prices in transactions between producers; state retail prices; agricultural procurement 
prices paid to farms for products procured by state agencies; collective farm market 
prices charged by individuals and collective farms for produce marketed thiough the 
collective market-oriented system; foreign trade prices charged foreign customers for its
product; wages and various bonus schedules; planning prices to guide internal decision-
127making within the system, though it did not actually apply in specific transactions.
These industrial prices were largely set to equal average cost by industrial branch, 
generally excluding rental and interest charges, plus a mall profit mark-up. The usage 
of branch average cost as a standard had resulted in enterprises making both planned 
profits and planned losses within the same branch. Exceptionally, collective farm 
market prices were determined by the interaction of supply and demand in the market, 
although the state monitored them. These cost-based prices were useful to planners as 
a means of evaluation and control over enterprise performance by inducing enterprises 
to use their relatively small room for manoeuvre within the plan in ways that reduced
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costs.
Unlike the market mechanism, the Soviet prices were not intended to play any active 
role of allocation, but rather passive roles of measurement and control for the physical 
government directive planning to measure the results of economic activity and to 
evaluate the economic outcomes and performance at all levels. Furthermore, prices 
were set for long-time periods not only to facilitate the constmction of plans to cover 
those periods but also to avoid the daunting task of recalculating the myriad of 
interrelated prices in the entire national economy. The measurement and control 
functions of prices were more easily carried out when prices were not changed. 
However, if prices remained unchanged and were not flexible enough to accommodate 
the changes on the demand side reflecting the changes occurred in the broad socio­
economic environment, they would no longer reflect current relative scarcities of 
resources and opportunity costs. In consequence, the Soviet prices in general provided 
information only on the relative costs of goods and seiwices that served as a means of 
the administrative economic management. Without any method to assess the relative 
scai'city of resources and the opportunity cost of their use, waste and mis-allocation was 
inevitable results of the government-directed system.
As far as the inter-enterprise trade was concerned, the Soviet economy was a 
‘documentary’ economy: nothing could be done without the necessary documents.
Money on its own, therefore, was not sufficient to get resources for production. In 
purely formal terms, the settlement of transactions between enterprises took place via 
bookkeeping over accounts in the unified banking system at the government set prices.
The banking system played an important supervising role here. In order to make 
payments to others, an enterprise must prove to the bank that such a payment was 
authorised in the plan, by presenting an allocation certificate entitling it to the materials 
purchased. For the economic participants, it was far more meaningful to gain an 
allocation certificate for scarce materials and products than money. In addition, there 
was no legal opportunity for basic economic units to buy something on a free market 
basis from others, due to the absence of free market and horizontal linkages between
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them. The general and particularly important point here is that the production 
enterprises lacked alternative suppliers of the necessary inputs, which resulted in the 
phenomena o f ‘supply uncertainty’.
Under the lack of alternative suppliers, individual production enterprises worked under 
the condition of uncertainty and information shortage: the uncertainty of whether the 
necessary inputs would arrive at the proper time, at the proper place, in a sufficient 
quantity, and with the expected quality. In the complicated Soviet national economic 
planning, if one change or failure in the chain of production or in the distribution link 
occurred, this would be transmitted thi'oughout the whole system. The basic economic 
units including production enterprises further down the chain of production would not 
receive supplies of necessary raw materials and semi-manufactured products. For the 
production enterprises, their capacity to achieve their production targets would be 
correspondingly reduced and at the risk. Consequently, either because of a plan error, 
below-plan production at another enterprise, diversion of shipments to a higher priority 
customer or some other reason, an enterprise not infrequently found that its plan- 
fulfilment was threatened by a shortage of raw materials or input goods. For the
individual enterprise, this “supply uncertainty” led to the adoption of various measures
128to secure its supply which caused more costs in production.
Success Indicator Problems
Under the condition of socialist ownership of the means of production, the Soviet 
official ideology suggested that each participant should work and engage in activities, 
entrusted to him or her “like a proprietor” in the capitalist market economy. In practice, 
the “proprietorial” motivation cannot be developed from the ideological declaration or 
the moral persuasion of ownership if the actual social position and ownership rights are
129not proprietorial in nature. As a result, the purpose of increasing economic 
efficiency and productivity in state enterprises, their management was motivated by a 
whole series of other ‘success indicators’, that is, some indices of performance on which 
bonuses were based, instead of profits for the real proprietor in the capitalist system. 
Theoretically, there is no reason why the Soviet planners could not develop an incentive 
mechanism consisting of a set of indicators that reflect every aspect of the desired plan-
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targets and ensure the fijlfilment of these indicators by large positive and negative 
incentives. However, the impossibility of the government planning mechanism to 
provide such detailed information to central planners caused the difficulty of giving a 
synthetic success indicator like profits in the market mechanism.
For that reason, the Soviet central planners concentrated on a few indicators, such as 
quantity of total output, reduction in overall production costs, and increases in labour 
productivity, with limits imposed on the lowest permissible quality and deviations ffom 
the desired product mix. The most fundamental and significant indicator was the 
quantity produced, that is, a target figure for physical production. Such indicators 
were inevitably biased towards what was easily identifiable and measurable. It was 
easier to measure the total output of an enterprise than to estimate the quality of the 
product, or whether the assortment of goods met the needs of customers, that is, non- 
measurable indicators. Historically, the gross value of output had been the most 
important ‘success indicators’ ffom the manager’s viewpoint. However, as the prices 
of inputs or outputs did not reflect the relative scarcities, although prices did, it would 
be difficult for planners to specify output targets in unequivocally clear terms. The 
choice of measurement unit for output, therefore, resulted in all types of deviations in 
the implementation of individual enterprises’ plans—the so-called “managerial success
Î30indicator problem.”
Soft Budget Constr aints
The Soviet economic bureaucracy, including state enterprises, faced the same incentive 
problems as non-profit government bureaucracies have been faced with in Western
131countries. Government bureaucracies exist in order to supply goods and semces to 
the public, but they do not report to elected political officials, who in a frictionless 
political environment would represent the tme preferences of the citizens. But, 
because of the existence of political ‘failures,’ such as rational abstention and rational 
ignorance, voter preferences are not conveyed in an unambiguous manner. The 
distortion allows bureaucracies to escape close monitoring by the citizens. Since 
bureaucrats cannot usually benefit monetarily from their departments’ monopoly 
position as the sole supplier of some public service, they tend to reap those benefits in
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Economie Security
The Soviet regime had issued to workers what Hewett has called “an insurance policy
134against personal economic risk.” The regime promised the right to work to everyone 
who was of age and able and who had pursued policies for full employment. Thus, the 
workers always enjoyed job and income security, and were protected from the economic 
uncertainties that have persisted in many of the Western capitalist democracies. 
Economic egalitarianism was also an objective of the Soviet regime; it was a bias that 
had come to be taken for granted among workers and managers of enteiprises. Wages
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many other indirect ways. Perquisites at the office is one manifestation, but perhaps 
the main source of inefficiency is the incentive to maximise their departments’ budget. 
In other words, the heads of the bureaucratic departments face an incentive to expand 
the size of their departments well beyond what would be it optimal size. Because the 
larger the department the more prestige, power influence, reputation and opportunity of 
promotion.
In the Soviet economy, almost all enterprises were owned by the state and their 
existence was in the hands of the central planners. They would therefore survive, no 
matter how well or poorly they were managed. The enterprise was not held 
responsible for the financial consequences of its decisions and its losses were 
automatically covered by the state budget. Accordingly, the Soviet economic 
bureaucracies as well as state enterprises worked under the condition of “soft budget
. 132constraints,” a concept introduced by Kornai. The “soft budget constraint” affected 
enterprise decisions in at least three ways. Firstly, all measures of financial 
performance were plan-related, so unnecessary claims on resources which were ratified 
by the plan never incurred any financial penalty. Secondly, since profitability was 
only one of a number of plan indicators, the incentive system did not necessarily 
penalise management greatly for below-plan profit performance, if the plan was 
fulfilled in other respects. Finally, unprofitable investments were not penalised,
133because profits plans were adjusted accordingly. This condition of soft budget 
constraints created some incentive problems to increase efficiency and productivity in 
the enterprises’ economic performance and in turn for the Soviet workers.
I
, -V-l
70
for those employed in the same type of job tended to be equal, regardless of the 
individual worker’s perforaiance and the profitability of the enterprise. Losses 
incurred by individual enterprises were often covered by the profits of other enterprises, 
and were thus socialised. On a larger scale, when one sector did not perform well, the 
entire society paid for its. For instance, the hard currency eaimings from the export of 
energy were spent abroad for the purchase of grain because domestic agriculture did not 
produce enough to feed both the population and its livestock. Because there was no 
distinction in pay between a “good” participant and a “bad” participant, the long-term 
effect had been to destroy the incentive to work.
Within the enterprise structure, the key incentives for getting workers and enterprises to 
produce efficiently and to innovate were stifled by the concept of “ceilings” and 
“floors,” on which economic security rests. Enterprises knew that they would not be 
allowed to fail or go bankrupt; so, there was a permanent safety net or floor, beneath 
them. Because profits resulting from efficiency or innovation were cross-subsidised to 
support poorly performing enterprises, a ceiling existed that automatically discouraged
135enterprises from trying harder. Aslund confirms that in this system of socialisation 
of losses and profits, the “beneficial treatment of inefficient loss-making enterprises and 
the stifling severity towards the most profitable” effectively discouraged any economic
136initiative. There had been little room for ambition and risk taking in the Soviet 
enterprises’ activities. As with the enterprises, so with the workers. While workers 
could be fairly confident that they would not be laid off, they also knew that hard work 
was rarely rewarded and that shoddy work was rarely penalised. The incentive 
problem had bred a difficult cycle within itself. The general shortage of consumer 
goods gave the workers even less incentive to work hard, yet they must work harder to 
help alleviate the deficit in consumer goods. Consequently, the ‘economic security’ 
for enterprises and workers generated ‘economic safety net’ for them, which created
137some incentive problems.
OPERATION
Opportunistic Economie Activities
In order to understand the individual economic activities of the Soviet political 
economy, one must understand how each individual economic participant responded to 
information and incentive problems derived from the nature of the government-directed 
system and what impact these had on the decisions of policy-making, planning and 
plan-implementation. In the Soviet system, each economic participant was placed in 
the centralised economic hierarchy and engaged in the activities of plan-elaboration and 
plan-implementation. At the highest level, the party leadership determined broad 
social goals and policies for guiding the government economic plan. The central 
planners translated these broad goals and policy into specific and measurable tasks, and 
then they issued specific orders in the form of plan-targets. At the low-level, the basic 
economic units, mainly industrial enterprises, implemented their specified plan-targets 
issued by superior planning bodies. The Soviet planning mechanism operated through
138the “vertical bargaining” along the centralised economic hierarchy. However, due to 
the information and incentive problems in the politically directed socialist system, 
individual participants had quite a bit of managerial freedom in fulfilling their tasks and 
the principal-agent problems occurred. Accordingly, the principal-agent model can be 
applied in analysing the Soviet economic activities.
At each level of the Soviet economic hierarchy, there existed principal-agent relations. 
In the principal-agent relations, if the principal possessed perfect information and 
incentive mechanisms, it could issue detailed and mutually consistent instructions to its 
agents and could monitor all of the agents’ decisions and actions from the standpoint of 
the principal’s interests. However, the principal’s information is not perfect in reality 
and therefore it is unable to monitor the activities of its agents perfectly. The more 
complex an economy and its bureaucratic hierarchy is, the less perfect its information 
and monitoring mechanism. For that reason, the principal has to rely on the 
information from its agents, who have more knowledge of local circumstances, and 
devise some incentives that would motivate the agents voluntarily to act in accordance 
with the interests of the principal. Since the principal can only reward or penalise
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selected and measurable tasks, the agents are free to engage in opportunistic behaviour 
in areas not subject to such rewards or sanctions, which is often inconsistent with the 
principal’s intended goals. Such opportunistic behaviour is entirely rational as long as 
the chances of meeting the principal’s specific reward targets are improved. The 
principal-agent problem, therefore, exists whenever a principal relies on agents to carry
139 ,out its goals. Figure 6 will summarise activities of major individual participants in 
the Soviet government-directed socialist politico-economic system.
Figure 6, Activities in the Soviet Government-Directed Socialist System
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Partymindedness
In the Soviet system, people had limited opportunities to signal their preferences in 
collective political activities as well as individual economic activities mainly because of 
the fimdamental restrictions caused by the preclusion of liberal democratic pluralist 
political activity and individual free market activity. In a pluralist democratic society, 
the process of collective political decision-making or government policy-making is 
essentially ‘political bargaining’ between the various interests of chief political
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participants, such as voters, politicians, professional advisers, and public sector
bureaucrats, for the purpose of achieving their own interests and goals. However, the
.collective political activities and the government policy-making processes in the Soviet 
.politico-economic system were different from one in the pluralist democratic society.
In the Soviet process of government policy-making, the ways, in which non party 
individuals and interest groups could articulate problems, raise issues, argue for policy 
changes, and challenge the status quo, were strictly restricted by the totalitarian political 
nature of the Soviet system and the dictatorship of the Communist Party.
In the Soviet collective political activities, the Communist Party imposed party interests 
on society as the only ‘leading and guiding force’ and responded to any opposition to 
party interests by ruthless repression. In government policy-making, the General 
Secretary and the Secretariats of the Central Committee played a major role in setting 
agenda, filtering and repressing various articulated interests and preferences, and the 
Politburo of the Central Committee determined the final policy-decisions and guidelines
140for government planning. Consequently, the party leadership, as the “system 
director,” guided the Soviet society and economy to desirable direction from party
141points of view. The party directorship, even dictatorship, was reflected in the 
important principle of “partymindedness” in government policy-making and
142government management of the economy. The principle of party mindedness
implied that the government policy and national economic plan were concrete 
expressions of party goals and all problems must be seen from the sovereign party 
preference point of view. The consequence of party mindedness in government policy­
making and government economic planning were constant political pressures for the 
rapid growth of priority sectors determined by the party leadership and the persistent
143“politicisation” of economic management.
Pressures for Rapid Economic Growth
The Soviet model of political economy offered political and economic stability to 
promote long-term aims of the Soviet regime. Under the established stability, the 
preference for rapid economic growth was consistently induced by the Communist Party. 
In the Soviet government planning mechanism, the decisions of central planners were
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subordinated to the decisions of the party leadership. The national economic plan was 
prepared by the central planners, but in accordance with the guidelines and priorities of 
party policy determined by the Politburo. For that reason, central government planners 
had no choice but to accept the sectoral and economy-wide growth targets handed down 
by their political masters. For that reason, it was impossible to construct a plan 
without growth and avoid the pressures for rapid growth in priority sectors determined
144and constantly pushed forward by the party leadership. Although the workload of 
central planners was heavy at times, they were rarely judged on the quality of their work. 
The central planners had no direct accountability for the outcome of their planning, thus 
they were not punished for the formulation of realistic and optimal plans.
Consequently, the Soviet government planning was far from being harmonious,
145balanced, and optimally co-ordinated.
Politicisation o f Economic Management
Economic tasks formed only one factor in the policy of the Communist Party and the 
Soviet government. Thus, economic considerations were often subordinated to other 
political objectives of domestic or foreign policy. Accordingly, the planned economic 
targets had to be amended during the planned year, when important political changes 
occurred and the leadership’s order of preferences for domestic and foreign policies 
changed. These political changes occurred from time to time and sometimes very 
abrupt. This ‘politicisation’ of economic management produced a contradictory effect 
on the consistency, realism, and rationality of the Soviet economic planning. However, 
in some ways, the politicised government economic management through national 
economic planning had an inner logic and offered the party leadership a more promising 
means of effectuating its control over the direction of social and economic development. 
It was not only a means of directing economic efforts on high priority sectors and 
diverting the impact of mistakes onto low priority sectors, but also a means of
146transmitting political urgency to economic activity.
Tactical Planning
As already examined at the last chapter, the Soviet government-directed system
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generated the intrinsic information problems in nature. The Soviet central planners
had, therefore, to face quantitative as well as qualitative problems caused by the
,requirement for vast quantities of information and the distortion of the upward flow of 
information in the planning process of ‘vertical bargaining’. In addition, they had to 
deal with external information and political pressures. Confronted with the intrinsic
more practical purpose of mobilising resources to secure rapid growth in priority
147sectors.
Concentrating on Priority Sectors
The Soviet government planning was focusing on output targets and investment projects 
in key priority sectors, such as capital goods and products in the heavy industry, which 
was selected and approved by the party leadership and repeatedly enjoyed a high 
priority. The traditional top priority of the Soviet planning was investment in heavy 
industry not only as the key to rapid economic growth but also as the basis for large 
scale weapons production, which was seen both as an essential guarantee of national 
security and as a means of projecting Soviet influence abroad. The Soviet leadership 
in the Communist Party used various strategies to impose their preference of priorities 
to investment over consumption and heavy-industrial sector over light-consumer sector. 
Thus, the distribution of investment favoured the heavy industry over the light 
consumer industry. The high rate of capital formation and rapid expansion of heavy 
industry were accompanied by relatively slow growth of consumer goods production, 
services, and agriculture, which became the neglected sectors of the economy. These 
sectors were developed only to the extent that was required in order to achieve the main 
priority goals.
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-s.:quantitative and qualitative information problems and the extrinsic politicised pressures 
.fr om their political masters, the central government planners compromised on national
economic planning. Their compromise demonstrated some opportunistic behaviour of
‘tactical planning,’ which engendered important planning principles in the Soviet 
.planning: concentrating on the priority sectors, taut planning fr om the achieved level, 
and corrections to the formal plan. After all, the Soviet principle of rational, optimal 
and prior central planning was simply an ideological illusion in reality, and served the
Ï
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Taut Planning from Achieved Level
The Soviet planners quite naturally fell into the practice of “planning from the achieved
149 150level” and “taut planning.” The provision of new economic plans was calculated 
on the basis of a mark-up on the achieved level of the previous plan period, responding 
to clear signs of surplus or shortage and clear indications of changed relative priorities 
in the growth rates for particular sectors. Moreover, the Soviet planners also 
prescribed a plan 10 or 20 per cent tighter than they themselves considered realistic for 
the purpose of forcing industrial enterprises and other productive economic units to 
reveal their concealed production possibilities and to mobilise all possible resources for 
the rapid rate of growth. The taut planning was clearly a basic aspect of the growth 
maximisation approach of the Soviet regime and a means of applying pressures for 
maximising output in the short term. Consequently, the gross-output targets in the 
Soviet plan were more significantly emphasised and the most important success 
indicators. Western literature described the practice of taut planning from the achieved 
level as the “ratchet effect” or the “ratchet principle” in Soviet planning, comparing the 
constant raising of output targets to a cogwheel that moves only forwards, not
151backwards.
Correction to the Formal Plan
Due to the inability to obtain sufficient information to make the ‘perfectly co-ordinated’ 
plan, and constant politicised pressures from the political masters, the formal national 
economic plan sent down from the government planners was at first “preliminary,” then, 
at the very end of the planning period, “initial,” and finally, during the implementation
152of the plan, “corrected.” The plan correction was the last resort for planners faced 
with the initial plans that obviously were not going to be fulfilled or changes in the 
priorities of the government and party. The correction took two basic forms: a 
reduction or augmentation in the planned growth rates in order to match the plan, ex
.post, to the actual situation; or a change in the plan within a year in an effort to balance 
the supply or demand for the product in which imbalances or bottlenecks were emerging.
John Wilhelm argued that the original plan, in the Soviet economy, was typically not 
workable and therefore continuously changed in the course of its implementation, and in
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the end revised to correspond to expected fulfilment. Given these circumstances, he 
argued, it would be inappropriate to refer to the Soviet economy as a ‘planned
153economy’.
Securing Plan-Fulfîïmeiit
In the Soviet government-directed model, the branch ministries and their subordinate 
economic units received directive plan-targets, including the gross-output targets which 
they were expected to produce over a certain period, the input targets which they were 
allowed to use, and a large number of other targets. Their freedom to make decisions 
regarding the running of their branches and enterprises was, therefore, severely 
restricted by the government plan. However, due to the inability of central planners to 
specify and co-ordinate all details of enterprises’ operation, there existed a significant 
area of managerial flexibility described by the ‘centralised pluralism’ inherent in Soviet 
system. The managerial and operational behaviour patterns of branch ministries and 
their enterprises were the managerial response to the tactical ‘rule of thumb’ planning of 
Soviet central government planners and the operational environment of enterprises 
subjected to the influence of the government-directed nature of the Soviet politico- 
economic system.
The branch ministries had two faces not only as planners for their subordinate economic 
units on the one hand but also as implementors of their ministerial plan-targets on the 
other hand. Accordingly, they engaged in both patterns of opportunistic behaviour as 
planners and as plan-implementers to minimise the risks of failing to fulfil their 
ministerial plan-targets. In the “downward” direction, they forced economic units to 
fulfil their plan-targets by tactical planning—concentrating on the priority sectors, taut 
planning from the achieved level, and correcting after the formal planning—as a planner. 
In the other “upward” direction, for the purpose of securing fulfilment of their 
ministerial plan-targets, branch ministries engaged in dysfunctional opportunistic 
behaviour, so called ‘departmentalism’ {vedomstvennost’). During the bargaining 
process with Gosplan, they tended to ease their plan-targets by concealing the 
aggregated full capacities of their enterprises and to secure the supplies of inputs for 
their enterprises by obtaining materials and labour in excess of real needs and by
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154avoiding specialisation between ministries and ‘self-supply’.
The basic economic units and industrial enterprises received directive plan-targets from 
their superior body, thus the ultimate goal of their management was primarily the 
fulfilment of plan-targets. Specifically, they concentrated the fulfilment of the most 
important plan-targets, upon which their bonuses were based. Their management was 
offered substantial bonuses for the achievement of these success indicators, but these 
success indicators were fuzzy and often ill defined, unlike the profits in the market- 
oriented system. Moreover, since the Soviet enterprises had no direct contact with 
consumers, the consumers’ preferences were deliberately neglected. Under these 
circumstances, in order to secure the fulfilment of bonus-forming targets, the industrial 
enterprises engaged in peculiar and dysfunctional behaviour patterns in their operational 
activities: easing plan-targets by concealing their full capacity, withholding over­
fulfilment, and reluctance to innovation; securing supplies of inputs by hoarding inputs, 
seeking self-sufficiency, over-demanding investment, and relying upon informal 
suppliers; focusing upon only key success indicators by storming at the final stage, 
violating planned assortment, and neglecting quality.
Easing Plan-Targets
Concealing and Withholding Full Capacity. During the planning process, the 
enterprise management bargained with its superior branch ministry to get the lowest 
possible targets by concealing its full production capacity, simply because the 
possibility of plan-fuffilment would be greater. The greater the possibility of plan- 
fulfilment was, the more easily the managers and workers would gain bonuses. After 
the plan targets were set, the enterprise tempered the rate of over-fulfilment of their 
plan-targets by withholding its over-fulfilling performance. If the enterprise over­
fulfilled its targets by too wide a margin, the plan-targets for the next period would be 
set much higher because the achieved production would be the point of departure for the 
plan for the next period. They knew the planners’ tactic of “taut planning from the 
achieved level.” Thus, the management of Soviet enterprises developed a sixth sense 
for optimal degrees of over-fulfilment, usually about 101 or 102 per cent of their
155production targets. This is very similar to the behaviour of workers on a piece-rate
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system of payment in the market economy, who also learn how much they can produce 
before the rates paid for each piece are reduced.
Reluctance to Innovation. In the same context, the enterprise management was 
reluctant to make any technological or operational innovation. The introduction of 
new technology involved certain risks and required a considerable expenditure of 
resources and time. For the Soviet enterprise, as almost any innovation entailed some 
temporary disruption of productive processes, it was a certain risk to fulfil the current 
production targets. Even a successfiil innovation would be a welcome one-time bonus, 
but this would be followed by correspondingly higher and more difficult production 
targets for the future period. In some innovations, for instance, improvements in 
productivity, quality, and durability were seldom rewarded owing to the importance of 
‘short-term quantitative plan-objectives’ in bonus-forming success indicators. The 
system director’s obsession to the rapid growth in priority sectors encouraged the Soviet 
enterprise to increase their output by using more inputs and expanding their productive 
capacity with more investment, rather than improving their productive efficiency by 
some kind of technological and operational innovation. Consequently, the 
management of Soviet enterprises was discouraged to take risks and reluctant to
156introduce new technological and operational innovation in their activities.
Securing Supplies o f Inputs
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iHoarding Inputs. Confronted with the ‘supply uncertainty’ in the Soviet economy, the 
enterprise management should secure the flow of input supplies to friffil the production 
plan-targets in any way. Thus, the enterprise was induced to accept all the inputs it 
could lay its hands on. Each enterprise wished to have an extra store of inputs to meet
its outputs-targets with, in case supplies of inputs should fail to arrive. The Soviet
enterprise situations o f ‘economic safety net’ and ‘soft budget constraints’ provoked 
them to over-demand any kinds of human and material inputs. During the vertical 
bargaining in the planning process, with, the management of enterprise over-ordered the 
requirement of inputs for production to its branch ministry, in the hope that if it did not 
get all it ordered, it might at least obtain as much as it needed to fulfil the output targets. 
The result was that all kinds of inputs were hoarded. As for labour supply, the fact that Ï
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.the planned wage fiind for a given year tended to be based on the actual wage 
expenditure of the previous year made it easy to recruit and hold on to labour ‘just in 
case’.157
Over-demanding Investment As with other inputs, an emphasis on gross output 
targets encouraged enterprises to over-demand investment, which would increase their 
productive capacity and their self-sufficiency and therefore steadily increase their
Seetdng Self-sufficiency, The enterprise management, looking for ways of 
safeguarding themselves against the effects of ‘supply uncertainty’, sought to divert 
investment resources towards ‘do-it-oneself operations. The enterprise produced 
most of the inputs and services that were required to produce planed outputs. The 
result was a high degree of ‘self-sufficiency’ in the Soviet economy. A survey by 
Goskomstat in 1987 reported that out of every 100 machine-building enterprises, 71 
produced their own iron castings, 27 produced their own steel castings, 84 their own 
forging, 76 their own stamping and 65 their own hardware. There was virtually no
158specialised production in the entire Soviet industrial structure. Regarding the 
machine-building enterprises, Shmelev and Popov argued that the tendency towards 
self-sufficiency in individual enterprises would undermine the division of labour and 
specialisation, which the central planning aimed at promoting:
Machine-buildiiig enterprises are overgrown witli subdivisions tliat 
are not part of their main product. They are usually poorly 
mechanised subdivisions tliat produce, often by hand labour, 
instnunents, fittings, castings, forgings, containers, and so forth.
They are inefficient but tliey can produce almost anything, so tliere is 
no need to turn to trading partners. For example, in Moscow 
Province, half of all tlie macliine-building enterprises produce tlieir 
own mstnnnents, forgings, and castings at a prime cost Üiat is 1.5-2.5
159times higher tlian m specialised enterprises.
possibility to fiilfil production targets. An insatiable ‘hunger’ for investment was
160caused the relative soft budget constraints in the Soviet economy. In the case of 
capital goods, soft credit created an investment ‘hunger’ in all Soviet enterprises. 
Since fixed capital was provided to the enterprise as a firee grant by the state, with no
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interest charge, it was in any case in the interests of enterprises to “overbid” in order to 
secure as many investment resources as possible and to have as many projects as 
possible on-going. The supply uncertainties that enterprises experienced spilled over 
into the demand for investment as enterprises sought spare capacity in the form of 
machines and buildings to ‘storm’ towards the end of a planning period when inputs 
became available. This over-demand for investment fed off itself in the sense that 
enterprises could not be sure that they would obtain the capital inputs that had been 
authorised since other enterprises also demanded them. Rational enterprises therefore
over-demanded and tried to hoard capital goods even more to allow for supply
161uncertainties, which in turn became greater.
Relying upon Informal Suppliers, In order to secure their supplies, the enterprise 
management employed special supply expediters called tolkachi, or ‘pushers’. The 
major job of the tolkachi was to make sure that their enterprises were able to gain inputs 
whenever needed. They worked on behalf of enterprises selling surplus commodities 
on the one hand and purchasing needed products on the other hand. An entire 
secondary supply system emerged around the tolkachi. Many of their activities were 
associated with the shadow informal market, that is, obtaining materials for which no 
allocation order had been issued and carrying out barter deals between enterprises 
through the use of shadow market transactions and bribes. Nevertheless, since the 
Soviet government planning mechanism could only operate effectively with the help of 
such unofficial expediters and informal shadow markets, the party leadership and 
central planners often turned a blind eye to them. Local party cadres would also get 
involved in this kind of matter when priorities were threatened in their ‘parish’. These 
semi-legal supply agents filled in the gaps created by the flawed official supply system 
and the tolkachi were, therefore, an important part of the Soviet supply system.
Focusing upon Success Indicators
Storming at the Final Stage, In the course of fulfilling production targets passed down 
to enterprise, the tendency to sharply uneven tempos of production, that is, ‘storming’ 
or exerting great effort toward the end of each plan period, was common in the Soviet 
enterprises’ activities. During the one-month operational plan period, the typical
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production cycle started off with a quiet ten days, as everyone recovered from the 
previous cycle, ten days o f ‘getting into it’, and a final ten days o f ‘stonning’ when the 
deadline approached. During the ‘storming’ period, all reserve capacities were 
mobilised to fulfil the important bonus-forming plan-targets. From October 1965 to 
March 1966, 21-29 per cent of TV sets was produced in the first ten days of the month, 
30-33 per cent in the second ten days and 39-48 per cent in the last ten days. In 
residential construction over the period 1953-73, 8-11 per cent of completion came in 
the first quarter, 19-21 per cent in the second quarter, 20-22 per cent in the third quarter,
163and 46-49 per cent in the fourth. The ‘storming’ practice was a response to plan 
delays and supply uncertainty, and to sharply dichotomous material incentives, namely 
bonuses, in which there was a very great discontinuity between 99.9 percent and 100
164percent of plan fulfilment.
i
Violating Planned Assortment Although production was supposed to be for use, not 
for exchange in the market, the production in the Soviet economy could, in practice, be
165described as “production for plan rather than use.” There was often a substantial 
gulf between outputs and their usefulness. During the ‘storming’ period, the enterprise 
management violated the planned assortment of production within the limits of 
corresponding to the most important success indicators which formed its bonuses. In 
almost every case, distortions and illogicalities resulted in the course of plan-fulfilment 
at the level of the enterprise. Commonly, the production targets, to be rewarded, 
required a definition for target figures of some kind, such as weight, length, numbers, 
money or some other suitable unit. When the production targets were measured in 
tons, the enterprise reached its production targets by increasing the economically and 
technically unnecessary heavier products. When the production targets were expressed 
in measures of length, without regard to width, the enterprise over-produced narrow- 
width outputs and under-produced broad width. When the production targets were
estimated in value units, the enterprise tended to overproduce those products that had
166high fixed costs, and so high prices. Accordingly, the success indicator problems 
generated the violation of planned assortment in enterprise activities.
Neglecting Quality, Since the Soviet enterprise had no direct contact with consumers.
-i
■the consumers’ preferences were deliberately neglected. The enterprise also tended to 
reduce the quality of its production during the ‘storming’ period. Much of the quality 
shaving was of a kind that would not easily be detected, thus not obstructing the 
fulfilment of major production targets and the receiving of bonuses. Fewer stitches in 
the garment, fewer screws in the piece, greener lumber in the building, and more 
impurities in the metal are examples of how an enterprise could shave the quality of its 
products. The enterprise had little incentive to be concerned about the quality of its 
products or the needs of the consumers. The Soviet planning mechanism was biased 
toward the supply-sided information. There was no obvious mechanism through 
which consumers could register their preferences and no alternatives available. In 
most case, the producers’ interests and preferences prevailed over the consumers’ need, 
which illustrated the condition of the ‘seller’s market’. Therefore, even if an enterprise 
produced goods that precisely met quality targets set administratively, these goods
Seeking Consumption rather than Working
might fall short of the needs of their users. Consequently, Soviet goods were of
167notoriously poor quality and low reliability.
In the Soviet government-directed system, the households had very limited opportunity 
.to signal their preferences in allocation, production, and distribution processes, due to 
the absence of an active market mechanism. The government planning mechanism 
was biased to the supply-sided information and created the condition of the ‘seller’s 
market’, where producers’ interests prevailed over consumers’ need. The Soviet 
economy was designed to induce workers to produce what the government wanted, not 
what they themselves wanted as consumers. Consequently, the high rate of capital
formation and rapid expansion of ‘priority sectors’ favoured by the government was 
accompanied by relatively slow growth in ‘residual sectors’. These were mainly 
consumer sectors and agriculture, and they became rather neglected. The result was 
consistent “personal consumption problems” of consumer durables, services, and food: 
widespread shortage and queues; very limited assortment and poor quality; slow 
introduction of improvement; and unavailability in the legal economy.
Working with Low Incentives
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Engaging in Informal Activity
84
The motivation to work hard and gain a bonus was dampened by the knowledge that
,these extra roubles could not easily be traded for desired consumer demands. The 
contours of a vicious circle emerged; virtually empty shelves in the shops reduced 
motivation at the workplace, which again ensured that there would be spaces vacant on
169shelves. This was reflected, for instance, in the jocular remark, ‘We pretend to be 
working, and they pretend to be paying us’. Alcoholism became a severe problem, and
170lying and cheating seemed to become pandemic in Soviet society. Millar and 
Clayton’s survey about how the Soviet people felt about their lives indicated that the 
great majority (75.6 per cent) of respondents were dissatisfied with Soviet consumer 
goods in quantity as well as in quality. The potential adverse effect upon work 
motivation was clear—supported by the frequency of unauthorised use of working time
171for personal shopping. However, Soviet workers enjoyed a higher degree of 
‘economic safety’, for instance, guaranteed jobs and income security, than Western 
workers, which caused a lack of competition among them and therefore generated some 
incentive problems in their work. A very low degree of work discipline in the Soviet 
work place was widespread and caused serious problems to the Soviet economy.
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Throughout the Soviet period, the informal shadow economy formed a significant part 
in the everyday life of the Soviet people. The relative shortage of consumer goods and 
services and relative abundance of forced savings together caused the households to rely
173Upon the informal economy. Consumers were willing to spend money on goods and 
services in short supply, and there were consequently substantial profits to be made for 
any individual or enterprise willing to engage in informal private activities, sometimes
174violating the laws. Informal private activities could be legal, simply tolerated by the
state, or illegal, depending on whether they supported or competed with the formal state 
sector’s activities. Several types of informal private activities were involved: work by 
single artisans operating without the legally required license; use of the “putting-out” 
system to produce illegal products; private production while at the work; parallel 
production in a plant, using extra materials to produce unreported output distributed 
through the system and using bribes; private, organised production in a state enterprise
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Extensive Economic Outcomes
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or collective farm; private underground manufacturing; construction by private teams;
175and brokering and information selling. In the late 1970s, Grossman estimated that,
in its legal forms alone, it was responsible for a little less than 10 per cent of the Soviet 
GNP, but some western economists thought the real figure might be up to three times as 
large.
The Soviet regime presented the countries of the capitalist West with a profound
challenge. The challenge was made explicit by repeated assertion by the Soviet
leaders that their brand of socialism and central government economic planning would
bring faster rates of economic growth and thus rapidly catch-up with advanced Western
capitalist countries in terms of output and living standards. The Soviet regime claimed
that its government-directed model based on socialist ownership was capable of faster,
more efficient, more stable, more balanced, more egalitarian economic growth than the 
.alternative market-oriented capitalist model. The official Soviet view emphasised the
advantage of directive government economic planning and management in both
‘extensive’ and ‘intensive’ aspects: better mobilisation of human and material
resources; higher level of static and dynamic efficiency; full-unemployment; absence of 
.inflation; and more equitable income distribution. All these factors could have been
177expected to raise rapid economic growth and improve material living standards.
...................The outcomes of such opportunistic individual activities in the government-directed 
politico-economic system was different from the Soviet challenge in both ‘extensive’ 
and ‘intensive’ aspects. In practice, the constant politicised pressures for rapid 
economic growth and the directive government economic planning was able to mobilise 
human and material resources effectively, but the outcomes were just ‘extensive’, and 
‘intensive’ aspects were neglected. The Soviet regime managed to secure relatively 
rapid economic growth, but only by expanding investment and using more human and 
material resources rather than by increasing productivity and efficiency. The 
consequence of this extensive economic growth was a decline in the rates of economic 
growth; chronic economic inefficiency; persistent economic imbalance; repressed 
economic stability; disguised economic equity; and underachieved material living
3%'
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Declining Economic Growth
Table 1, Soviet Economic Growth Performance Compared, 1928-1985
Average Annual Rate of Growth
Countnes Compared Soviet Union USA E-OECD
Period 1928-85 1950-80 1970-80 1950-80 1970-80 1950-80 1970-80
GNP 4.2 4.7 3.1 3.3 3.0 4.2 3.0
GNP p e r  capita 3.0 3.3 2.1 1.9 2.0 3.3 2.3
Source: Gur Ofer, “Soviet Economic Growth: 1928-1985,” Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 25 (December 1987), p. 
1780.
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standards. The causal factors underlying these extensive economic outcomes were 
primarily a direct result of such opportunistic individual activities in response to the 
economic conditions generated from the nature of the government-directed socialist 
system.
From the point of availability, quality, usability, and reliability, the Soviet official
178statistics had a number of problems. Notwithstanding, according to Soviet official 
data, the Soviet economic growth was simply unbelievable, about 9 percent on average 
annually. Western estimates of Soviet economic growth rates were much lower than 
the Soviet ones. Since the Soviet socialist system was firmly established in 1928, the 
annual growth rate of GNP was 4.2 per cent on average and the annual growth rate of
179GNP per capita was 3.0 per cent on average. As shown in Table 1, in comparison 
with the growth record from 1950 to 1980 in Western industrialised countries, the 
annual growth rates of GNP in USSR were higher than in the USA and slightly higher 
than those of European OECD group. Annual growth rates of Soviet GNP per capita 
were also higher than in the USA and similar to those of European OECD group. The 
high level of investment was central to the Soviet model of economic growth, restricting 
consumption levels, at least in the short run, to make room for investment. Compared 
with the gross investment’s shares of about 16 per cent in USA, the Soviet Union had
consistently invested one-third of its GNP and most of that went toward expanding
180productive capacity of heavy industry.
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Table 2, Declining of Soviet Economic Growth Rate, 1961-85
Average Annual Rate of Growth
Years 1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85
Narkhoz (P/anecf Nl) 7.3 6.9 6.7 4.7 3.4
Narkhoz (Actual Nl) 6.0 7.1 5.1 3.9 2.7
Selyunin & Khanln (Nl) 4.4 4.1 3.2 1.0 0.6
CIA (GNP) 4.8 5.0 3.0 2.3 2.0
Ofer (GNP) 5.2 5.2 3.7 2.6 2.0
Ofer (GNP per capita) 3.9 3.9 2.7 1.8 1.1
Sources: Revisiting Soviet Economic Performance Under Glasnost: Impiications for CIA Estimates 
(Washington, D.C.: CIA, 1988), table 5 and Gur Ofer, "Soviet Economic Growth: 1928-1985," 
Journal of Economic Literature, vol. 25 (December 1987), table 1.
Chronic Economic Inefficiency
1
Overall Soviet macroeconomic growth was quite satisfactory for the Soviets, but the 
critical issue was how to sustain such growth rates. From the early 1980s, the Soviet
leaders publicly expressed increasing dissatisfaction with their country’s economic
performance, in particular the steady deterioration of economic growth. As indicated 
in Table 2, whichever measures of macro activities one uses and whoever uses these 
measures, the downward trend in the macroeconomic growth rates from their peak in 
1966-70 is unmistakable. Soviet estimates of economic growth rates during the late 
decades are higher than Western estimates, but the downward trend is virtually identical.
Moreover, real growth since the 1970s was lower than planned, therefore the decline 
was to some extent involuntary from the viewpoint of the Soviet regime and central 
planners. This decline in growth rates and the late very low growth itself became a 
special cause for concern among the party leadership. Different from the Soviet 
economic challenge for rapid economic growth in both ‘extensive’ and ‘intensive’ 
aspects, in practice, Soviet macroeconomic growth relied heavily upon extensive 
sources. There were, therefore, physical limits to the Soviet ability of sustaining high 
growth rates by persistently increasing labour and capital inputs.
I
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Although the Soviet government-directed model was capable of generating high rates of 
economic growth, the Soviet economic growth was generated usually by high rises in
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strategy was its consistent policy of very high rates of investment that led to rapid 
growth rates of capital stock. The Soviet capital stock had been growing since 1928 at
185an annual rate of 6.9 percent.
Table 3, Annual Growth of Combined Inputs and Factor Productivity
Period 1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-80 1981-85
G ross national p ro d u ct 4.7 5.0 3.0 2.3 2.0
C om bined inpu ts 4.8 4.4 4.5 3.7 3.3
Mamhours 1.6 2.0 1.7 1.2 0.7
Capital 8.8 7.4 8.0 6.9 6.3
Land 0.2 NEGL 0.1 -0.1 -0.1
F actor p ro du ctiv ity -0.1 0.6 -1.4 -1.4 -1.2
Man-hours 3.1 2.9 1.3 1.1 1.3
Capital -3.8 -2.3 -4.7 -4.4 -4.0
Land 4.5 5.0 2.9 2.4 2.1
s
inputs and slow rises in productivity. As shown in Table 3, for the post-war period, the 
growth in inputs declined, but the growth of output decreased more than the growth of 
inputs. The capital productivity and total factor productivity had been massively
negative for each period, which implied that intensive growth had been usually
181negative. In the Soviet economy, economic participants always had a hunger for all
kinds of human and material inputs, which had been used at far higher rates than
182elsewhere in the world. The number of employed and hours worked grew by 1.9 
and 1.8 per cent annually, which was faster than the population growth rate of 1.3
183percent. Hence, the high rate of participation in the labour force was much higher
184than in any other country. The most outstanding characteristic of the Soviet growth
■ft
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Average Annual Rate of Growth 
------------- -------------- ------
* Inputs of man-hours, capital, and land are combined using weight of 51.2 percent, 45.8 percent, 3.0 
percent, respectively, in a Cobb-Douglas production function.
Source: CIA, Handbook of Economic Statistics, 1986 (Directorate of Intelligence, September 1986), p. 70.
The constant pressures for rapid economic growth from the party leadership also 
resulted in a serious ignorance about economic efficiency in operational economic 
activities. In the face with intrinsic information and incentive problems, and extrinsic 
politicised pressures from the party, the Soviet planners issued taut plans from the
previously achieved level concentrating on planning priory sectors. The ratchet effects 
in the Soviet planning made state enterprises inflate their demands for any kinds of 
inputs beyond their profitable levels during the plan bargaining with their superior 
planning bodies. Furthermore, under the condition o f ‘soft budget constraints’ Soviet 
enterprises kept over-ordered material and labour inputs in stock for the peak ‘storming’ 
production keeping the ‘supply uncertainty’ in mind. In consequence, supplied 
resources were easily wasted and also considerably over-used and no resources could be 
calculated in some objective way owing to the ‘non-scarcity information’. Two long­
time analysts of the Soviet economic experience, Peter Wiles and Alec Nove, argued
that the Soviet regime might have deliberately sacrificed economic efficiency to achieve
186long-run political objectives of rapid economic growth.
Although the Soviet politico-economic model was intended and designed to co-ordinate 
individual economic activities in great detail by the directive government economic 
planning, there existed a certain communication distance between planners and plan- 
implementers due to the problems o f ‘success indicators’ and therefore a significant 
area of managerial flexibility in plan-implementation. Since the Soviet incentive 
mechanism did penalise plan under-fulfilment more than it rewarded over-fulfilment 
and could not penalise under-fulfilment, the asymmetry of rewards and penalties caused 
enterprises to avert any kind of risks and be reluctant to make any technological and 
operational innovations. The Soviet efforts to improve success indicators could not 
prevent excess demand and use of resources, the violation of the planned assortment, 
and the shaving of the quality in enterprises’ operational activities for their plan- 
implementation under the sellers’ market condition. In this context, static and 
dynamic economic efficiency was constantly neglected. There were no incentives for 
any plan-implementers to economise on inputs by paying more attention to costs and by
187introducing innovations for raising productivity.
Persistent Economic Imbalance
The Soviet economy tolerated some supply-demand imbalances occurred in a wide 
range of inputs, products and even sectors for decades. Any economy at all times 
experiences imbalances in the supply of and demand for some products, but in the
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Table 4, Consumption, USSR and Selected OECD Countries, 1985
(USA^IOO)
Country GDP per worker Consum ption per worker Consumption per capita
USSR 36.7 25.0 28.6
USA 100.0 100.0 100.0
Germany 80.6 75.7 69.3
France 81.4 80.0 68.1
Japan 67.9 62.4 65.7
UK 69.8 69.3 65.6
Italy 81.0 79.8 64.6
Finland 63.5 56.4 61.7
Austria 70.5 63.0 59.0
Spain 73.7 73.9 46.1
Ireland 61.5 55.9 37.2
Greece 44.9 46.8 37.0
Portugal 37.9 36.3 32.3
Turkey 31.8 29.0 20.0
Soviet system, either there were no feedback mechanisms to inform the system of the 
need to respond to an existing supply-demand imbalance, or the feed back was ignored. 
Together with the condition of soft budget constraints, the ratchet effects in the tactical 
planning caused Soviet enterprises to over-demand inputs and investments, since the 
Soviet motivation mechanism did penalise plan under-fulfilment more than It rewarded 
over-fulfilment. This excess demand in all kinds of inputs indicated an important 
aspect of imbalance in the Soviet economy. In addition, the Soviet strategy to develop 
rapidly priority sectors was accompanied by relatively slow development of neglected 
sectors. Hence, the shortage of consumer goods and services and agricultural products 
had been a persistent phenomenon in the Soviet economy and, if available, had very 
limited assortment and poor quality.
;
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 - -    - -  -   - -------------------------------------Source: Abram Bergson, “The USSR Before the Fall: How Poor and Why?" Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, vol. 5, no. 4 (Fall 1991), p. 39.
There is no direct way to test the proposition that consumer goods and services as a
whole were in excess demand in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Soviet leaders and 
.economists took this for granted. Thus, in general disposable income exceeded the 
supply of goods available for purchase. Saving deposits grew at an average rate of 9.3
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per cent during 1975-85, whereas consumption over the same period grew by only 4.6 
per cent. As wages paid in industry were not connected to productivity, the wage
growth exceeded the growth in retail sales. During 1970-83 retail sales grew by 81 per
188cent while wages grew by 90 per cent. In Bergson’s recent study about comparative
consumption levels in the Soviet Union, the Soviet per capita consumption in 1985 was 
just 28.6 per cent of US levels and well below other countries. Consumption per
189worker was 25 per cent of the level in the US, which is indicated in Table 4.
Repressed Economic Stability
Economic stability means the absence of significant fluctuations in economic growth 
rates, that is, the maintenance of acceptable rates of unemployment and the avoidance of 
excessive inflation whether or not the inflation and unemployment are cyclical. The 
economic stability provided by the Soviet model was possibly impressive and 
satisfactory to the Soviet regime. Nevertheless, it is difficult to judge to which extent 
this economic stability was real. In the market-oriented model, the degree of economic 
instability is immediately apparent when macroeconomic imbalances occur in markets. 
Excess demand accelerates inflation rates and downturns in the business cycle are 
reflected thiough upsurges in unemployment rates. Even though, as discussed above, 
there had been persistent chronic excess demand and shortages of supply in any kind of 
input resources, investment, and consumer commodities, things were different in the 
Soviet government-directed model. Since the government planning mechanism could 
not reflect flexibly enough the changes in socio-economic environments, in particular 
on demand side, there had been a ‘repressed’ economic stability, such as over­
employment (internal unemployment) and ‘hidden’ and ‘repressed’ inflation.
Over-employment (Internal Unemployment)
The Soviet regime deliberately pursued a planning policy of full-employment to 
liquidate unemployment. The unemployment statistics had not been published 
officially, simply because the Soviet government claimed unemployment had been 
‘liquidated’ in the early 1930s. According to the Soviet anti-parasitism laws, every 
Soviet citizens of labour-force age were generally obliged to work full-time in the
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190socialist sector and had “job rights.” In spite of foil employment policy, the smveys
Hidden and Repressed Inflation
Most prices in the Soviet economy were fixed by central planning authorities for long 
periods and driven primarily by supply-side consideration. Under the condition of
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about the Soviet labour market, in any case, clearly indicate the existence of 
unemployment, but its level appeared to be low, and a high proportion of it was
191voluntary and not the result of a lack of job. Compared to about 3-4 per cent in the 
West, the estimates of fractional unemployment in USSR were somewhat lower, varying
192between 2-3 per cent reported by Ellman and 1.3 per cent by Wiles. Although the 
unemployment was eliminated in the labour market, this did not guarantee foll- 
employment inside factories. On the contraiy, the ‘internal’ unemployment, or 
unemployment in the job, was inevitable on account of the practice of over-demanding
193employees.
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In the Soviet practice, the enterprise managers would be unwilling to dismiss low
productivity workers and rather demand more reserved labours to secure folfilment of
their plan-targets. Under these circumstances, there had been over-employment, which
could not be tolerated in the market-oriented system. There are three main
implications of external labour shortage and internal unemployment. Firstly, the
hoarding labour implied ‘feather bedding’ and low labour productivity. Given the
capacity of human beings to keep themselves busy, this slack might not be easy to
eliminate when circumstances changed. Secondly, surplus reserved labours inside
enterprises might have indirect effects. The low level of work morale and discipline 
.might further inhibit productivity gains where there was no effective threat of dismissal 
for poor performance and where alternative employment could in any case soon be 
found. At the same time, industrial accidents and labour turnover might be high for 
enterprises where morale was low. Finally, the external excess demand and the 
internal excess supply of labour produced inevitable pressure for unofficial transactions 
in products and labour services. Private work might be performed on the enterprise’s 
premises, or workers might absent themselves to go shopping or in pursuit of some
194other leisure activity, for example a visit to the steam-baths.
Î
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.passive price system, prices could not used to signal emerging disequilibrium in the 
market. Until the late 1980s, there was little indication of significant price or wage 
inflation. The Soviet regime had been anxious to eliminate inflation and proud of their 
achievement of official zero inflation, because inflation was seen as a symbol of the 
anarchy of capitalist markets. However, the official Soviet price indexes were so few 
and so flawed that there was no official information on inflation rates. The Soviet 
official estimates about the rate of retail price inflation did not take into account, higher 
prices with unofficial premia paid on authorised transactions, implicit price increases 
hidden by quality variations, inflation in informal markets, or forced savings. Central 
price-fixing might prevent over inflation, but excess demand could lead to rationing 
devices of various kinds, price increases for ‘new’ goods that are unwarranted in terms 
of their quality, and other forms of what might be considered tantamount to inflation.
All these practice implied persistent pressure for inflation and ‘hidden’ or ‘repressed’
195inflation under the conditions of excess demand and shortages of supply.
The official ideology, i.e., the socialist principle o f ‘distribution according to work’,
Disguised Economic Equity
The two mutually contradictory tendencies o f ‘differentiation’ and ‘equalisation’ existed 
in the Soviet socialist system, but if one considered all dimensions of material welfare 
in the Soviet system, the economic inequality was less than in the market-oriented 
capitalist system. Some attempts to generate socialist competition contributed to the 
tendency toward differentiation, but an inclination toward levelling out incomes could 
still be discerned. The almost complete liquidation of private property and the almost 
complete elimination of market exchange allowed the egalitarian tendency to 
preponderate. In the market-oriented capitalist system, the range of incomes is 
expanded by large incomes associated with property ownership and market success. In 
the Soviet socialist system, the successful earnings from work might seem large 
compai'ed with the earnings of average citizens, but they were nothing compared with 
the vast earnings from the market success. Although savings deposits, bonds, 
consumer durables and half the housing stock were privately owned and could be 
inherited, wages from work were the main source of individual earned income.
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applied at least in the case of earned income. In addition, influenced by the Soviet 
ideological doctrine of egalitarianism and condemnation for the gains through 
‘unearned income’, ‘speculation’, or ‘trafficking’, suspicion and envy of higher earners, 
those at the upper end of the distribution scale, became deeply embedded in people’s
197consciousness and emotional realm. There is overall evidence of a substantial
narrowing of the earnings distribution since 1956, reflecting the reform of the wage 
stmcture and increasing minimum wages. A full reorganisation of wage tariffs by 
occupation, industry and kill level was achieved in 1957-61, and a minimum wage of 
between 27 and 35 roubles per month (depending on industry) was introduced in 1956, 
and subsequently raised to 40-45 roubles in 1959, 60 roubles in 1968, 70 roubles in 
1974/5 and 80 roubles in 1985. In 1967, a five-day week and 12-15 days of holiday
198pay per year were also introduced. McAuley catalogues the efforts of the State
Committee on Labour and Wages (Labour and Social Questions since 1976) to convert
199Stalin’s wide earnings differentials into a more egalitarian system since 1955.
However, in reality there existed substantial perquisites and fringe benefits in state
200employment, although it is very difficult to value in the Soviet system. These 
covered the whole spectrum of Soviet individual economic activities in agriculture 
industry, services and government administration. From the bottom end, illegal bribes 
might be paid to police officers, shop assistants, and housing officials, for preferential 
treatment. Thi ough the middle of the spectrum, the improved health, housing, 
recreation and holiday facilities were fairly provided by state enterprises and institutions, 
and farm workers received income-in-kind. At the top end of the spectrum, members 
of elite groups had access to special shops, special dining facilities within government 
departments and travel to the West. Even the special ‘fifth lanes’ on Moscow 
boulevards were kept clear for senior members of elite groups. These elite groups
have received much attention in the literature on the Soviet economy and income
201distribution. Matthews identified the elite as all recipients in 1971-3 of at least 400-
500 roubles per month of official earnings, which was between 3.1 and 3.8 times the
202average 1972 pay. In this context, it does not seem unreasonable to accept 
Morrison’s judgement, based on the Soviet and Polish experience, of an elite 
comprising 1.5 per cent of the population enjoying fringe benefits and additional
203incomes worth up to 100 per cent on top of official incomes.
There also existed informal incomes from legal or illegal private activities in response 
to the seller’s market condition in the state sector. Since the state enterprise had 
relatively soft budgets constraints and their existence did not depend upon their ability 
to match the quantity or quality of consumers’ demands, shortages of consumer goods 
and services occurred, which encouraged informal private activities. Several types of 
informal private activities thus emerged: work by single artisans operating without the 
legally required license; use of the “putting-out” system to produce illegal products; 
private production in the job; parallel production in a plant, using extra materials to 
produce unreported output distributed through the system and using bribes; private, 
organised production in a state enterprise or collective farm; private underground
204manufacturing; construction by private teams; and brokering and sale of information. 
Throughout the Soviet period informal private activities constituted a significant part of 
Soviet people’s everyday life. Ofer and Vinokur have estimated—based on their 
survey of Soviet émigrés—that private income from these informal private activities 
constituted 11-12 per cent of all household income in 1972-4, although their sample did
205not included elite groups.
It was provisionally concluded that the Soviet distribution of state monetary wage and 
salary earnings was relatively egalitarian, but the Soviet official data based on sample 
surveys was clearly restricted to official earnings in non-elite groups and omitted any 
perquisites or private incomes, which weaken this conclusion. As already examined, 
the elite groups did exist in the Soviet Union and the faithful political service to the 
party policy with loyalty and discipline were rewarded in material welfaie. Individuals 
did obtain incomes through property instead of work and legal or illegal activities in the 
private market. In many cases, the distribution of material welfare was favoured with
the cities over the villages, the capital over the other regions, and industrial workers
206over those on the land and in the services. However, the extent of these factors was 
comparatively small and on a scale insufficient to overturn our conclusions. The 
Soviet ratio of differentials was no greater than 5:1, whereas ratios as high as 20:1 occur
207in the US. Although it was clear that elite groups were mostly left out of the surveys
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and it seemed probable that Soviet sampling techniques might involve other forms of
f
bias, the Soviet income distribution was relatively egalitarian compared with those in
208the West, but not dramatically so.
Underachieved Material Living Standards
Material living standards are a ‘rag-bag’ in economic terms, that represents a net 
outcome of the interplay in economic performance. In other words, the material living 
standards constitute not just an outcome of economic growth, but a net outcome of all 
the other aspects of static and dynamic economic efficiency, such as better allocation, 
production and innovation, constant economic balances without any shortages, 
persistent economic stability with low levels of inflation and unemployment, and high 
level of economic equity in opportunity and earnings. However, comparisons of 
relative incomes and living standards between countries are notoriously difficult.
Every country may stand at different stages of economic development, their consumers 
may enjoy different ‘baskets’ of goods and services, hidden price inflation may 
understate private incomes in official statistics, or unrealistic exchange rates may 
obscure the outcome. The failure to adopt realistic exchange rates for the rouble 
against hard curi'encies in the West implicitly prevented Soviet citizens from comparing 
their material living standards with those in the West. Soviet statistical digests were 'full of carefully selected economic comparisons between the USSR and Western 
countries, but these were bound to be superficial and selective.
.Certainly, the Soviet regime heavily emphasised on the ability of the Soviet socialist 
system to ‘catch up’ with the West in material terms. However, the actual performance 
was somewhat different from the regime’s expectation in its economic outcomes.
Despite its heavy commitment to heavy industries and military spending, the Soviet 
regime achieved substantial improvements in material living standards following the 
Second World War, particularly in the areas of health care, education, and public 
transport. Basic human needs had also been satisfied and overt poverty was rare.
The Soviet regime might feel happier with their achievements in relation to rapid 
growth of the heavy industry and military potentials as well as the relatively slow 
growth of living standards. Nevertheless, generally speaking, it seems fair to conclude
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that the Soviet material living standards were still fairly lower compared with other
209industrialised Western countries, although distributed in a relatively egalitarian way.
Moreover, accompanying with the slowdown and deteriorating rates of extensive 
economic growth, there was every sign of a slowdown in the growth rate of material 
living standards in the 1970s and 1980s, even below the reduced rates still enjoyed in 
the West. The Soviet regime and the party leadership started expressing their 
disappointment with overall economic performance of directive economic management 
and government central planning, particularly with the underachievement of intensive 
growth and material living standards. As even the Soviet official statistics showed a 
slowdown in extensive economic growth and consumption after 1979, it became 
obvious that further growth was impossible without diverting resources from investment 
into consumption or without a stronger commitment to intensive growth. Continued 
emphasis on extensive growth would require persistent sacrifice of current consumption 
and living standards due to the physical constraints of investment resources
Reform Policies under Soviet Regime
Further Perfection
As economic growth rates had begun to decline in the mid-1960s, the chronic 
inefficiencies in Soviet production put continuous pressures for changes in the Soviet 
government-directed model of political economy. It became increasingly evident that 
the economic growth could no longer be maintained by increasing inputs. Therefore, 
the party leadership turned its attention towards raising efficiency through better 
utilisation of inputs, increasing the quality of products and opening up for teclinological 
innovation in the production units. Accordingly, the Soviet regime pursued reform 
policies for ‘further perfection’ of the economic mechanism in order to induce the 
intensive growth. Perennial attempts to reorganise the centralised economic hierarchy, 
to improve the government planning mechanism, and to develop incentive arrangements 
were made almost eveiy year and became a continuous process. However, these 
reform policies were limited within the fi-amework of the government-directed model, 
which had been formed according to the principle of directive government economic
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The necessity of more synthetic success indicators and incentives to induce ‘intensive’ 
economic activities came to be discussed among intellectuals. This discussion was
precipitated by the publication of Liberman’s article, “The Plan, Profits and Bonuses” in
212Pravda on September 9, 1962. Khrushchev was forced to allow a fairly broad 
debate, often referred to as the ‘Liberman debate’, on the problems of economic 
inefficiency and the transformation to intensive growth. The debate included a 
continued discussion of Liberman’s proposals and furthermore expanded into new
213topics that reflected a broad range of views. The Liberman debate itself yielded
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planning and management. Berliner regarded it as “the fundamental property” of the
Soviet system and Scliroeder described it as a “treadmill of reform” emphasising its
210limitation and continuity.
Territorial Decentralisation
Klirushchev’s dissatisfaction with the ministries’ supervision of their enterprises—
particularly in the industrial sector—paved the way for the policy of ‘territorial
decentralisation’. The ‘departmentalism’ in ministerial behaviour led generally to high
production costs as well as substantial inefidciencies in the operation of Soviet
enterprises, which caused ‘anti-ministerialism’ in the party leadership. They attributed 
.intensive economic activities of enterprises to their branch ministry’s opportunistic 
behaviour and mismanagement. In order to eliminate the ministerial departmentalism, 
the authority of supervising enterprises devolved from all-union branch ministries to 
regional economic councils {Soveiy narodnogo khozyaistva, or sovnarkhozy). This 
territorial decentralisation was intended to increase efficiency and reduce the demands 
on an overburdened transportation system with a rational division of labour within and 
between regions. In the economic aspect, its outcome was indeed predictable, as there 
had been an ample evidence in the past o f ‘localism (mestnichestvoy in the decision­
making of regional governments and regional party organisations. Accordingly, the 
real purpose of sovnarkhoz policy was in politics rather than economics. Berliner 
observed that it was “Khrushchev’s gambit for cmshing the power base of the Moscow 
bureaucracy by transferring their power to his supporters in the provincial centres.”
Consequently, the opportunistic activities of individual enterprises were remained.
1
i
Decentralisation in Enterprise Management
In the Soviet economic decision-making structure, the changes involved the shifts in 
two directions: “administrative re-centralisation” and “economic decentralisation.”^^^
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some valuable insights into the economic problems that the Soviet policy-makers had to 
face in qualitative changes of the Soviet economy. Consequently, the Liberman debate 
resulted in an experimental program sanctioned by the Central Committee of the CP SU 
in 1964. As of May 1, 1964, two textile factories—the Bolshevichka factory in 
Moscow and the Mayak factory in Gorky—were singled out for a more relatively 
radical experiment. The Bolshevichka and Mayak experiments were extended to other 
factories in light industry and, furthermore, some heavy industry enterprises with some
214modification six months later. These experiments continued under Kosygin after the 
Khrushchev’s political ouster.
The Soviet regime under Kosygin and Brezhnev’s leadership supported new measures 
for the improvement of the economic mechanism. On September 27, 1965, the 
Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Kosygin, reported “On Improving 
the Management of Industry, Perfecting Planning, and Enhancing Economic Incentives 
in Industrial Production” to the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CP SU and
215launched reform policies that became known as the ‘Kosygin reforms’. With the 
impetus from the Bolshevichka and Mayak experiments based on Liberman proposals, 
this Plenum approved some guidelines and policies for the new form of government 
planning mechanism, into which the Soviet enterprises gradually were transferred. 
These guidelines and policies were inspired from the Liberman proposals and therefore
formulated on the basis of the assumption: “what is best for the economy should be best
216for the enterprise.” Robert Campbell summarised the general goals of these policies 
briefly as “an attempt to give enterprise decision makers more freedom to make 
decisions about resource uses and to give them a reformed set of incentives and signals 
that would encourage them to use this new freedom in ways consistent with the general
217[social] welfare.”
On the one hand, the planning and supervising authority over enterprise operations was 
re-centralised fi-om the regional back to national level and the nation-wide economic co-
219ordination was emphasised. On the other hand, the operational decision-making
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authority of enterprise management was, somewhat contradictorily, decentralised to 
lower level economic units to overcome the information and incentive problems. The
total number of directive compulsory plan-targets to an individual enterprise from its
220branch ministry and central planners was reduced to eight major targets. All other 
operational decisions were supposed to be decided by the management of each 
enterprise itself independently in the light of actual production conditions, without any 
formal endorsement by its higher planning or administrative bodies. The enterprises 
were encouraged to propose ‘counter-plans’ in the planning process which were more 
difficult than those obligated by their branch ministries. Besides, the newly formed
Gossnab was to apply itself to the creation of a wholesale trade system based upon
221direct contracting anangements between suppliers and users. It was aimed at raising
the quality of goods and the responsiveness to customers with establishing a closer link
222between supplier and customer enterprises.
In order to enforce a more uniform approach to setting prices, the price-setting authority 
was centralised to Goskomtsen from many bodies throughout the system. Goskomtsen 
revised industrial prices in 1966-67, usually referred to simply as “the industrial price
223reform.” The objective of the price revisions was to support the profitability of an
enterprise to serve as an important success indicator, even though it was not intended at 
the same time to serve as an allocative device by influencing production choices. In 
addition, a special price system was introduced for new products that would allow 
temporarily high profits to cover the costs of introduction, which was supposed to
224encourage productive and operational process innovation. A new bonus system was 
introduced linking the enterprise performance in most important plan-targets to bonus 
payments from their profits in order to make them concerned with efficiency, cost and
225quality in their operational activities. In an attempt to harden the enterprises’ budget 
constraints, the principles of full profit-and-loss accounting {khozraschet) and self- 
fmancing were more emphasised. Thus, the retained profits and bank credits were
programmed to develop as a major alternative forms of financing fixed capital
226investment. I.:":
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However, the reform was a somewhat contradictory in its design. Though enterprises 
were permitted to make a wide range of decisions, their branch ministry was also 
directly responsible for their plan-fulfilment. As long as branch ministries held direct 
responsibility for the fulfilment of plan-targets issued to their subordinate enterprises, 
they still intervened their enterprises’ operational activities by using directives in 
specified physical quantities or gross values. Their enterprises, therefore, dealt with 
only secondary choices for which their ministry itself was not directly accountable. 
Consequently, the range of such decentralised decision making authority to enterprises 
was likely to be very limited. The genuine idea of “economic decentralisation” in 
enterprise management was, therefore, easily hampered by the branch ministries’ 
reluctance, even resistance, to their lost of control. Moreover, there were increasing 
concerns over the large share of bonuses received by managerial personnel, the 
unwillingness of enterprise managers to propose higher difficult counter-plans, and the 
lack of attention to conduct labour productivity increase, quality improvement, and 
teclinological innovation. In practice, the branch ministries began to press for 
amendments to the original program with reacting against “undesirable” enterprise 
response and gradually increased the number of enterprises’ directives.
Improvement o f Planning Mechanism
The Kosygin’s reform programme, the improvement of economic management 
mechanism with ‘economic decentralisation’, failed to produce the intended results to 
transform from the extensive growth performance to the intensive where state 
enterprises were conducting labour productivity increase, efficient use of material 
resources, quality improvement, and productive and technological innovation. From 
the beginning of 1971, several features of the original 1965 policies were modified 
continuously during the Brezhnev’s leadership. The Brezhnev’s policy was the
continuation or extension of a series of changes rather than as a break with the past or as
228an introduction of new economic management methods to the intensive growth area.
For that reason, Gertrude Schroeder described his policies as “reformations of the
229reforms.” In general, its direction was towards the more centralised enterprise 
management, more rigid and detailed directive plan-targets and more diverse and
intricate success indicators.
For the attempt to manage the economy in greater detail from the centre, the central 
planners—Gosplan, other state committees and functional ministries—were given 
substantially increased authorities to co-ordinate economic decisions on the national 
scale. Furthermore, several special inter-departmental commissions in the Council of 
Ministers and Gosplan, a new State Committee for the Supply of Petroleum Products,
and two new all-union ministries were established for better co-ordination of inter-
230sectoral programs. Three basic types of inter-sectoral programs were projected: 
scientific-technical programs intended primarily to guide scientific research and 
development; targeted economic programs aimed at coping with an economy-wide
231problem; and comprehensive programs for developing a particular region. The 
internal structure of Gosplan was reorganised to establish a number of comprehensive 
departments that would deal with the major targeted economic progi'ams. In 
accordance, the size of the economic bureaucracy was considerably proliferated, which 
increased by a 57 percent during 1966-77 compared with 38 percent for state 
employment as a whole. In addition, according to the new Law on the USSR Council 
of Ministers adopted in July 1978, the ministerial structui*e was reorganised to 32 all- 
union ministries, all but one of them economic, and 30 union-republic ministries 23 of
. 232them economic.
In July 1979, the CPSU and the Council of Ministers adopted an omnibus decree, 
entitled “On Improving Planning and Strengthening the Economic Mechanism’s 
Influence on Raising the Effectiveness of Production and the Quality of Work.” The
goal of the decree was a familiar one: inducing industrial enterprises “to increase 
output; to reduce cost, and particularly the use of materials and fuels; to improve quality 
through the introduction of new products; to secure the timely delivery of output
234according to the contracted product mix; and to cut production time and costs.” The
major section of the decree was devoted to the improvement of the planning mechanism. 
The ten-year plan was suppose to set out the main directions of economic and social 
development. Further, the twenty-year plan was to outline the main directions of 
technological progress. The five-year plan linked to a wider ten-year plan was
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officially designated as the basic plan and remained stable throughout the plan period. 
The computers, mathematical optimising models and input-output techniques were 
extensively used in making more balanced—in terms of input-output relationships—and 
optimal plans. The integrated planning was employed in the ten-year and five-year
plans to accomplish comprehensive programs for some major inter-sectoral or inter-
235regional development objectives.
These objectives were to be pursued mainly by setting tight plan-targets. The list of 
plan-targets and norms was longer than before and covered every operational matter.
The management of the enterprises would be rewarded by voluntarily adopting a
236counter-plan with higher targets than those in the original plan. In addition, to 
increase economic efficiency and reduce costs, a program for gradual transformation of 
all economic entities to a system of fixed profit sharing with the state budget and to self- 
financing, starting with industrial ministries, was outlined. Accordingly, branch 
ministries and enterprises were required to finance their operations from internal funds 
or bank credits, rather than by grants from state budget. The centralised ministerial 
funds for research and development formed by a levy on enterprise profits were 
established to finance the planned R&D program and to compensate enterprises for 
experimental production and start-up costs. The bonuses were paid from own profits 
with respect to mainly the fulfilment of the three plan-targets: labour productivity, 
quality mix (share of products in the highest quality category), and product deliveries
238under contracts, which focused on raising efficiency and product quality. These 
targets were measured on the basis of net output rather than gross output, the so-called
239‘normative net output’ (normativnaya chistayaproduJctsiya, NNO).
The obvious objective of the Brezhnev’s policies was to enable the government to 
manage the economy better and plan better by the intensification of government 
planning practice. In general, the policy direction was towards more centralisation, 
more rigid and detailed directive plan-targets in the government planning mechanism, 
and more diverse and intricate success indicators. However, the information and 
incentive problems stemmed from the government-directed economic nature of the 
Soviet system were still unsolved and remained. The solution for the intensive grovrth
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by further centralising the government planning by the more rigid and detailed directive 
physical planning and the more tightly rationed supply system of producer goods 
multiplied the administrative burden on higher central bodies. The still fragmentary 
success indicators, unlike the profits in the market system, were potentially conflicting 
variables, with the priority given to production plans expressed in physical units. In 
consequence, without resolving intrinsic information and incentive problems by 
introducing more market-oriented policies, Brezhnev’s policies could not substantially 
change the opportunistic enterprises’ activities to raise efficient utilisation of inputs, 
product quality, and technological innovation.
Perestroika
Following the death of Brezhnev, the Soviet leaders had referred guardedly to the 
economic ‘difficulties’ of the late 1970s and early 1980s. Their overwhelming 
concern was with the decline in economic growth rates and the difficulty in 
transforming the economy from being extensive to being intensive within the 
framework of the government-directed system. This economic reform debate on the 
ways of improving the Soviet economic performance was initiated by Y. Andropov and 
continued under K. Chernenko. The actual task of economic revitalisation and 
transformation to achieve an efficient and intensive economy was taken on by M. 
Gorbachev in the second half of the 1980s. Gorbachev and the party leadership 
initiated the reform policy ofperestroikd\ which translates as ‘restructuring’ or 
‘radical reform’. He explained that it was not just accelerating the rate of economic 
growth that was needed but also the shift towards a new quality of growth based upon 
intensive development, scientific and technological progress, structural changes, and
240new forms of management and labour incentives.
The principal distinctive features of perestroika was the supplementation of the 
technocratic approach by the socio-economic, that is, the activation o f ‘the human
241factor’ as a condition of transforming the whole system of production relations. In 
general, the strategy of perestroika was an effort to institutionalise the pressure for 
greater economic discipline and incentives for active and creative work. The diverse 
measures of the human factor socio-economic approach were bound together by an
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underlying hypothesis that the economic performance could be improved by forcing
242individual participants to live up to their responsibilities. At the beginning of 
perestroika, the pressure for increased discipline and incentives for creative works in 
individual economic activities was intended to come from early disciplinary measures to 
intensify individual economic activities, later from restructuring of the economic 
management mechanism to introduce clear rules for winners and losers, and further
,from démocratisation of collective political activities.
I
Gorbachev’s first efforts were to eliminate ineptitude in economic activities and to
correct the undisciplined behaviour of workers. Disciplinary campaigns were
launched, which combined with an enhanced emphasis on the need for every economic
participant in the centralised economic hierarchy to take responsibility for his/her
decisions and actions. The campaigns included measures to inspire workers and
enterprise managers by giving them more initiative and allowing for more
entrepreneurship; to purge the economic sphere of so-called negative phenomena, as
corruption, drunkenness and illegal economic activity. Beside, there would be greater 
.enforcement of discipline in the work force. In this context, the rapid personnel 
changes in the party and the government hierarchies took place—approximately one 
third of the men heading the fifty or so branch ministries were replaced and new
243appointments continued throughout 1986. Besides, an anti-alcohol campaign was 
initiated a decree by the Council of Ministers ‘On measures for overcoming 
drunkenness and alcoholism, eliminating illegal distillation of alcohol’ to raise labour
244productivity in the work-place and to improve the quality of life. The basic idea was 
that it would be difficult to buy alcohol to prevent drunkenness in the work-place.
To overcome quality problems, a new stricter state system of quality control was 
enforced. On 12 May 1986, a special organ of extra-departmental quality control, 
called ‘a state acceptance {gospriemkd)\ was created by the decree ‘On measures to
245fundamentally raise the quality of production’. The new quality inspectors were 
directly subordinated to the State Committee for Standards {Gosstandart), so that they 
would not be influenced by enterprises, ministries or local authorities including the
I
Party. In the first inspection, only 82-85 per cent of the output passed, but the rest was 
returned for more improvements in quality. The impact on output was so dramatic that 
output targets were not reached and therefore workers and enterprise managers were 
deprived of their bonuses. Moreover, the improvements in quality of the returned 
products turned out to be very costly. Due to the absence of the objective checks in the 
market, some external quality control appeared necessary instead, but it could not be a 
firm solution.
The effort to accelerate efficiency, productivity, and scientific-technical progress turned 
to industrial modernisation. The modernisation policy was admitted with some 
measures in investment decisions and wages settings to improve the technological base. 
In investment decisions, the emphasis was on renovating and re-equipping already 
existing factories, rather than building new ones, which was more efficient than new
246investment in construction because of its higher output-to-capital ratio. Besides, the 
first priority in investment was given to the machine-building and metalworking 
industries, in particular to energy-saving teclinologies and improved methods of tilconstruction. The higher priority for these sectors was clearly indicated in the 12 
FYP: the 43 per cent increase in production and no less than 80 per cent increase of in
247investment during 1985 to 1990 in these sector. In the wage settings, new wage 
tariffs were revised to stimulate people more effectively promoting efficiency and 
quality, raising their qualifications, and providing more incentives to research and
248development.
Restructuring o f Economic Management Mechanism
At the Plenum of the Central Committee on economic reform in June 1987, Gorbachev 
concluded that the Soviet economy in the 1980s was not only in a difficult but also in a 
‘pre-crisis situation’ and called for a ‘radical restructuring of economic management’. 
The Plenum adopted a resolution entitled ‘Basic Provisions for the Radical
249Restmcturing of Economic Management’. Later, these principles were embodied in 
the Law on the State Enterprise (Association) on 30 June 1987 that came into effect in
250January 1988. In July 1987, it was supplemented by ten decrees issued by the 
Central Committee and the Council of Ministers and concerning the major functions of
106
107
3
'■-'M
251the economy and their executive government organs. The objective of the new 
economic management mechanism was to establish an ‘integrated, efficient and flexible 
system of economic management’, allowing greater independence for individual co­
operatives and state enterprises.
Decentralisation o f Economic Management Authority
In order to overcome ‘ministerial departmentalism’ and ‘economic bureaucratism’, the 
government administrative units were reorganised and their staffs were streamlined.
The central planning organs were reorganised and encouraged to concentrate on long- 
range strategic planning using indicative ‘economic levers’, such as prices, financial 
norms and credit, to focus on scientific and technological progress. Gosplan was in
252charge of the development of methods for the long-term plans. In order to accelerate 
the scientific and technical progress, the State Committee for Science and Technology
253(GKNT) was strengthen. The decree on the activity of ministries and departments
passed in July 1987 recommended gradual mergers of related ministries and cutting the
staff of the ministries considerably without specifying numbers. Although the nature 
.of the Soviet ministerial stmcture did not changed, branch ministries were supposed to
I'
concentrate on long-term planning and technical development while the operative
254economic work was to be transferred to the enterprises. Accordingly, the
establishment of super-ministerial bodies was reinforced to strengthen inter-sectoral co­
ordination within some traditionally-defined ‘complexes’ or groups of branches at the
255highest level.
Another new scheme of reorganisation was induced for the aim of linking large 
production associations and enterprises directly to the ministries. The meaningless 
bureaucratic intermediaries, namely all-union industrial associations (VPOs) that had 
replaced the glavki by the reorganisation of 1973, were immediately abolished. The 
abolition of the VPOs was to be accomplished by continuing the ongoing process of 
amalgamating enterprises into production and science-production associations. 
Furthermore, the decree on the branch ministries of July 1987 set out the task to 
elaborate a statute on a new kind of ‘state production associations’ (GPO), which aimed 
at vertical integration like the East German Kombinate. GPOs were supposed to be
Î
256inter-sectoral and to integrate all phases of the research-production-marketing chain.
The purpose was to overcome autarchic tendencies, the so-called ‘departmentalism’, 
within the ministries and creating conditions for rational specialisation, co-operation, 
and scientific-technical progress. The concept of GPOs was pushed by ministerialÜ1representatives. However, at the 19 Party Conference in 1988, this decision was
257reversed because of the danger of the tendency for monopolies.
In addition, the operational autonomy of individual enterprises and co-operatives over 
their own affairs was considerably extended by enacting the Law on the State 
Enterprises in 1987 and the Law on the Co-operatives in 1988. According to these 
laws, the government central planning agencies and administrative units were 
responsible for setting out the broad direction of socio-economic development, then the 
enterprises and co-operatives were given economic independence and discretion from 
the dictates of their branch ministries and higher-level planning organs. The 
enterprises were, therefore, to operate on the basis of profit-and-loss accounting 
(khozraschet) and self-financing, and under the conditions of economic competition
258among themselves restricting their monopoly position. The Law on the State 
Enterprises enumerated in considerable detail the rights and obligations of enterprises in 
a number of key areas; planning; scientific and technical progress and improving 
quality; technical re-equipment and reconstruction; the social development of the labour 
collective; labour and wages; material and teclinical supply; the sale of output, work and 
services; finance and prices; credit and settlement; foreign economic activity; nature use 
and environmental protection; the enterprise’s joint production and social activity; and
239record-keeping, reporting and monitoring.
In a way, the Law of State Enterprises advocated a ‘combination of centralised 
management and independence at the enterprise’. The enterprises were 
‘independently’ to work out and confirm their own five-year and annul plans and 
conclude contracts, but guided by control figures, state orders, long-term economic 
norms and quotas (limits) as well as consumers’ orders. They must strictly observe 
plan discipline and completely fulfil plans and contractual commitments, producing 
highest quality output with full potentials in highest efficiency. Although branch
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ministries were prohibited from interfering in day-to-day operational activities of the
enterprises, they were still responsible for taking measures to prevent inflation in costs 
.and prices, stagnation in the scientific and technical progress and restriction of 
production of goods in demand and also for counteracting the monopoly tendencies.
The fate of enterprises was still in the hands of the government bureaucracy and the 
Law explicitly provided for declaring bankrupt and liquidating enterprises that
persistently made losses. The enterprise could be founded, reorganised, and liquidated
260by the government.
Without any substantial commitment to the market mechanism, the economic activities 
were still to be continuously co-ordinated by the government planning bodies as a 
means of carrying out the socio-economic party policies. However, some reform 
policies aimed at improving planning methods was intended to alter from the directive 
physical mandatory planning to the long-range strategic planning with using functional 
indicative economic levers, such as prices, financial norms and credit, and focus on 
scientific and technological progress. The government planning focused on long-range 
strategic planning and therefore the five-year plan became the basic form of national 
economic planning instead of the short-term annual plan. The annual assignments 
allotted from the five-year plan-targets were set and disaggregated down to the 
enteiprises through the administrative planning hierarchy. These enterprise 
assignments in the form of control figures, long-term economic norms, and limits, and 
state orders were not directives or commands that the enterprises were obliged to fulfil,
■■but non-binding indicators, or ‘initial planning data’ for their individual operational 
plans. Gosplan review these enterprise own plans annually and if required could 
revise them.
;
Though the authority for enterprise management was dispersed to enterprises 
themselves, the government was still able to determine the directions and priorities of 
socio-economic development by issuing control figures, state orders, economic norms 
and limits. The social requirements for output produced by the enterprises and the 
minimal levels of production efficiency were reflected in ‘control figures’, though they
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became non-binding indicators. By giving ‘state orders’ to enterprises, the satisfaction 
of society’s top-priority demands were guaranteed. The enterprise plans must include 
these state orders. In addition, the government was also able to control the rate and the 
direction of the bulk of investment by inducing long-term economic financial norms and 
limits. These long-term economic norms determined relations with the state budget, 
the formation of the wage fimd, economic incentive funds and other aspects of 
enterprise activities. The limits were intended to establish the maximum size of 
centrally distributed material resources and capital investment for the development of
inter-branch production facilities, new construction and the accomplishment especially
262important tasks.
In company with the redefinition of government planning and the decentralisation of 
enterprise management, the state supply system was decentralised and the wholesale 
trade system was encouraged. The Law on State Enterprises approved the intention of 
decisive transition from the state material and technical supply system for material 
resources allocation to the wholesale trade system by attaching producers to consumers, 
which took the form of ‘free’ purchase and sale on the basis of direct and self-sustained 
commercial contracts with other enterprises, state wholesale agencies, primarily 
regional bodies, and manufacturers’ direct outlets. Only the ‘particularly scarce’ 
resources and goods would continue to be allocated or rationed by the state agencies, 
while the inputs that were required to fulfil mandatory state orders were included on the 
list of state allocation. The transition was scheduled to stait with the resources for 
consumer goods production, agriculture, constmction, machinery production of greatest 
importance and the needs of co-operatives and private producers. Gossnab was in
263charge of this transition which would be completed in 4 to 5 years.
For the effective function of indicative economic levers, the role of money and prices 
was enhanced. In order to establish the monetary balance and promote the effective 
role of financial norms and credit for investment, two separate decrees on the finance 
mechanism and on banking in July 1987 envisaged a system where bank credits and 
interests rates were to serve as important economic levers in promoting efficient 
resource utilisation in enterprise operation. To assist enterprise self-finance, bank
credits were to become a more important source of financing investment and new
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In order to create a ‘powerful’ system of motives and incentives, the more greater 
utilisation of material incentives, self-interests, and economic competition and the 
competition between various fornis of co-operatives and individual private sector and 
state sector were emphasised as effective stimuli. Forcing economic participants to
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commercial banks were created. According to the decree on the restructuring of the 
system of price formation of 1987, new revised industrial wholesale prices as well as 
service and transport tariffs were scheduled to be introduced in 1990 and new estimate 
prices in construction and agricultural purchasing prices in 1991. The enterprises were 
given the right to set contract prices based on arrangements with consumers along with 
the development of wholesale trade and commercial contract, but these prices would be 
monitored by the government. However, the share of administratively fixed prices was 
planned to be reduced, but nothing was said about retail prices in the intended price 
reform.
Enhancement o f Material Incentives and Competition
■The main question in the reform of the Soviet motivation mechanism was how to create 
stimuli that are even more powerful and how to achieve economic, scientific, 
technological and social progress by intensive activities under socialism. The essential 
element was how to blend the government guidance with the interests of individuals and 
work collectives. Perestroika called for ensuring the practical involvement of the 
broad masses of working people in economic management at every level from work 
units to the entire national economy. For the purpose of giving work collectives and 
individual workers opportunities to manage public property by themselves and 
increasing their accountability for efficient performance as a real and active ‘co­
proprietor’, the principle o f ‘self-management’ was emphasised within the socialist 
framework. They participated in the highly important operational decisions of 
enterprise management and monitored the implementation of these decisions. The 
Law of the State Enterprises stated that enterprise managers and directors would be
elected by their workers, who would also elect a work council that would confirm
266enterprise plans.
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live up to their responsibilities, the persistence o f ‘levelling’ (uravnilovka) or
‘egalitarianism’ was prevented. The wages and bonuses of workers were to be tied 
much more closely to the results of works not only in its quantity but in also its quality 
by pushing for widespread adoption of brigade systems for compensating labour. 
Those systems would lead to income dispersion even within the enterprises and would 
further enhance workers’ interest in the management of the enterprise. The reform 
could have immediate effect of creating labour income differentials among enterprises 
in the same sector, even for people with the same jobs, all related to differences in.enterprise performance. These incentive earnings were not limited to a maximum
amount, but the size and growth of the total wage and bonus fonds were to be regulated
267by various indicative norms set by the ministry.
•Besides the state sector, the Law on Individual Labour Activity on 19 November 1986 
and the Law on Co-operatives on 26 May 1988 allowed individual private activities that 
were already widely spread. According to the laws, members of the co-operative were 
allowed to work foll-time and own its property, except land, and permitted to engage in 
any kind of activity that was not forbidden by law. The law contained a number of
liberal stipulations, such as permission for co-operatives to sell shares or bonds, to
268choose banks, to set up banks, to firm associations and to pursue foreign trade.
However, these private individual activities were allowed with some restrictions. The 
individual labour activity could be permitted for employees in the socialist sector during 
their free time with the participation of cohabiting members of the family as a part-time 
occupation, only exceptionally as a foil occupation for housewives, disabled, pensioners, 
students, and ‘other citizens not occupied in social production’. Co-operatives could 
employ an unlimited number of non-members on a contract basis, but hiring of labour 
was not allowed. The co-operative activities were restrained by the still centralised 
supply and licensing and the high taxes were rendered to the private activities and the 
high personal income.
In addition, foreign economic relations and participation in the international division of 
labour was enhanced, involving joint ventures and other form of co-operation with
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capitalists as well as other socialist states. The basic changes were outlined in a decree 
on the management of foreign economic relations of August 1986. The Ministry of 
Foreign Trade lost its monopoly over foreign trade. Initially, twenty-one branch 
ministries and sixty-seven large associations (enterprises) were given foreign trade 
rights. The State Foreign Economic Commission was established to supervise the 
activities of foreign trade and foreign economic relations and, in January 1988, it was 
amalgamated into a new Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations. The new Complex 
Programme of CMEA adopted in December 1985 urged more organisational integration 
with ‘direct links’ between enterprises and joint ventures. The legislation of August 
1986 envisaged joint ventures also with capitalist countries, and on 13 January 1987 
two decrees were adopted on the creation of joint ventures with CMEA countries and
270other countries, respectively. The USSR also changed its policy towards 
international economic organisations, such as UNCTAD, IMF, the World Bank, and
I
GATT, and intended to become a full member.
Political Adaptation 
.The forther activation of the human factor under perestroika was the démocratisation of
collective political activities. After the extended debate, the 19 Party Conference in
1988 duly adopted a series of resolutions calling for further démocratisation and reform
of the totalitarian political power structure. Gorbachev made clear from the outset that
perestroika was conceivable only in association with a far-reaching ‘démocratisation’ in
Soviet society as a ‘guarantee’ that perestroika was irreversible. Gorbachev believed
that it was only democracy in all spheres of Soviet life that could unleash the powerfol
‘human factor’ from the ‘straitjacket’ by various governmental bureaucratic controls
and prevent working people from becoming alienated from public ownership. First
of all, the policy ofglasnost ' or openness was launched so as to enhance the role of the
media and to encourage the diversity of public interest. Glasnost’ entailed the
pluralism of points of view rather than the previously centralised and controlled party
monism. Glasnost’ considerably spread over almost all fields of public and cultural 
.life in the Soviet society. Glasnost’, in the first place, did not and was not intended to
Imean an unqualified freedom of expression, but the movement towards the freedom of I
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expression was rapidly accelerated.
One of the earliest political changes was the reform of the electoral system. At the 
Central Committee Plenum in January 1987, Gorbachev himself suggested that the 
voters be allowed to choose among several candidates and the larger constituencies. A 
lack of choice of candidates was perhaps the most widely remarked shortcoming of the 
Soviet electoral system and the composition of each group of deputies was regulated 
much too precisely by the party. At the end of March 1987, it was announced that an 
‘experiment’ in the elections to local soviets would take place under which a choice of 
candidates would be nominated in a number of enlarged constituencies. In line with 
this experiment, the resolution ‘On démocratisation of Soviet society and reform of the 
political system’ endorsed by the 19 Party Conference in 1988 committed the party to 
a ‘substantive renewal of the electoral system’ ; unrestricted nomination of candidates; 
broad and free discussion in election conferences for nomination; the inclusion on the 
ballot papers of a larger number of candidates than seats and strict observance of the
276democratic procedures of elections. A Supreme Soviet by-election in January 1988 
and republican by-elections in October 1988 took place on the basis of these new 
electoral principles. Eventually, the new electoral law adopted on 1 December 1988 
made it clear that these democratic electoral principles and practices were to become 
universal.
For the démocratisation of the political power structure, the central objective was ‘all
power to the soviets’, and more generally a shift of political power ft om the Communist
Party to the state institutions as representative bodies. In this context, at the 19 Party
Conference, Gorbachev proposed the resumption of full authority by the soviets and a 
.new ‘representative supreme government body’, the Congress of People’s Deputies of 
the USSR, elected by political and social organisations as well as from national and 
territorial constituencies. The new Congress of People’s Deputies would in turn elect 
a bicameral Supreme Soviet, which would be the standing legislature. Finally, a 
number of constitutional amendments were passed by the Supreme Soviet on 1
278December 1988. The first elections of the Congress of People’s Deputies of the 
USSR took place in March 1989 and held its first session on 25 May 1989. One of the
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Congress’s first acts was to set up the new-style Supreme Soviet as the standing 
legislature, which met for the first time on 3 June 1989. Gorbachev was elected to the 
newly-established post of Chairman of the Supreme Soviet by the election against two
279candidates.
Finally, perestroika tried to divest the party apparatus of its administrative role in 
industry and in government by clear-cut separation of functions of the Party and local 
government bodies and by stopping the duplication of state functions by party 
organisations at all levels. Accordingly, perestroika considerably reduced its functions 
and changed the way in which the party operated. The party central organs no longer 
determined government policy and became less powerful than hitherto. The Politburo 
had been significantly downgraded and was no long a major determinant of state policy. 
After all, the Communist Party had lost its prime de jure monopoly position of political 
power. The supreme political power was shifted from the Communist Party to the new 
representative state bodies, the Congress of People’s Deputies and the new Supreme 
Soviet of the USSR. At the Plenum in February 1990, the Central Committee 
abandoned its constitutionally guaranteed ‘leading role’ and Article 6 of the Soviet
Constitution was amended. However, prior to the coup attempt of August 1991, the
280Communist Party, was still an important force.
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In the years following Stalin’s death, Soviet leaders aimed to get away from terror and 
arbitrary lawlessness and to move toward a more “contractual” political legitimacy, 
based primarily on economic guarantees to the population. For the legitimisation of its 
dictatorship and the repressed low level of the political culture within mass society, the 
Communist Party had a tacit social agreement with the people on the promises of 
surpassing the industrialised Western capitalist countries in the level of material living 
standards; income security by job lights; elimination of unjust and unequal distribution
of wealth; social welfare by low prices for necessities and housing; and general social
281policy to provide free health services and education. This rather restricted social 
contract fitted well into the extensive phase of industrial development. However, since 
the economic growth rates started declining from the mid 1960s and continued to 
decline during 1970s and 1980s, there was every sign of difficulties to keep these 
promises. Consequently, it became clear that the extensive economic growth could not
be sustained much further without serious damage to the restricted social contract, thus
282the more radical approach to the reform policy was inevitable.
The Soviet society of the late 1980s was significantly different from that of which the 
Bolsheviks had taken power. By the 1980s, the USSR was an urban industrial society 
comparable in many respects to advanced Western societies. There was a spectacular 
rise in educational standards. Because of industrialisation, the occupational structure 
had shifted away from jobs in the primary to those in the secondary and tertiary sectors. 
The large educated non-manual urban population changed the social base of politics. 
The maturing of the Soviet political culture led to a significant number of individuals 
and groups having a positive conception of their own interests. The real political 
ballast of the regime moved from the peasantry and working class to the intelligentsia. 
The Soviet regime officially continued to dominate its citizens, but, in reality, Soviet 
society became individualised and socially decentralised, although not independent of 
its state. As a result, an unofficial “second” society developed alongside. Blair 
Ruble suggested that what was taking place was a sort of “quiet revolution” with the 
informal emergence of a second economy, a second culture and even a second politics.
285and in full recognition of the continuing limits imposed by the officials ones.
117
1
In a modern society, the changing social structure is one of those crucial variables in the 
provision of support or opposition to a given political leadership and the prevailing 
system. The preferences and interests of a majority strata exert important influence on 
social norms, values, institutions and processes. The rise of a large stratum of non- 
manual urban people in the Soviet society had implications for the political support
Structure. They were capable of participating in political processes and prepared new
286intensive form of market activities to capitalise their marketable ‘skill assets’. 
However, the Soviet system had under-utilised them and the old social contract 
discriminated against them and deprived them of any real participation in the political 
life. These changes were evidence of increasing levels of dissatisfaction, especially 
among the growing professional groups. They were eager to dismantle what Jerry 
Hough called the “two Iron Curtains”—the one that was erected to keep out Western
287ideas and the one that was erected against Western market forces.
In order to accommodate these quantitative and qualitative changes in Soviet socio­
economic environment, the new leadership under Gorbachev initiated the reform policy 
of perestroika. During the period of perestroika, in principle, Gorbachev and radical 
reformers turned away from the traditional ideology of Marxism-Leninism, and moved 
to ‘market socialism’ and ‘social democratic vision of socialism’. In the economic 
sphere, their approaches were accompanied for quite a long time by attempts to create a 
‘special way’ of socialism: a combination of private entrepreneurial incentives with 
preservation of the absolute dominance of state ownership. In the political sphere 
‘general human values’ of democracy—the modern democratic system characteristic of 
the developed countries of the West—emerged practically straight away as the basic 
model. The break with Marxist-Leninist ideology was a consequence of a conscious 
decision to move toward a new market and democratic type society. Moreover, some 
members within the political leadership, initially grouped around Gorbachev himself, 
lost confidence in the party and communist institutions of power and they publicly 
discredited the legitimating ideology of Marasm-Leninism.
However, the pace of radical reform process to the more market-oriented economy was
3
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too slow, because the political, economic internal and external context was not 
favourable for market transition. The individual propensity to relinquish ideological 
and political impediments among the party leadership was too wide to reach a
289consensus for the market reform policies. From the very beginning, the
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ideological and political impediments, therefore, constrained the alternative of radical
'‘-‘ftransformation of Soviet political economy were conceived as a complex, multifaceted task, but the reform policies of perestroika lacked any well formulated conception for 
the market transformation. Perestroika effectively destroyed the political control over 
economic management and system of central planning, but nothing was put in its place 
except uncertainty and ambiguity. Their attempt to find a ‘special way’ of socialism— 
a combination of private entrepreneurial incentives with preservation of the absolute 
dominance of state ownership— had failed. Its mobilising principles were rent with 
contradictions; between market and plan, between entrepreneurial demands for private
property and state ownership, and between the forces generated by civil society and the
290dominant party.
The political reform dismantled the political stability and led to a polarisation of Soviet 
politics, which in some ways made economic reform for the market more difficult.
David Dyker expressed Gorbachev’s dilemma: ‘It is hard to dispute Gorbachev’s 
conclusion that economic reform would not be possible without political reform. What
291is less clear is whether economic reform is possible with political reform.’ The 'attempted economic restructuring and political démocratisation dismantled the stability 
of the Soviet system, but the critical problem revolved, inevitably, around the economic 
modernisation and the legitimisation of the communist Soviet regime. The two 
objectives were mutually constraining: that is, the economic reform was constrained by 
the regime’s legitimisation strategy of economic security and equity; the legitimisation, 
in turn, was constrained by the long-term decline of the Soviet economic performance.
The “equity-efficiency trade-off’ were undeniable in the Soviet reform process. The
market reform and privatisation. However, the nascent nature of the introduction of 
rapid marketisation and privatisation with high prices, temporary unemployment, and 
unequal income distribution was objectionable to a broad public, particularly manual 
workers, and still dominant party and union government apparatus. Hence, Gorbachev
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and his advisers confronted the vacillation in economic policy and the real dilemma like 
“collapse without reform and revolt with reform. 293
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Without any social consensus for the future, the credibility of perestroika was thi eatened 
and the Soviet system was on the verge of collapse. Major destabilising elements
became apparent: first, widespread dissatisfaction with economic and social conditions; 
second, ambiguity among the leaders and the lack of a definite plan to overcome the 
discontent; third, increased political activity among the masses; and fourth, 
independence movements in the republics and regions. Perestroika, as Schroeder 
concludes, brought “the macroeconomy from the comparative stability of central 
planning to a state of massive disequilibrium and the microeconomy from perennial but
294tolerable disarray to the brink of chaos.” The growth rates of industrial, and 
agricultural production from 1985 to 1990 were getting worse. The fiscal and 
monetary situation was destabilised with “truly horrifying dimensions” by sharp
295increase of state budget deficit and a huge monetary overhang. . The consumer 
markets had been already in massive disequilibrium and random shortages, but the 
situation deteriorated dramatically. Furthermore, the controlled hidden and repressed 
inflation was unchained by the relative decentralisation of state price.
In the beginning of the 1990s, the Soviet Union was a tangled network conflicts,
accompanied by a situation of rapidly aggravating economic depression and growing
political uncertainty. The weakening of the party apparatus and the government
executive authority naturally shifted political power from the union centre to the 
.republics, simple because it was the party and the USSR ministries which had provided 
.the unity in the Soviet system. The weakening of the union authority steadily reduced 
the union government’s possibility of influencing the course of political events and 
further economic reform. After all, the previous confidence of the Soviet regime in 
omnipotence was replaced by lack of confidence, um eadiness to take responsibility for 
implementing unpopular measures, the necessity for which became quite obvious in 
crisis. Moreover, the leadership of the USSR were divided and attempted to hide its 
unreadiness to take such decisions by demonstrating its devotion to democratic 
procedures, which had severe economic consequences.
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The general conclusion was that the union government was incapable of conducting an 
effective and consistent more radical market oriented reform policies. Once the right 
had been conceded for contested elections, nationalist forces gained strength and 
governments hostile to the Union were elected in many republics. The political 
leadership in the republics, now constituted lai'gely from politicians with authority in 
their Supreme Soviets, sought independence and the dissolution of the USSR. By the 
end of 1990, all the constituent republics and many other regional areas of the USSR 
had declared their own sovereignty. Nationalism and the values of capitalism and 
liberalism gradually provided their own form of legitimisation to the local republican 
elite and, as ideologies, a legitimisation for opposition to Soviet regime and to
communism. The weakening of ideological controls and the discrediting of Soviet 
institutions, as a consequence of the failed perestroika, and their legitimating ideology 
created conditions in which the republican political elite had potentially more to gain 
than to lose by advocating a move to their own sovereignty. I
In consequence, on 8 December, the leaders of the three Slav republics—Russia, 
Ukraine and Belorussia—established a new ‘Commonwealth of Independent States’, 
which was later joined by almost all of the other former Soviet republics, excepting the 
Baltic states and Georgia, on 21 December. On 25 December 1991, Gorbachev 
resigned as president of the USSR the red flag was hauled down from the Kremlin 
tower. On 31 December, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics existed no more, and 
the Soviet regime collapsed. Russia was recognised internationally as the successor 
state to the USSR. The era of the Soviet-type government-directed politico-economic 
model in the name of socialism had ended by the demise of the Soviet regime under the 
political and economic directorship of the Communist Party. Figure? is explaining the 
operation of the Soviet-type government-directed socialist system of political economy. 
Notwithstanding the economic reform policies of ‘further perfection’ and later 
‘perestroika’, the regime’s reform efforts within the framework of the government- 
directed political economic model failed eventually. The grand Soviet experience of 
the direct government involvement in the whole political economy would provide us 
with important general lessons for long-term stability and dynamism in a political 
economy.
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Figure 7, Operation of Soviet Government-Directed Socialist System
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